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I 
 
Determinants and Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance 
Abstract: 
 
This thesis analyses and groups antitakeover provisions as they relate to CEO’s 
monetary benefits. It specifically focuses on the six provisions that were proposed by 
Bebchuk et Al. (2009) to conversely affect firm value. Although all provisions 
provide managers with a takeover protection, some provisions provide managers 
with a monetary outcome (Category A provisions) if a takeover was successful while 
others do not (Category B provisions). Findings indicate that CEOs with a role 
duality use their power to influence the adoption of takeover defences that provide 
them with a monetary outcome. Moreover, in the presence of CEO duality, the 
relationship between Category A provisions and firm value worsens. On the other 
hand, the relationship between Category B provisions and firm value is unaffected 
by the presence of CEO duality. This suggests that CEOs having a role duality do 
not feel the need to work in the shareholders’ best interest when entrenched with 
Category A provisions. 
The second model of this thesis explains the conflicting evidence found on agency 
theory in previous literature. This is achieved by introducing interaction variables 
between three of the main governance mechanisms used to mitigate agency 
problems: Shareholder rights, CEO ownership and board independence. Findings 
suggest that board independence and the market for corporate control act as 
substitutes. Board independence has a positive effect on firm value for firms with a 
weak governance structure. For firms having high levels of governance and 
shareholder rights, no extra monitoring by independent directors is needed. Such 
firms could benefit more from the firm-specific knowledge of insider directors.  
Results also show that both takeover defences and CEO ownership increase 
managerial power. Therefore, providing CEOs with antitakeover provisions and 
high levels of ownership increases the entrenching effect of CEO ownership on firm 
value. 
The overall findings of this thesis indicate that internal and external governance 
mechanisms interact in affecting firm performance. Suggestions of agency theory 
(increasing CEO ownership, increasing board independence and removing CEO duality) 
are valid for firms with low levels of external governance and shareholder rights. On the 
other hand, firms that are already enjoying a good level of governance benefit from 
providing managers with more power and leadership roles that are in line with the 
stewardship theory. 
 
II 
 
 
 
Determinants and Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance 
 
 
by 
Bilal Abdallah Al Dah 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
University of Durham 
Durham University Business School 
United Kingdom 
2015 
 
 
 
III 
 
Table of Contents 
Determinants and Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance .............................................................................................................................. I 
Abstract: .................................................................................................................................... I 
Determinants and Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance ............................................................................................................................. II 
Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................................. 5 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5 
1.1 Background and Overview................................................................................................. 6 
1.2 Research Motivation ...................................................................................................... 8 
1.3 Research Methodology and Expected Contribution .................................................... 10 
1.3.1 The Grouping Process ........................................................................................... 10 
1.4 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 15 
1.5 Thesis Structure ........................................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................ 20 
Evolution of Takeovers .......................................................................................................... 20 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 21 
2.2 Evolution of Takeovers and Governance in the United States: ................................... 21 
2.2.1 Takeover boom of the 1960s ................................................................................. 22 
2.2.2 The Williams Act of 1968 ..................................................................................... 24 
2.2.3 Pre-Takeover Boom of the 1980s ......................................................................... 24 
2.2.4 Takeover boom of the 1980s ................................................................................. 26 
2.3 Enron 2001 ................................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1 Consequences of Enron ......................................................................................... 30 
2.3.2 Sarbanes Oxley Act ............................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................................ 35 
Literature Review ................................................................................................................... 35 
3.2 Determinants of Antitakeover Provisions: ....................................................................... 36 
3.2.1 Determinants of Individual Antitakeover Provisions ................................................ 38 
3.2.1.1 Golden Parachutes.............................................................................................. 38 
3.2.1.2 Poison Pills ......................................................................................................... 44 
3.2.1.3 Staggered Boards ............................................................................................... 52 
3.2.1.4 Supermajority Requirement for Mergers ........................................................... 53 
3.2.1.5 Limitations on Bylaws and Charter Amendments ............................................. 54 
3.2.2 Determinants of previously used indices .................................................................. 55 
IV 
 
3.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 59 
3.4 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth: Interest Alignment Hypothesis 
Revisited ................................................................................................................................ 60 
3.4.1 Ownership Structure and Compensation ................................................................... 60 
3.4.2 CEO and managerial ownership ............................................................................... 62 
3.4.3 Entrenchment ............................................................................................................ 68 
3.4.4 Board Independence .................................................................................................. 81 
3.4.5 CEO Duality.............................................................................................................. 86 
3.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 93 
Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................................ 95 
Theory Chapter ...................................................................................................................... 95 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 96 
4.2 Theories of Corporate Governance .................................................................................. 97 
4.2.1 Agency Theory .......................................................................................................... 97 
4.2.1.1 Agency Conflicts: .............................................................................................. 99 
4.2.1.2 Agency Costs: .................................................................................................... 99 
4.2.1.3 Mitigating Agency Problems: .......................................................................... 101 
4.2.2 Stewardship Theory: ............................................................................................... 106 
4.2.3 Stakeholder Theory: ................................................................................................ 110 
4.2.3.1 Critics of the Stakeholder Theory .................................................................... 114 
4.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory: ........................................................................... 115 
4.2.5 Multi-theoretical Approaches: ................................................................................ 118 
4.3 Framework for this study ............................................................................................... 121 
4.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 122 
Chapter 5 .............................................................................................................................. 124 
Research Methodology ........................................................................................................ 124 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 125 
5.2 Model One: Determinants of Antitakeover Provisions .................................................. 126 
5.2.1 Dependent Variable ................................................................................................ 126 
5.2.1.1 Entrenchment ................................................................................................... 126 
5.2.1.2 The Grouping Process ...................................................................................... 128 
5.2.2 Independent Variables ............................................................................................ 129 
5.2.3 Board Characteristics .......................................................................................... 130 
5.2.3Control Variables ................................................................................................. 135 
V 
 
5.3 Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Duality .................................................................... 145 
5.4 Model Two: Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth ....................................... 147 
5.4.1 Dependent Variable ................................................................................................ 147 
5.4.1.1 Firm Value ....................................................................................................... 147 
5.4.2 Independent Variables ............................................................................................ 148 
5.4.2.1 Entrenchment ................................................................................................... 148 
5.4.2.2 Antitakeover Provisions and Board Independence .......................................... 151 
5.4.2.3 Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Ownership ................................................. 154 
5.4.3 Control Variables .................................................................................................... 156 
5.4.3.1 Long-term Investments .................................................................................... 157 
5.4.3.2 Advertising Expenditure .................................................................................. 157 
5.4.3.3 Firm Size: ......................................................................................................... 158 
5.4.3.4 Leverage ........................................................................................................... 158 
5.4.3.5 Profitability ...................................................................................................... 159 
5.4.3.6 Firm Age .......................................................................................................... 159 
5.4.3.7 Capital Expenditures ........................................................................................ 160 
5.4.3.8 Board Size ........................................................................................................ 160 
5.4.3.9 Board Leadership ............................................................................................. 160 
5.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 163 
Chapter 6 .............................................................................................................................. 164 
Determinants of Antitakeover Provisions ............................................................................ 164 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 165 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................................... 166 
6.3 Hypothesis Testing ......................................................................................................... 177 
6.3.1 Studying the determinants of the E-index ............................................................... 177 
6.3.2 Studying the determinants of individual provisions................................................ 178 
6.3.3 The Case of Golden Parachutes .............................................................................. 183 
6.3.4 Further Implications on Firm Value ........................................................................ 185 
6.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 189 
Chapter 7 .............................................................................................................................. 191 
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth: Interest Alignment Hypothesis Revisited
 ............................................................................................................................................. 191 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 192 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................................... 194 
VI 
 
7.3 Hypothesis Testing ......................................................................................................... 203 
7.3.1 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance ................................................... 203 
7.3.2Antitakeover Provisions and Board Independence .................................................. 205 
7.3.3 Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Ownership ........................................................ 209 
7.3.4 Additional Robustness Analysis ............................................................................. 211 
7.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 217 
Chapter 8 .............................................................................................................................. 219 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 219 
8.2 Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................. 221 
8.3 Results and Findings ...................................................................................................... 222 
8.4 Implications and Suggestions......................................................................................... 225 
8.5 Limitations and Future Research ................................................................................... 226 
8.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 227 
References ............................................................................................................................ 229 
Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 238 
 
1 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics                167 
Table 2 Spearman’s Correlation Matrix              169 
Table 3 Variance Inflation Factor               171 
Table 4 Hausman Test                 172 
Table 5 Fixed Effect Regression (E-index determinants)            178 
Table 6 Probit Regressions (Category A determinants)            180 
Table 7 Probit Regressions (Category B determinants)            182 
Table 8 Fixed Effect Regressions (Antitakeover * Duality)                        187 
Table 9 Variance Inflation Factor               202 
Table 10 Hausman Test                 203 
Table 11 Fixed Effect Regressions (Firm Value)             204 
Table 12 Fixed Effect Regressions (Antitakeover * Independence)           206 
Table 13 Fixed Effect Regressions (Antitakeover * Ownership)           210 
Table 14 Correlation between E-index and performance            213 
Table 15 Lagged Fixed Effect Regressions (Antitakeover * Independence) 214  
Table 16 Lagged Fixed Effect Regressions (Antitakeover * Ownership)    216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Percentage of Category A provisions by CEO Duality            173 
Figure 2 Percentage of Category B provisions by CEO Duality            173 
Figure 3 Category A provisions-Firm Value Relationship (CEO Duality)           174 
Figure 4 Category B provisions-Firm Value Relationship (CEO Duality)           175 
Figure 5 Duality-Performance Relationship (By Category A)            176 
Figure 6 Duality-Performance Relationship (By Category B)            177 
Figure 7 Independence-Performance Relationship (By E-index)           195 
Figure 8 Independence-Performance Relationship (By Category A)           196 
Figure 9 Independence-Performance Relationship (By Category B)           197 
Figure 10 Ownership-Performance Relationship (By E-index)            198 
Figure 11 Ownership -Performance Relationship (By Category A)           199 
Figure 12 Ownership -Performance Relationship (By Category B)           200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Declaration 
I, the author of this thesis, declare that this thesis is the result of my own hard work. 
Up to my own knowledge, the content of this paper has not been formerly published 
nor submitted to any other institution. The copyright of this thesis shall remain with 
the author, hence acknowledgment related to any information derived from it should 
be noted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Acknowledgments 
All praise be to God, the most Merciful and Gracious, for giving me the strength to 
complete this thesis. 
My deepest gratitude goes to my supervisors for their continuous help and support 
throughout the past years. I am grateful to Dr. Amir Michael for his continuous 
support, encouragement and guidance. Thank you for always being available to 
provide the support that I needed. I also owe my deepest appreciation to Professor 
Rob Dixon for his highly constructive comments.  
I would also like to thank all of my Ph.D friends for the lovely times we spent 
together. Your presence made this tough road much more enjoyable. 
Thank you to my family for their support ever since I decided to take on this long 
journey. Your support, prayers and blessings played an essential role in the 
completion of this challenge. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife for her utmost support from the 
beginning of this journey. Thank you for your patience and care throughout the bad 
and good times of this tough journey. We have completed this tough challenge and a 
long road awaits us. 
God bless you all, 
Bilal 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
1.1 Background and Overview 
Ever since the famous book by Berle and Means in 1932 “The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property”, researchers have strived to find the optimal combination of 
mechanisms for governing firms. However, conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders occur due to opportunistic behavior by some managers. Therefore, 
several internal and external governance mechanisms have been suggested by 
researchers to reduce this conflict of interest and, thus, enhance firm performance.  
This research revisits the interest alignment hypothesis between managers and 
shareholders. Agency theory proposes several governance mechanisms that could be 
used in order to mitigate agency problems among firms. Increasing board 
independence, having an independent leadership structure, increasing managerial 
ownership and the presence of an active market for corporate control have all been 
suggested separately as solutions to the conflicts of interest that can take place 
between managers and shareholders and thus increase firm value (Dalton et al., 
2007; Rhoades et al., 2001).  
The main focus of this study is the market for corporate control, which is one of the 
main mechanisms used in corporate governance to discipline managers (Bebchuk et 
al., 2009; Dalton et al., 2007). An underperforming firm would become undervalued 
in the market and therefore would become an interesting takeover target for bidding 
firms. In most cases, after a takeover successfully takes place, the bidding firm 
brings a management team of its own to replace the management team of the target 
firm. Knowing so, managers of these firms tend to adopt antitakeover provisions to 
lower the probability of a takeover threat taking place even if their firm is under-
performing (Bebchuk et al., 2009) .  
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Following the takeover boom of the 1980s in the US, managers started creating new 
mechanisms to oppose the takeover threats they are facing to protect their position in 
the company. Therefore, several antitakeover provisions were created and became 
widely spread among US firms during the 1990s. There is a wide dispute among 
researchers as to the main motive behind adopting takeover defences. One group of 
researchers propose the interest alignment hypothesis where managers adopt 
takeover defences in order to increase their bargaining power in case of a takeover, 
which is in the shareholders’ best interest. Other researchers suggest the 
entrenchment hypothesis where managers influence the adoption of takeover 
defences in an attempt to block any takeover attempt even if it has a positive effect 
for shareholders. 
Antitakeover provisions can take a variety of forms (Gompers et al., 2003). Some of 
these provisions make a takeover more costly for the bidder while other provisions 
increase the legal requirements (such as voting percentage to approve a merger) for a 
takeover to take place. Another type of takeover defences can delay a takeover 
making it less interesting for bidders to launch a takeover attempt against firms 
having such provisions. Gompers et al. (2003) highlights the importance of studying 
antitakeover provisions because they can act as an indicator for either managerial 
power or shareholder rights. Being able to adopt various takeover defences is an 
indicator of high managerial power and low shareholder rights since the managers 
take away the right of the shareholder of having a takeover take place. Accordingly, 
following Gompers et al. (2003), various researchers have been using indices of 
takeover defences as a proxy for shareholder rights and soundness of a firm’s 
governance structure (Harford et al., 2008; Kaplan and Minton, 2006; Masulis et al., 
2007). 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
Different researchers study different types of antitakeover provisions throughout the 
literature. Whether the study is addressing the determinants of antitakeover 
provisions or their effect on firm performance, randomly selected takeover 
provisions dominate most of the previous studies. Researchers have used single 
provisions such as poison pills (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Davis, 1991), golden 
parachutes (Cochran et al., 1985; Singh and Harianto, 1989) or other randomly 
selected indices of provisions (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). More recently, 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) create the E-index out of six provisions that were found to be 
the only provisions with a significantly negative effect on firm performance. 
However, up to my knowledge, none of these studies takes into consideration why 
do managers support or oppose the adoption of certain takeover defences. In other 
words, it is expected that there is a behavioral differences by CEOs and directors 
towards the adoption of different types of antitakeover provisions. For example, 
opportunistic CEOs might be supportive to the adoption of antitakeover provisions 
that provide them with more room to gain private benefits. On the other hand, 
independent directors are said to be more concerned with monitoring opportunistic 
behaviors by managers. Therefore, independent directors are expected to oppose 
takeover defences that provide CEOs with private benefits. This new way of 
classifying antitakeover provisions based on whether they provide CEOs with 
private benefits or not inspires more research to be done on the determinants of 
takeover defences. 
In addition to the determinants of takeover defences, this study also addresses the 
effect of takeover defences on firm value in different ways. It addresses the direct 
relationship between adopting takeover defences and firm value as well as the 
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indirect relationship of the effect of takeover defences on the relationship between 
other governance mechanisms and firm performance. Even though antitakeover 
provisions are thought to be entrenching for managers (Bebchuk et al., 2009) and 
take away the shareholders’ rights of having a takeover without incurring huge costs 
(Gompers et al., 2003), empirical evidences have not been conclusive. Some 
researchers argue that takeover defences are beneficial to shareholders because they 
result in a higher bid premium (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Harris, 1990; Stein, 
1988). On the other hand, more recent researches supports the entrenchment 
hypothesis by finding that antitakeover provisions are used to entrench managers in 
their positions at the company (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Sundaramurthy, 1998). These researchers find that the presence of antitakeover 
provisions lowers the probability of a takeover taking place while also lowering the 
value of the respective firm.  
Furthermore, empirical evidences have also been inconsistent for the other 
governance mechanisms included in this study (CEO Duality, CEO ownership and 
board independence). Agency theory predicts that increasing board independence 
and increasing CEO ownership both enhance a manager’s motivation to work in 
maximizing shareholder value. However, results in the literature have been highly 
inconsistent. Although some researchers find results consistent with the assumptions 
of the agency theory (Cotter et al., 1997), others find the opposite (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Brick et al., 2006; Ryngaert, 1988). In addition, a large number of 
researchers also find that the aforementioned governance mechanisms do not have a 
significant effect on firm performance (Abdullah, 2004; Baliga et al., 1996; Bhagat 
and Black, 2000; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). All of these contradicting results 
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encourage more research to be done in this field in an attempt to find more definitive 
results and to explain the reasons behind the contradictory results in previous studies.  
1.3 Research Methodology and Expected Contribution 
In order to test the validity of the above arguments, this research starts by studying 
the determinants of an index of antitakeover provisions. Studying the determinants 
of antitakeover provisions gives more insights on the motives behind adopting these 
provisions.  The index that will be used in this study is the E-Index, which consists 
of six antitakeover provisions that previous researchers, such as Bebchuk et al. 
(2009), found to be negatively correlated with firm value.  
In addition to studying the determinants of the E-Index, this research provides a new 
way to study and group antitakeover provisions. The majority of previous studies 
show that all of these antitakeover provisions have an entrenching effect for 
managers and negatively affect firm value. Many of these studies observe the 
determinants of single antitakeover provisions or randomly selected indices of 
provisions (Davis, 1991; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Harris, 1990; Singh and 
Harianto, 1989;).  However, very little has been said about the managerial 
preferences when choosing which antitakeover provision to adopt and why managers 
could support the adoption of a certain provision over another. It is expected that 
managerial preferences could differ between one provision and another. Therefore, 
this study groups antitakeover provisions in a new way that, up to my own 
knowledge, has never been used in previous literature.  
1.3.1 The Grouping Process 
Danielson and Karpoff (1998) argue that managers as well as directors prefer 
specific antitakeover provisions or another. Becker-Blease (2011) suggests that, in 
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many cases, managers and directors play an active role in the process of voting for 
these provisions and enacting them. In the same sense, this study hypothesizes that 
CEOs and independent directors each have preferences for certain provisions and 
each would try to adopt the provisions of their preference. 
According to the grouping process of this study, there are two characteristics of 
antitakeover provisions. The first characteristic, which is common for all 
antitakeover provisions is that they make a takeover process harder. However, the 
second characteristics of takeover defences, which is valid only for some provisions, 
is the monetary benefit received by a CEO if a takeover successfully takes place. 
Opportunistic CEOs who are seeking private benefits more than they are trying to 
maximize shareholder wealth will choose antitakeover provisions that also provide 
them with a monetary outcome even if these provisions lead to a worse effect on 
firm performance. The provisions of the E-Index will be grouped into two categories. 
The first category or provisions, Category A, are the provisions that are favourable to 
CEOs and that provide with CEOs with a monetary benefit along with takeover 
protection. The second category of provisions, Category B, includes the provisions 
that only provide CEOs with a takeover defence without providing them with any 
monetary outcome if a takeover takes place. In addition to directly affecting firm 
performance, such provisions might worsen a firm’s governance structure and the 
relationship between other governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
Thus, this study contributes to the previous literature on antitakeover provisions and 
other governance mechanisms in several ways. First, the research studies the 
determinants of the E-index as well as the determinants of the individual provisions. 
The E-index is then split into Categories A and B to study if there are any difference 
in the determinants of these two indexes. By studying the determinants of individual 
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provisions, results will confirm the validity of the grouping process used in this 
study. In other words, results will show if powerful CEOs support the adoption of 
the three provisions of Category A more than they support the other three provisions 
of Category B. The research gives particular attention to CEO duality as a significant 
determinant of the aforementioned categories of provisions to check if CEOs act in 
an opportunistic way and try to influence provisions that provide them with personal 
benefits. Empirical tests support the hypotheses of this model, indicating that CEOs 
with a role duality support the adoption of all Category A provisions and oppose the 
adoption of all Category B provisions. 
Second, this study tests the effect of both categories A and B on firm value in the 
presence and absence of CEO Duality. This will check if CEOs, who also act as 
chairmen of the board, feel safer in the presence of Category A provisions and lose 
the motivation to work in the shareholders’ best interest. Moreover, such an 
interaction variable will also indicate the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance in the absence of takeover defences. In such a case, a firm is enjoying a 
high level of shareholder rights. Such firms could benefit from the leadership of a 
CEO with a role duality knowing that there is a high level of governance and no 
room for opportunistic behavior. Results designate that the type of antitakeover 
provisions adopted by a firm moderate the duality-performance relationship. In the 
presence (absence) of Category A provisions, CEO duality has a negative (positive) 
effect on firm performance. On the other hand, the presence/absence of Category B 
provisions does not significantly affect the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance. This shows that the combination of Category A provisions and 
CEO duality gives CEOs too much power leading to the worst effect on firm 
performance. 
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In addition, another important variable when studying the determinants of takeover 
defences is the percentage of independent directors. If, as hypothesized, Category A 
provisions prove to be the worse type of provisions, then it is expected that 
independent directors show greater opposition against Category A provisions than 
against Category B provisions. Empirical evidence from this model provides partial 
support to this hypothesis. In contrast to CEO preferences, independent directors 
seem to favour the adoption of most Category B provisions and oppose the adoption 
of the other Category A provisions. 
Third, in an attempt to explain the previous contradicting results with the 
propositions of agency theory, interaction variables will be introduced between the 
different antitakeover provision indices used and the other governance mechanisms. 
Cremers and Nair (2005) highlight the importance of the interaction between internal 
and external governance mechanisms. However, very few researchers study the 
interaction among these mechanisms and how does their interaction affect firm 
value. Therefore, this study provides a better insight about the cases where the 
assumptions of the agency theory are valid and the others where they are not. 
As the core variable of this study is the entrenchment effect caused by the presence 
of antitakeover provisions, this research gives special attention to the effect of 
antitakeover protection on the relationship between each of the other two 
mechanisms (ownership structure and board composition) and firm value. Each 
mechanism is studied on its own, as well as two interaction variables (one between 
antitakeover provisions and ownership and the other between antitakeover provisions 
and board composition) and their effect on shareholders’ wealth. First, the E-Index 
will be used as a proxy for the level of antitakeover provisions and shareholder rights 
available at the respective company. The E-Index will then be split into Category A 
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and Category B provisions and interaction variables between both categories of 
provisions and the other governance mechanisms will be introduced. Following the 
previous hypothesis that Category A provisions lead to a more entrenching effect for 
managers, it is expected that the interaction of Category A provisions with the other 
governance mechanisms also leads to a worse firm performance. As it is the case 
with CEO duality, findings indicate that the level of antitakeover provisions, as a 
proxy for external governance and shareholder rights, moderate the independence-
performance and ownership-performance relationships. Figure I below summarizes 
the finding of the second model of this research. As the number of antitakeover 
provisions increase, managers have more protection from the takeover market and 
cannot be disciplined by it. In such a case, CEOs will have more room to extract 
private benefits and, therefore, more monitoring of managers is needed. Thus, in the 
presence of a high (low) number of takeover defences, increasing the percentage of 
independent directors has a positive (negative) effect on firm performance. Similarly, 
when the number of antitakeover provisions adopted is high, a significant increase in 
CEO ownership provides CEOs with excessive power that could prove detrimental 
to firm performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Figure I 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
By creating a new way to group antitakeover provisions, and by introducing the 
aforementioned interaction variables, this research will address the following 
questions:  
 Do powerful CEOs (CEOs with a role duality) act in an opportunistic manner 
and influence the adoption of Category A provisions that provide them with 
more benefits than Category B provisions? 
 Do independent directors oppose the adoption of Category A provisions more 
than they do for the adoption of Category B provisions? 
 In the presence of CEO duality, will the adoption of Category A provisions 
lead to a worse effect on firm value than the adoption of Category B 
provisions? 
 In the absence of takeover defences, indicating a sound governance structure, 
will CEO duality have a positive effect on firm performance? 
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 Will the presence of antitakeover provisions trigger an alarm for independent 
directors that a more strict monitoring process should be implemented?  
 Will the absence of antitakeover provisions, reduce the negative 
entrenchment effect of high levels CEO ownership on firm value? 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of two models comprising seven chapters. The first chapter 
serves as an introduction for the two models in this research highlighting the 
importance of the contribution in this study. The introduction also defines the 
motivation for conducting this study as well as the research questions that this 
research strives to answer. This chapter concludes by showing a brief summary of 
the findings of this study as well as outlining the structure of the whole thesis. 
The second chapter talks about the evolution of antitakeover provisions in the United 
States and how they spread rapidly during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is 
essential to know the history of antitakeover provisions in order to know how and 
why do managers adopt these provisions. This section is also important to justify the 
use of data from the United States industries due to the takeover boom that took 
place in the 1980s and the rapid spread of takeover defences directly after it. 
The third chapter is the literature review and it is divided into two major parts. The 
first part of this chapter attempts to make a comprehensive summary of previous 
researchers who studied the determinants of antitakeover provisions. The second part 
of this chapter comprises a literature review for studies addressing the relationship 
between the governance mechanisms used in this study (board independence and 
CEO ownership) and firm performance. 
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The fourth chapter sets a theoretical framework for both models to rely on. It shows 
the theories that are most commonly employed in corporate governance studies such 
as agency, stewardship and stakeholder theories. A detailed explanation is given for 
the uses of each theory separately along with a small conclusion highlighting the 
relevance/irrelevance of each theory to this study. A theoretical framework is 
essential to understand how certain variables are correlated and the reasons behind 
such a correlation 
The fifth chapter develops the methodological approach to tackle the research 
questions of both models. Thus, this chapter is divided into two sections; the first 
section discusses the methodological framework of the first model (determinants of 
antitakeover provisions) while the second section indicates the methodological 
framework of the second model (relationship between governance mechanisms and 
firm performance). In each section of this chapter, the dependent, independent and 
control variables are defined along with their measures. Following each independent 
variable, an empirical argument is put forward for the relationship between the 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable followed by the relative hypothesis. 
This chapter also includes a detailed discussion of the data source, sample data and 
the new grouping process of antitakeover provisions that is proposed in this study. 
The sixth chapter is the first empirical analysis chapter in this study. This chapter 
discusses the results for the determinants of antitakeover provisions as well their 
interaction with CEO duality in affecting firm performance. The chapter starts with 
descriptive statistics and figures that would allow researchers to visualize the 
relationships between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The 
descriptive statistics are followed by regressions in order to test the research 
hypothesis. Regressions are made for the determinants of the E-index provisions as 
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well as the determinants of single provisions to check if the results for the single 
provisions support the grouping process developed in this study. In additions, 
interaction variables are introduced between the different indices of takeover 
defences and CEO duality to check how powerful CEOs act in the presence/absence 
of each type of antitakeover provisions. 
The seventh chapter is the second empirical analysis chapter and it tests the research 
hypotheses of the second model of this study. Specifically, this chapter examines the 
relationship between governance mechanisms (such as board independence and CEO 
ownership) on the one hand and firm performance on the other. The importance of 
this chapter is that it re-examines several relationships found in previous literature in 
a new way. For example, previous literature provides lots of inconsistent results for 
the relationship between board independence and firm performance. This study 
proposes that antitakeover provisions, as a proxy for shareholder rights, moderate the 
independence-performance relationship and that the failure to control for such 
interactions was the main reason for the inconsistent results in previous literature. 
Consistent with the first empirical chapter, this chapter starts by displaying 
descriptive statistics and figures that would make it easier for researchers to 
understand the interaction between takeover defences and other governance 
mechanisms. Following the descriptive statistics, regression analysis is implemented 
to test each of the relative research hypotheses. Additional robustness tests are also 
employed to provide additional support for the results of this chapter. 
Chapter eight is the last chapter of this thesis and it provides a summary of the whole 
study.  It highlights the importance of this study and its contribution as well as a 
brief discussion of the results of both models. Moreover, this chapter stresses on the 
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importance of this study for future researchers and practitioners. Potential limitations 
as well as future research ideas are also included at the end of the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
Evolution of Takeovers 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical background on the evolution of antitakeover 
provisions in the United States. Studying the history of antitakeover provisions and 
their evolution provides possible explanations of the reasons why some managers are 
still adopting takeover defences in the modern world. Thus, it is essential to check 
the real motives behind the creation of antitakeover provisions. 
This chapter also highlights the importance of using the US market as the sample 
data in the study since the takeover booms and the subsequent creation of 
antitakeover provisions took place in the US in the 1980s. Following the takeover 
boom of the 1980s, managers started creating new ways to protect their firms from 
being taken over since most takeovers result in a management change (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1991).  
Finally, this chapter illuminates the significance of the timeframe of the sample data 
in this study. Following the takeover boom of the 1980s, antitakeover provisions 
were created and started spreading in the US market in the early 1990s (Danielson 
and Karpoff, 1998) 
2.2 Evolution of Takeovers and Governance in the United States: 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) report that the U.S. market has experienced two major 
takeover trends recently. The first takeover wave took place in the 1960s while the 
second one took place in the 1980s. 
Prior to the takeover boom of the 1960s, most of the mergers were friendly ones 
where managers of both firms reach a mutual agreement on the terms of the takeover 
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(Weston et al., 2003). Thus, managers did not feel any need to adopt takeover 
defences that would protect them from unwanted takeover attempts. 
2.2.1 Takeover boom of the 1960s 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) state that firms with large cash flows preferred to use 
their money for investments, such as mergers and acquisitions, rather than having to 
pay them as dividends in order to maintain the company’s wealth. 
They claim that the takeovers of the 1960s were mainly conglomerate mergers made 
for diversification purposes. Most of the takeovers were characterized by a large firm 
acquiring a smaller firm from a different industry. This is consistent with Rumelt 
(1974) who finds that from 1959 until 1969, the percentage of firms that were 
associated with a single industry dropped from 22.8 percent to 14.8 percent 
respectively. Meanwhile, the percentage of conglomerate businesses increased from 
7.3 percent to 18.7 percent during the same time frame.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) provide several reasons of why this takeover wave was 
mainly associated with conglomerate mergers. One significant reason could be the 
antitrust enforcement which prohibited mergers of companies of the same business 
line during the 1960s and 1970s. Consistent with the scientific management theories, 
another explanation might be due to the perception that small companies do not have 
a wide knowledge in management. Therefore, large companies believe that by 
providing their managerial skills to small firms, they would be able to increase the 
value of the small firms and their own wealth respectively. Other reasons of the 
boom in conglomerate mergers implemented by managers might be to decrease their 
risk, decrease the cash flow cycle or aiding managers to protect their jobs by 
entrenching them in the company.  
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Matsusaka (1993) studies the reasons why firms were heavily engaged with 
conglomerate mergers in the 1960s. In contrast with the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis, the author provides evidence that the conglomerate mergers had a 
significant and positive impact on the bidding company’s stock price. On average, a 
conglomerate acquisition increased the value of the bidding firm by $11 million. 
Matsusaka (1993) explains that shareholders, at that time, saw opportunities for 
expansion and creating more value in conglomerate acquisitions than in the within 
industry acquisitions. 
In addition, Matsusaka (1993) finds out that the conglomerate mergers where the 
management of the target firm remained in business received the highest amounts of 
return. This shows that managers of the bidding firm were not after disciplining the 
management team of the acquired company; the reason behind the mergers was to 
benefit from the combined value of both firms (consistent with the synergy 
hypothesis). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) also suggest that some firms were engaging in 
conglomerate mergers because there was no room for additional growth within their 
own industry. Therefore, companies were seeking to expand into different industries 
in which they could achieve more growth. Matsusaka (1993) provides evidence 
supporting this argument by showing that the stock price of the acquiring firm 
increased as the growth potential of the target firm increased. Therefore, 
shareholders were in favour of having their managers engage in conglomerate 
managers where there the target company is growing or in a growing industry. 
Surprisingly, the value of the target companies did not improve after the takeovers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) and almost half of the 
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conglomerate takeovers that occurred during this period were divested later on 
(Porter, 1987). 
2.2.2 The Williams Act of 1968 
The takeover boom of the 1960s stimulated several adjustments to previous acts 
concerning firm regulations (Straska and Waller, 2012). The Williams Act was 
enacted in 1968 as a modification to the previous Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Among the objectives of the Williams Act was ensuring that managers and 
stockholders should receive early information about takeover attempts (Straska and 
Waller, 2012). This would allow the management team to better assess the takeover 
attempt. In additions, The Williams Act provides managers with the right to sue the 
bidding company in case the procedures of the takeover were unfair to the target 
firm. 
2.2.3 Pre-Takeover Boom of the 1980s 
Previous researches suggest that prior to the takeover boom that took place in the 
1980s, the interests of managers and shareholders were not well aligned (Donaldson 
and Lorsch, 1983; Jensen, 1988). Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) believe that the 
governance structures, at that period, did not stimulate the managers to work in the 
shareholders’ best interest. They state that external disciplinary mechanisms, such as 
the market for corporate control or proxy contests, were limited and ineffective while 
the internal mechanisms, such as the board of directors, were tolerant with their 
monitoring. 
Jackson (2010) shows the composition of the board of directors from 1950 till 2005. 
From 1950 till 1975, boards had a majority of insider directors. It was unusual for 
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insiders to reject or make major changes to decisions taken by the CEO. The main 
function of insiders was to provide advice to the CEOs (Mace, 1971). On the other 
hand, there was a relatively low level of board independence where the percentage of 
independent directors was at a maximum of 30 percent throughout the period. 
Jackson (2010) argues that even these outside directors did not have the monitoring 
role that is associated with outsiders nowadays. 
The 1970s, however, began witnessing some governance restructuring and legal 
requirements being imposed on US firms. Gordon (2006) reports that in 1974, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) started to require from US companies 
to disclose whether or not an audit committee is present. Four years later, in 1978 the 
SEC issued guidelines to specify the job of the audit committee. Gordon (2006) also 
reports that in 1977 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required the presence of 
an audit committee with independent directors as part of its listing requirements. 
After 2 years, almost all of the firms enlisted in the NYSE had audit committees with 
a majority of independent directors. Following the NYSE, the Amex and the 
NASDAQ also required the presence of an audit committee during the late 1980s. 
During this period, Jackson (2010) reports that there were no guidelines for 
assigning executive compensation. Executives’ pay was mainly comprised of the 
fixed annual salary payment and the bonuses that an executive receives for the firm’s 
performance throughout the year. However, Jensen et al. (2004) argue that the 
salaries at that period were unaffected by the company’s current performance or its 
long term expected performance. They were rather dependent on the magnitude of 
the firm’s revenues. 
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Hall and Liebman (1998) suggest that the motivation to work in the shareholder’s 
interest, provided to the managers in the form of stock ownership and stock options, 
was also weak in the early 1980s. Hall and Liebman (1998) study the pay 
performance sensitivity of CEOs from 1980 to 1994 and find that only 20 percent of 
a CEO’s compensation package was tied to the performance of the company’s 
respective stock. 
2.2.4 Takeover boom of the 1980s 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) state that this negligence of working in the 
shareholders’ interests led to a significant increase in the amount of hostile takeovers 
and governance restructuring in the 1980s. This takeover threatened the supremacy 
of managers of US corporations (Jackson, 2010).  
Davis (1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (1991) report that the takeover boom of the 
1980s had several different characteristics than that of the 1960s. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991) claim that takeovers were more hostile in the 1980s, while Davis 
(1991) states that the size of the acquired firms in general was significantly larger. 
Davis and Greve (1997) add that the removal of the state corporate laws in 1982 that 
protected companies form having a hostile takeover threat also played an important 
role in increasing the number of hostile takeovers in the 1980s. Consistent with 
Davis and Greve (1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1991) also report that takeovers 
within the same industry emerged in the 1980. They believe that the increase in the 
number of within-industry takeovers was due to the antitrust policies in 1982 that 
lowered the previously set governing barriers for merging companies in the same 
line of business. Therefore, companies seeking mergers had options other than 
diversifying into other industries. 
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The 1980s also saw the emergence of new types of takeovers that were not used 
frequently before. Many companies started engaging in bust-up takeovers or 
leveraged buyouts. Both strategies include buying the target company through debt 
financing and then selling part of the target’s assets to other firms within the same 
industry in order to partially cover their leveraged position (Bhagat et al. 1990). 
Davis et al. (1994) and Davis and Greve (1997) state that, if each part of a 
conglomerate is sold to another firm within the same line of business, the separate 
values of the different parts/divisions would exceed the share value of the combined 
firm. Therefore it would be beneficial for firms to engage in taking over a 
conglomerate firm and selling its parts to other firms within the same industry (Davis 
et al. 1994). 
Morck et al. (1990) show that, unlike the 1960s, shareholders started favouring the 
acquisition of firms in the same industry. The stock prices of companies taking over 
other firms within the same line of business increased while stock prices of 
companies engaging in conglomerate takeovers declined.  
The previous corporate governance system was known for separating ownership 
from management and control (Berle and Means, 1932), where the shareholders are 
small, weak and dispersed, while the managers were powerful and not subject to a 
heavy monitoring process (Davis and Greve, 1997).   
Facing another takeover wave, managers and executives had to create governance 
mechanisms that would protect them from a takeover threat (Davis and Greve, 
1997). One of the solutions to a takeover threat was the golden parachute. A golden 
parachute is implemented by a company’s board of directors and would provide the 
firm’s CEO, and sometimes other directors, with a considerable amount of 
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compensation in case they lose their job after a successful takeover (Davis and 
Greve, 1997). Hammermill Paper was the first company to adopt a golden parachute 
among the firms enlisted in the Fortune 500, however, Davis and Greve (1997) 
report that golden parachutes only became popular in the 1980s. 
Davis and Greve (1997) argue that another takeover defence mechanism that became 
popular in the 1980s is the poison pill (also known as the Shareholder Rights Plan). 
Unlike golden parachutes which are designed to provide managers with 
compensation in case a takeover takes place, poison pills are made to make a hostile 
takeover much more costly and therefore put pressure on the bidding firm to 
negotiate a deal with the management team instead of going for a hostile takeover. 
Following the takeover boom of the 1980s, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) report 
that the number of takeovers and the hostility of takeovers started to decrease in the 
1990s. Danielson and Karpoff (1998) report the rate of recurrence of 20 governance 
provisions among 513 US firms from 1984 till 1989. In 1984, the firms in the sample 
had an average of 2.07 provisions. Five years later, the average number of provisions 
increased to reach 5.93. This increase in the number of corporate governance 
provisions played a key role in the decrease in takeover activity that took place in the 
beginning of the 1990s (Coffee, 1991; Pound, 1992) 
Jackson and Miyajima (2007) provide evidence supporting the aforementioned 
claims. The authors show that the average number of hostile takeover attempts in the 
1980s in the United States was 52 attempts per year. This number decreased 
significantly in the following years, reaching an average of 32 attempts in the 1990s 
and then reaching a minimum of around 7 attempts in the 2000s period.  
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Managers responded to the increase in takeover threat in the 1980s by promoting 
state governments to legislate antitakeover regulations that hugely increased the 
expense of hostile takeovers (Useem, 1993). 
Jackson (2010) provides three possible explanations for the decrease in the number 
of hostile takeovers in the 1990s. Consistent with Useem (1993), Jackson (2010) 
suggests that antitakeover defences had a key role in decreasing the number of 
hostile takeovers. As stated before, Jackson (2010) argues that antitakeover 
provisions, such as staggered boards, poison pills and golden parachtes, made the 
transaction cost too high for some companies and thus demotivated them from 
engaging in a hostile takeover attempt. 
 Jackson and Miyajima (2007) also report that the adoption of a poison pill reduces 
the chance that a hostile takeover attempt will be a successful one roughly from 50% 
to 33%. These results indicate that a poison pill might decrease the probability of a 
takeover or provide /the management with a better bargaining power, but a pill does 
not remove the presence of a takeover threat on its own. 
Adams (2003) states that U.S. law courts permitted the usage of some antitakeover 
provisions, such as poison pills, by managers to reduce the likelihood of a takeover 
threat. The author states that these actions were taken by the U.S. courts although, 
from an economic perspective, they were against the stockholders’ interest. Norton 
(1991) believes that the wide authority given to the managers exceeded the level of 
suitable power that a manager should hold. Protecting managers from a takeover 
threat, while neglecting the shareholders’ interests, is against several state 
corporation laws which emphasize on maximizing the shareholders’ value (Adams, 
2003).  
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2.3 Enron 2001 
The following period was marked with an increase in shareholder activism, increase 
in the percentage of independent directors, and an increase of performance based 
compensations for managers to help align their interests with those of the 
shareholders (Jackson, 2010). Jackson (2010) also states that auditors were 
monitoring the information submitted by the board of directors and the corporate 
governance of the modern US economy seemed to be in good shape until 2001.  
In a well-developed governance system, like the US market, there must be a flow of 
information between shareholders and managers (Healy and Palepu, 2003). Incentive 
contracts should be available to motivate the managers to work in the shareholders’ 
best interest and governance bodies (such as auditor or the board of directors) should 
be available to monitor the managerial behaviour and performance. These governing 
bodies are also subject to regulation (from the SEC and other institutions) to prevent 
further agency problems. Yet, in the presence of all of these regulatory mechanisms, 
Enron’s case exploits several weaknesses of the capital market in the United States 
(Healy and Palepu, 2003; Gordon, 2002). Enron, thought to be one of the leading 
and highly innovative corporations in the United States, had to file for bankruptcy in 
2001 (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Jackson, 2010).  
2.3.1 Consequences of Enron 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) report that the Enron scandal, along with the other 
scandals that followed (Tyco, Worldcom) led to significant changes in corporate 
governance. Arthur Andersen, one of the big 5 audit firms back then, went out of 
business because they were auditing Enron and as a result lost all of their reputation. 
In 2002, the Sarbanes Oxley Act was legislated setting more guidelines on the 
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publicly traded firms in the US. In 2003, NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX all 
implemented more rules to govern companies that are listed on their respective 
markets. 
2.3.2 Sarbanes Oxley Act 
While the internal and external governance mechanisms discussed do help in 
lowering the agency costs and decrease fraudulent activities, recent scandals, such as 
Enron, WorldCom and other famous US companies, prove that these instruments 
might not be enough to guarantee a safe and sound corporate structure (Jain and 
Rezaee, 2006). As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was legislated by the U.S 
congress in 2002 to re-establish public assurance and prevent more scandals by 
making the executives such as CEOs and CFOs more responsible for the managerial 
decisions that they make. This is established by raising the legal responsibilities that 
they face and putting penalties on those who do not comply with the existing rules. 
Many studies attempt to find a relation between stock returns and the enacting of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act. Li et al. (2008) show that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relation between the returns on stock and the proceedings that resolved 
the doubt about the final provisions of the SOX. However, Choi et al. (2008) suggest 
that these studies fail to take into consideration the firms’ prior governance structure 
and the balance of power between managers and shareholders. The passage of the 
SOX might be beneficial to firms that had a low level shareholder rights and that 
would benefit from more monitoring. However, firms with a high level of 
shareholder rights and that were already enjoying an efficient governance structure 
might experience an adverse effect due to the costs associated for complying with 
the SOX and that might seem to the firm as “redundant monitoring”. 
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Choi et al. (2008) compare the market’s response to the SOX legislation between 
firms with low shareholder rights and those with high shareholder rights. The results 
show a positive and significant change in stock price for firms with low shareholder 
rights in the Post-SOX period. This is likely due to the fact that the SOX provides 
the shareholders with more protection, which is associated with a higher stock return. 
On the other hand, there is no significant change in the stock price for firms with 
high levels shareholder rights. This indicates that these firms already had a decent 
level of shareholder rights and good governance structures, and therefore the SOX 
legislation did not provide substantial marginal protection for shareholders. Choi et 
al. (2008) also studied the risk sensitivity of the firms with low and high shareholder 
rights during the Pre and Post SOX periods. The results indicate that the firms with 
low shareholder rights are becoming less risk averse after the SOX was enacted, 
while recording no significant change in the risk taking decisions for firms with high 
shareholder protection. This is consistent with John et al. (2008) who demonstrate 
that when shareholder rights increase, a manager’s likeliness of dodging a risky 
project that might be value appreciating decreases. 
Choi et al. (2008) also find that, according to the G-Index, firms with high 
shareholder protection tried to lower their shareholder protection (rights) after SOX, 
indicating that some of these firms thought that the changes in monitoring required 
by the SOX is unnecessary. As a result, the overall monitoring level for these 
companies remained unchanged. On the other hand, no change in shareholder 
protection was noted in firms with low prior shareholder protection. 
However, Chang et al. (2012) doubt the effectiveness of SOX in increasing a firms’ 
corporate governance. Surprisingly, Chang et al. (2012) find that the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act weakens the alignment of incentives between CEOs and shareholders. Upon 
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increasing the CEO’s responsibilities, the CEO will feel that his position at the 
company is insecure and will therefore tend to become more risk averse in his 
investments and decision making. Bargeron et al. (2010) reach the same conclusion, 
stating that in the post-SOX period, companies tend to decreases their spending on 
risky projects resulting in an increase in cash holdings. 
In addition to the weaker incentive alignment, Chang et al. (2012) find that stock 
ownership also decreases in the post-SOX period due to several factors. First, 
consistent with Demsetz and Lehn, (1985) and Booth et al. (2002), governance 
legislations can offer subsidized monitoring of managerial performance. Thus, 
companies don’t have to depend on management ownership to increase the level of 
their respective governance. Chang et al. (2012) argue that another reason might be 
due to the fact that the managers feel that their decision making power has decreased 
due to the regulations. Therefore, managers lower their stock ownership since they 
cannot influence the success or failure of the firm the same way they used to do.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Ever since the takeover boom of the 1980s, antitakeover provisions have become 
widely spread throughout the US market. After a successful takeover, it is highly 
likely that the bidder firm changes the management of the target firm. Therefore, 
managers influenced the creation of different types of takeover defences to protect 
their positions at their firms by decreasing the possibility of a takeover taking place. 
These provisions became widely spread in the US market in the early 1990s. 
Knowing so, the sample data of this study starts in 1992 in an attempt to cover the 
determinants and effects of antitakeover provisions when they first became 
widespread in the US market. 
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Following this takeover boom and the wide adoption of takeover defences, the 
governance of US firms was stable until the collapse of Enron in 2001. Before its 
collapse, Enron was considered as one of the leading and promising companies in the 
US market. However, Enron’s sudden collapse due to its fraudulent activities 
brought the governance policies implemented at that time into question. 
Consequently, the Sarbanes Oxley Act was enacted in 2002 in an attempt to improve 
US corporate governance. The regulations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act tackled 
important governance mechanisms such as board independence. It was believed that 
requiring a majority of independent directors serving on a company’s board of 
directors will improve the overall governance of the market. However, empirical 
results for the effects of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on firm performance have been 
inconsistent. This second empirical model of this research revisits the independence 
section of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and attempts to explain the independence-
performance relationship by introducing the level of shareholder rights as a 
moderating variable. All of these mixed results highlight the necessity to have 
continuous governance studies and reforms that can stay up-to-date with the 
changing environment. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter surveys previous literature addressing the determinants of antitakeover 
provisions and their effect, along with other governance mechanisms, on firm 
performance. This chapter is divided into two main sections. 
The first section of this chapter provides a literature review for the determinants of 
takeover defences. Since the rapid spread of antitakeover provisions in the early 
1990s, researchers have been trying to identify the reasons behind adopting takeover 
defences. Therefore, this section provides a critical assessment of the studies 
addressing the determinants of antitakeover provisions. 
The second section of this chapter reviews the literature for the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Specifically, it covers studies 
addressing the relationship between CEO ownership, CEO duality, board 
independence, and antitakeover provisions on one hand and firm performance on the 
other hand. Although all of these governance mechanisms are hypothesized by 
agency theorists to reduce agency conflicts, empirical evidence is not consistent. 
Therefore, a critical analysis of the literature could highlight any flaws in previous 
studies and the reasons for the inconsistent results in previous literature. 
3.2 Determinants of Antitakeover Provisions: 
Becker-Blease (2011) reports that there are two types of antitakeover provisions: 
firm-specific provisions and state-level provisions. State-level provisions are adopted 
by the state and they cover all of the companies that are incorporated within the 
respective state. In most cases, firms are automatically offered the protection from 
these provisions without having to take any further action. Firms can, however, ask 
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the state to waive their protection from any state-level takeover defence. On the other 
hand, firm-specific provisions only provide the protection for the company that 
adopted them. Becker-Blease (2011) believes that adopting such provisions sends a 
signal that the firm is changing its response towards the takeover market and any 
possible acquirers. This study focuses on firm-specific provisions in order to 
determine why firms adopt certain provisions and what are the consequences of such 
decisions. 
Different studies have tried to identify the determinants of antitakeover provisions 
and their effect on firm performance. However, although some of these studies use 
the same methodologies and time frames, the evidence provided shows several 
contradicting results. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) argue that there are two opposing 
hypotheses that might explain the adoption of antitakeover amendments. The first 
one is the managerial entrenchment the hypothesis which was previously suggested 
by Cary (1969) and Williamson (1975). This theory believes that takeover defences 
are implemented by the managers who wish to protect their position at the expense 
of shareholders.  
In addition to the protection from takeover attempts, supporters of the entrenchment 
hypothesis also argue that antitakeover provisions help managers engage in empire 
building. Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2011) report a significant difference 
between takeovers that take place in the United States and takeovers that take place 
in Australia
1
. The authors report that managers of firms in the United States, with a 
high number of antitakeover provisions, engage in poor acquisitions for empire 
building purposes. On the other hand, Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2011) report 
                                                          
1
 Antitakeover provisions are common and widely used in the US market. On the other hand, 
adopting antitakeover provisions is prohibited in Australia. 
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significant positive returns to Australian acquiring firm. This is consistent with other 
recent researches that argue that antitakeover provisions drive bad acquisitions that 
are value destroying for the company (Bauguess and Stegemoller, 2008; Harford et 
al., 2010; Masulis et al., 2007). The authors conclude by claiming that the absence of 
takeover provisions lowers the probability of bad acquisitions and encourages value-
enhancing takeovers. 
The second hypothesis suggested by DeAngelo and Rice (1983) is concerned with 
the interests of the shareholders. The hypothesis suggests that the net effect of 
adopting antitakeover provisions is positive for shareholders. Grossman and Hart 
(1980) also claim that antitakeover provisions are a reply by shareholders to a free 
rider problem related to tender offers.  
3.2.1 Determinants of Individual Antitakeover Provisions 
3.2.1.1 Golden Parachutes 
Gompers et al. (2003) describe golden parachutes as compensations paid to 
managers and executives in case they are fired from their position or in case a 
takeover took place and resulted in a management change. Golden parachutes take 
away the right of shareholders to replace the management team without experiencing 
heavy costs.  Since golden parachutes do not necessitate the approval of 
shareholders, Gompers et al. (2003) argue that adopting these parachutes reduces 
shareholder rights. Other researchers describe such compensation as beneficial for 
shareholders (Lamberet and Larcker, 1985; Harris, 1990). Lamberet and Larcker 
(1985) provide evidence that the presence of golden parachutes enhance a manager’s 
response to the presence of a takeover attempt, which is usually in the shareholders’ 
best interest. 
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Therefore, the literature provides two arguments for the adoption of golden 
parachutes. On one hand, a golden parachute decreases the likelihood that an 
entrenched manager will try to block a takeover attempt that is in the shareholders’ 
interest. This finding is consistent with Walkling and Long (1984) who provide 
evidence that there is a direct relation between takeover resistance and the effect of 
the takeover on the management’s own wealth. Baron (1983) also reports an inverse 
relationship between the willingness of the management team of the target firm to 
maintain control and their relative percentage of stock ownership. The second 
argument suggests that a CEO may try to implement antitakeover provisions, 
including golden parachutes, in order to entrench himself in the company or to obtain 
a high compensation in cases he loses his job after a successful takeover takes place 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk  et al., 2009).  
Cochran et al. (1985) study how the board structure and other firm specific aspects 
affect the rate of adoption of golden parachutes. Some researchers claim that firms 
adopt golden parachutes in order to be able to attract high quality managers to come 
to their firm, or to promote a feeling of loyalty and security among current managers. 
Others argue that golden parachutes are a proof of the managers’ wealth maximizing 
behaviour regardless if the actions are in the shareholders’ best interest. Others 
believe that golden parachutes are just a legal way for theft (Business Week, 
1982:136). 
Contrary to expectations, Cochran et al. (1985) found that there is a significant and 
negative relationship between the passage of golden parachutes and the percentage 
of inside directors. Other findings show that golden parachutes adoption is inversely 
related to firm size. This is consistent with Comment and Schwert (1995) who find 
that as the size of a firm increases, the probability of having a takeover threat 
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decreases. Thus, managers of large firms and firms that are performing well will feel 
that their position in their company is secure and do not need golden parachutes to 
guarantee their position.  
Cochran et al. (1985) also report a negative relationship between the presence of 
golden parachutes and the firm’s financial performance. Malatesta and Walkling 
(1988) also report similar findings about the relation between a firm’s financial 
performance and another antitakeover measure (poison pills). Malatesta and 
Walkling (1988) find that, one year before poison pill adoption, the average profit of 
firms implementing poison pills is significantly less than that of the industry average. 
Heron and Lie (2005) report similar findings, suggesting that some firms adopt 
antitakeover provisions in response to poor performance by the company’s stock in 
the previous year, an event that would increase the possibility of a takeover event. 
 However, Cochran et al. (1985) report no significant relationship between adopting 
golden parachutes and measures for the percentage of stock owned by insiders and 
the firm’s leverage.  
Consistent with Cochran et al. (1985), Singh and Harianto (1989) report that firms 
with golden parachutes already in place have a larger percentage of outsiders on their 
board of directors than firms who do not have golden parachutes.  
Singh and Harianto (1989) also find out that firms are more likely to have a golden 
parachute when their boards have previously encountered a takeover attempt. The 
authors believe that it is due to the fact that board members will feel insecure when 
they experience previous takeover attempts and will therefore adopt golden 
parachutes.  
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In addition, Singh and Harianto (1989) show that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between the percentage of stock owned by the management team and the 
incidence of golden parachutes. This is consistent with the view that CEOs perceive 
golden parachutes as a substitute for stock ownership. When the CEOs own some 
stocks in the corporation, they will also be able to benefit from the premium obtained 
through the takeover process and might therefore accept having a takeover if it is in 
the shareholders’ interest. 
Harris (1990) suggests that several firms have both adopted antitakeover 
mechanisms and golden parachutes. The author studied the reasons behind 
shareholders accepting to have antitakeover provisions embraced by their firm and 
why do shareholders also grant their managers golden parachutes. Consistent with 
Lambert and Larcker (1985), Harris suggests that golden parachutes can help in 
solving the agency problem between managers and shareholders. If a takeover takes 
place, the shareholders would benefit from the premium paid by the bidding firm. 
However, managers are usually unwilling to have a takeover threat because most 
takeovers result in a change of management and the manager will ultimately lose his 
job.  Thus, a takeover threat will stimulate the manager to try and block the takeover 
even if it is in the shareholders’ interest. Therefore, by providing managers with a 
large payment (golden parachute), managers will have less reason to try and block a 
takeover and he might even be motivated to try and reach a successful takeover 
(Harris, 1990). In addition, Zhao (2013) talks about other benefits of golden 
parachutes and other severance packages. The author suggests that the presence of 
severance packages in a manager’s contract enhances the manager’s engagement in 
investments with a positive but risky net present value.  
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The author further explains why the shareholders would accept to have the 
provisions and the golden parachute in the first place as it might seem that 
shareholders are better off without both provisions. Harris (1990) suggests that a 
takeover threat will improve the bargaining power of the management when a 
takeover threat is imminent. The excess synergy gains that occur from the presence 
of antitakeover mechanisms might well exceed the costs of the golden parachute to 
be paid to the manager if the takeover successfully takes place. This is consistent 
with DeAngelo and Rice (1983) who suggest that the presence of an antitakeover 
provision will make the firms’ shareholders act in a unified way. This unification 
will result in a better bargaining position leading to more synergy gains than they 
would receive in the absence of antitakeover provisions. 
Even though a CEO does not have official authority over the board of directors, he 
can try to exercise some of his “social influence” to help influence the decision 
making process. Wade et al. (1990) study the rationale behind the implementation of 
golden parachutes. They hypothesize that the presence of golden parachutes might be 
due to the societal influence of the CEO or to an economically logical procedure.  
In harmony with their expectations, and consistent with the previous literature, Wade 
et al. (1990) provide evidence that there is a strong and negative relationship 
between the three main economic variables used in their model (Firm size, owner 
control and takeover susceptibility measured by EXCESS) and the incidence of 
golden parachutes. Jensen, 1988  suggests that larger firms are more difficult to 
acquire than smaller firms due to the high cost needed to acquire them and due to 
their complex structure that will make the firm’s assets harder to integrate for the 
bidder. 
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In addition, Singh and Harianto (1989) argue that there is a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and the presence of golden parachutes because it is 
hard for smaller shareholders to coordinate together in monitoring the management. 
Small shareholders have a small amount of capital at stake compared to institutional 
investors and large blockholders. Accordingly, it will be too costly for small 
shareholders to coordinate their efforts in monitoring management. Therefore, it is 
expected that CEOs of management-controlled firms will find it easier to adopt 
golden parachutes than CEOs of owner-controlled firms. 
Consistent with Cochran et al. (1985), Wade et al. (1990) use an EXCESS ratio to 
calculate the takeover susceptibility. EXCESS is measured by calculating the 
difference between the market value and the book value of a firm’s assets. Both 
researchers find that the higher the susceptibility of a takeover (lower EXCESS 
value), the higher is the likelihood of adopting a golden parachute. Wade et al. 
suggest that this is due to the fact that a CEO under a threat of a takeover will try to 
provide himself with a compensation if the takeover was successful and he lost his 
position. 
Results also show that CEO tenure is negatively correlated with the presence of 
golden parachutes. Wade et al. (1990) believe that his is due to the fact that golden 
parachutes, at the time, was still a modern  invention and therefore will be used more 
by new CEOs who use their bargaining leverage upon their appointment. 
Moving on to the social influence of CEOs, Wade et al. (1990) find that the higher 
the number of boards the CEO is on, the higher is the probability of adopting a 
golden parachute. This indicates that CEOs who are have a good reputation and are 
aware of golden parachutes are more likely to influence its adoption at their firm. 
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CEOs with a higher average tenure than that of board members are also more likely 
to have a golden parachute. CEOs with a high relative tenure are expected to have 
played a role in assigning several other directors on the board who may feel loyal to 
the CEO and influence a decision to grant him a golden parachute. 
3.2.1.2 Poison Pills 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) explain that poison pills are usually activated when a hostile 
takeover takes place. They describe the poison pill as a right that allows its holders to 
reduce the voting power of acquiring firm. When a poison pill is triggered, the 
stockholders of the acquired firm, different from the bidder, have the right to buy 
stocks in one of the two merged companies, the bidder or the target firms, at a great 
discount price (Gompers et al., 2003). Ryngaert (1988) states that poison pills 
adoption does not require the acceptance of a firm’s shareholders, and can be 
redeemed by the board of the target firm. Therefore, pills do not necessarily remove 
the threat of a takeover; pills exert a pressure on the bidding firm to engage in 
negotiations with the board of directors of the target firm.  
Comment and Schwert (1995) argue that adopting a poison pill results in a higher 
premium for shareholders and also does not affect the likelihood of a takeover 
attempt. On the other hand, Field and Karpoff (2002) suggest that antitakeover 
provisions, including poison pills, reduce the probability of a takeover while not 
having a significant impact on the takeover premium. Coffee (1991) and Pound 
(1992) claim that this reduction in the probability of a possible takeover attempt 
taking place is due to the high costs associated with taking over a firm with 
antitakeover provisions. 
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Facing a takeover threat, a manager will feel that his prestige, power and human 
capital are all at stake. In such a case, the manager will be willing to implement 
certain governance mechanisms (such as poison pills) to decrease the takeover risk 
even if it is not in the shareholders’ interest. Malatesta and Walkling (1988) argue 
that poison pills significantly reduce the disciplinary threat of the market for 
corporate control. In turn, this will decrease a manager’s motivation to act in the 
interest of shareholders. 
Others argue that poison pills might be beneficial for the shareholders because they 
promote managers to engage in long term investments (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983, 
Stein, 1988). DeAngelo and Rice (1983) state that when long term investments are 
first implemented, they are undervalued. Thus, managers working under the threat of 
a takeover will not invest in long term projects since it would make the firm seem 
more undervalued and subject to a takeover at a low price.  Managers would prefer 
to invest in short term projects that would enhance the firm’s performance on the 
short run only. Adopting poison pills would decrease the likelihood of a possible 
takeover, and the managers will feel free to take long term projects since their 
position at the company is partially guaranteed to stay until the investment is 
finished. 
 However, Mallette (1991) indicates that there is no significant difference in long 
term investments between firms with antitakeover provision and those without ones. 
Davis (1991) studies the factors that affected the wide spread adoption of poison 
pills in the 1980s. The author explores the influence of the inter-organizational 
structure of large firms and its role in reproducing the intra-organizational corporate 
control.  
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Davis (1991) finds out that high managerial ownership decreases the management’s 
resistance to antitakeover attempts because of the premium they will receive from 
the takeover bid. High ownership concentrations were also found to have a negative 
effect on the adoption of poison pills due to the better monitoring provided by large 
blockholders. 
Surprisingly, the author reports that the percentage of inside directors on the board is 
negatively correlated to the implementation of poison pills. In addition, Davis (1991) 
finds that the presence of golden parachutes increases the probability of adopting a 
poison pill. 
The author suggests that one of the important flaws of the agency theory is that it 
fails to take into consideration the inter-corporate environment that affects the 
decisions of the manager. The social setting and background of a firm should be 
expected to affect the manager’s decision making process. Many managers tend to 
imitate the behavior of other successful management teams regardless of the 
rationale behind their decisions. The environment surrounding the organization is 
also expected to affect the decision making process by managers due to the 
accessibility of resources. Therefore, Davis (1991) suggests that it is important to test 
the effects of ownership structure and incentives as well as inter-corporate factors in 
order to get a broader view of the elements that affect an organization’s control. 
Davis (1991) further reinforced his suggestions and found that board centrality, the 
presence of board members in several other boards, is positively related to the 
adoption of poison pills. Davis (1991) suggests that normative inventions, such as 
the poison pills, are implemented more rapidly by central firms than by others.  The 
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author also finds evidence that interlocks with corporations that already have a 
poison pill in place will increase the rate at which the firm adopts a poison pill. 
Mallete and Fowler (1992) study the relationship between several board and 
ownership characteristics and the passage of poison pills by industrial manufacturing 
companies in the United States.  
Mallete and Fowler (1992) find that several different governance elements play an 
important role in the passage of pills. CEO duality increases the likelihood of 
adopting a poison pill. The authors also report that as the percentage of independent 
directors increases, the magnitude of the relationship between CEO duality and 
poison pill adoption increases. However, board independence was not a significant 
factor on its own.  
The CEO’s tenure and the independent director’s tenure were not found to be 
significant factors on their own. However, for firms with a low-tenure CEO, the 
likelihood of passing a poison pill decreases significantly as the average tenure of 
independent directors rises.  
Regarding the ownership structure, firms with low insider ownership and firms with 
high institutional ownership tend to have a high probability of adopting poison pills. 
This is consistent with the idea that insiders with low equity will feel that a takeover 
will harm them more since they cannot gain much from the takeover premiums and 
therefore will tend to adopt poison pills to lower its risk. Also, CEOs of firms with 
high institutional ownership will feel more pressure due to the increased monitoring 
and will tend to adopt takeover protections to guarantee their place at the company. 
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Other researchers claim that in order to study the real motivation behind poison pills 
and other antitakeover amendments, one has to study its effect on the wealth of the 
CEO and his compensation packages. Borokhovich et al. (1997) believe that 
studying the CEOs’ pay and compensation packages would help in understanding the 
real motives behind adoption antitakeover amendments. Borokhovich et al. (1997) 
find out that the compensation packages of CEOs at firms that adopt antitakeover 
amendments include greater amounts of salary and bonus than those who are at firms 
without antitakeover amendments. They report these results as a supporting evidence 
for the entrenchment hypothesis and claim that the CEOs use antitakeover 
amendments to secure their position at the company regardless of shareholders’ 
wealth. Borokhovich et.al (1997) also find out that firms with takeover defences 
receive fewer takeover bids in the 3 years following the antitakeover adoption than 
the other firms in their industry. This further suggests that antitakeover amendments 
might be against the shareholders’ interests by reducing the probability of takeovers.  
Bizjak and Marquette (1998)  extend the work of Borokhovich et.al (1997) and look 
at things from a different perspective. Unlike Borokhovich et.al (1997), Bizjak and 
Marquette (1998) include the option part of the compensation in the year after 
adoption as well as study the pay performance sensitivity to gain a better look at the 
motives behind adopting antitakeover amendments. Bizjak and Marquette (1998) test 
the two hypotheses concerning the adoption of poison pills (Managerial 
entrenchment and interests alignment hypotheses) using a different approach. The 
authors find results contradicting the previous work of Borokhovich et al. (1997), 
indicating that antitakeover amendments increase the efficiency of the CEO’s 
compensation package. 
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Bizjak and Marquette (1998) argue that if the managers influence the adoption of 
pills in order to entrench themselves in the firm, one would expect that the 
compensation packages would be less sensitive to the stock price and firm 
performance in the post-pill adoption period. However, results suggest that the 
compensation packages of CEOs become more sensitive to the firm’s performance 
after adopting a poison pill.  
Therefore, Bizjak and Marquette (1998) suggest that their result support the interest 
alignment hypothesis and that the poison pills improve the effectiveness of the 
compensation contracts given to CEOs. In turn, this is supposed reduce the agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers. 
Heron and Lie (2005) identify poison pills as being more controversial than the 
antitakeover charter amendments because the pills can be adopted without the 
approval of shareholders while the charter amendments cannot. The authors study 
the effect of adopting antitakeover provisions on the outcome of the takeover 
attempts as well as studying several factors (such as ownership, governance, 
financial and offer characteristics) to determine which of them might affect the 
implementation decision of these provisions. The authors find that higher insider 
ownership decreases the likelihood of adopting a poison pill. Heron and Lie (2005) 
explain that a high percentage of insider ownership might be powerful enough to 
block a takeover attempt without needing to adopt antitakeover provisions. The 
authors further reinforce their suggestion by showing that none of the firms in their 
sample with 50% or more insider ownership (a level of ownership that would 
remove the likelihood of having a hostile takeover attempt) had a defensive payout 
or a poison pill in place. Other findings also show that firms with poison pills usually 
have a low level of cash.  
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Previous studies have also found that firms that have already adopted pills have a 
low level of managerial ownership with respect to their peers that do not have pills 
(Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988). Boyle et al. (1998) also addresses 
the relation between adopting antitakeover provisions and the level of managerial 
ownership. However, unlike previous studies done by Malatesta and Walkling 
(1988) and Ryngaert (1988), Boyle et al. (1998) suggest that there might be an 
insider tradeoff between insiders’ stock ownership and antitakeover provisions. 
The findings of Boyle et al. (1998) support their claims. Results show that there is a 
tradeoff at an insider ownership level of 10.3%. Below this cutoff point, there is a 
negative relationship between equity ownership and antitakeover provisions. 
However, after the 10.3% ownership level, there is no association between 
ownership and adopting antitakeover provisions. Boyle et al. (1998) believe that 
these results are consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. Managers can entrench 
themselves by either having high ownership in the corporation or by adopting 
antitakeover provisions. Boyle et al. (1998) state that at low levels of ownership, 
managers adopt antitakeover provisions to protect themselves from a possible 
takeover threat. At higher levels of ownership, no significant relationship is found 
because a high ownership level could act as a substitute for the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions in entrenching managers. 
Heron and Lie (2005) suggest two possible explanations for the negative relationship 
between poison pill adoption and the levels of cash holdings and insider ownership. 
On one hand, low levels of cash holding and insider ownership will decrease the 
bargaining power of managers in case a takeover attempt is present. Therefore, 
managers of these firms might tend to adopt poison pills to increase their bargaining 
power. On the other hand, managers might be adopting antitakeover provisions to 
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entrench themselves in the company because their low ownership will not provide 
them with a high amount of the premium paid to shareholders and thus they would 
want to block a takeover attempt even if it is beneficial for the shareholders. 
Consistent with Comment and Schwert (1995), Heron and Lie (2005) argue that 
poison pills in particular are beneficial for shareholders because pills result in a 
higher premium being paid to the shareholder without decreasing the probability that 
a takeover will take place. These results support the increased bargaining power 
explanation for adopting poison pills when levels of insider ownership are low. 
Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011) study the passage of poison pills in Japan and its 
indicators for managerial preferences. They argue that since poison pills can be 
adopted at any time, even after a hostile takeover attempt is launched (Coates, 2000; 
Gompers et al. (2003), adopting poison pills can reveal specific signs about 
managerial behaviour. Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011) claim that the market response 
after adopting poison pills is due to the fact that managers are giving out signals that 
they wish to entrench themselves in the company (they call this the “private 
information revelation hypothesis”) 
Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011) find that firms with longer-tenured managers are 
likely to have poison pills. They believe that a manager with a long tenure will be 
more powerful (dictator) and will therefore be able to make independent choices. In 
addition, they argue that these powerful managers tend to have poison pills only if 
the financial performance of their respective company is poor. 
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3.2.1.3 Staggered Boards 
Gompers et al. (2003) categorize staggered boards (also called classified boards) in 
the delay provisions category. A staggered board is a board in which its members are 
split into different and overlapping classes for re-election (usually 3 classes). This 
separation makes it impossible for the bidder to replace a majority of the board 
members in one single year, even if the bidder has support from a majority of the 
shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Therefore, in order for a bidding firm to gain 
full control of the board, they have to wait for several years (at least 2 election 
periods). 
Sokolyk (2014) presents evidence that CEOs of firms with takeover defences are less 
likely to get disciplined by the board of directors or the market for corporate control 
for making bad acquisitions. Sokolyk (2014) maintains that these results are 
especially strong and significant for companies having staggered boards. Even 
though bad acquisitions cause negative returns for the acquirer, CEOs of these firms 
have a lower to be removed from their positions than their counterparts and their 
firms are less likely to be taken over.  
Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue about the importance of studying the interaction 
between poison pills and staggered boards. Since the board of directors of the firm 
facing a takeover threat is the entity that can redeem a poison pill, pills should be 
more effective for a firm with a staggered board in place too. Accordingly, Heron 
and Lie (2005) find that firms with a staggered board provision in place are more 
likely to adopt a poison pill than those who do not. This is consistent with Bebchuk 
et al. (2002) who claimed that staggered boards and poison pills are complementary 
antitakeover provisions. Consistent with these arguments, Sokolyk (2011) finds that 
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the combination of a staggered board and a poison pill is one of the most effective 
antitakeover mechanisms in resisting takeover attempts. 
3.2.1.4 Supermajority Requirement for Mergers 
Gompers et al. (2003) state that a supermajority requirement for mergers is a 
provision that necessitates a percentage of voting that is higher than that of the state 
law in order to approve a merger. State laws usually require a minimum of 50 or 66.7 
percent of the stockholder voting power to approve a merger (Jarrell et al., 1988). 
However, the adoption such a provision increases the minimum percentage of votes 
required to approve a merger to 66.7 percent. Gompers et al., reports other 
commonly used percentages of supermajority requirements to be 66.7, 75, or 85 
percent. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) report that firms that adopt supermajority 
requirements have a higher insider ownership and lower institutional ownership than 
other firms. This explains how do these provisions get adopted although they 
decrease shareholder rights. 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) report that having a supermajority requirement to approve a 
merger will give an insider a much better chance in obstructing a takeover attempt. 
Even if inside directors lose their control over the board, a supermajority 
requirement will still allow them to oppose a merger if they have a good amount of 
equity holdings. Therefore, Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that such a provision will 
discourage bidders looking to obtain blocks of stock in order to gain control over the 
firm. 
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3.2.1.5 Limitations on Bylaws and Charter Amendments 
The remaining provisions included in the E-Index by Bebchuk et al. (2009) are 
limitations on bylaws amendments and limitations on charter amendments. Bebchuk 
et al. (2009) state that these limitations, along with the supermajority requirement for 
mergers, are strongly disapproved by shareholders. This opposition is due to the fact 
that these provisions limit the ability of shareholders to make changes in the 
documents that govern the corporation or to approve a merger.  
Researchers suggest that stockholders can amend a company’s charter or bylaws in 
order to “frustrate the incumbent board and force an early settlement” (Hochmang 
and Folger, 1979, p.p. 543). The authors argue that such amendments can take 
various forms that would diminish the power of directors. For example, stockholders 
can increase the number of directors, require that the chairman of the board of 
directors be elected by stockholders instead of board members or even necessitate 
the approval of all board members in board decisions. Thus, if stockholders are able 
to appoint only one member on the board of directors, they can have the power to 
veto all of the decisions that are taken by the board. 
Therefore, some management teams adopt limitations on bylaw and charter 
amendments to limit the power of shareholders over the board of directors. Gompers 
et al. (2003) argue that the limitations on bylaws and charter amendments can take 
several forms. The limitations can range from requiring a supermajority of 
shareholders to vote in order to approve bylaws and charter amendments to 
eliminating the shareholders’ capacity to make changes in the bylaws and charter or 
even give the directors the right to make amendments to the charter and bylaws 
without having the shareholders’ consent.  
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3.2.2 Determinants of previously used indices 
Danielson and Karpoff (1998) inspect the frequency and combinations of the usage 
of a firm’s governance provisions. They also observe the effect of the ownership and 
board structures on the adoption of the provisions. Their study contains 20 different 
types of internal and external provisions. 
Danielson and Karpoff (1998) suggest that previous studies assumed that the usage 
of governance provisions is independent of whether a firm has other provisions and 
therefore study the determinants of single provisions one at a time. Although this 
might be the case with some provisions (poison pills) results show that several 
provisions (such as supermajority voting requirements, shareholders meeting 
requirements and staggered boards) are used jointly. Thus, there might be an 
interaction between the usage of governance provisions and it is important to have a 
wider view for studying these provisions.  
Danielson and Karpoff (1998) also find that several governance provisions were 
spread at a much faster rate after an official court pronouncement cleared the doubt 
regarding their lawful status. An example of such resolutions is the Delware 
Supreme Court in 1985 which cleared the ambiguity regarding poison pills. The next 
year, there was a significant increase in the number of firms adopting poison pills 
(Ryngaert, 1988).  
The findings suggest that there is a significantly positive correlation between the 
number of internal and external governance provisions. 
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Danielson and Karpoff (1998) find that only three of the provisions (poison pills, 
confidential voting and blank checks) under study are significantly related to the 
ownership and board structures.  
Firms adopting poison pills are found to have a higher institutional ownership and a 
lower managerial ownership than the averages of the respective firms in their 
industries.  
Both low managerial ownership and high institutional ownership increase the risk of 
a takeover threat. Therefore, managers might resort to adopting poison pills in order 
to decrease the likelihood of a takeover taking place. Also, adoption of poison pills at 
firms with lower outside blockholders is more common than in firms with a 
significant amount of outside blockholders. This is consistent with the view that 
large outside blockholders might have enough power to prevent managers from 
adopting such provisions. Surprisingly, firms with poison pills tend to have a lower 
proportion of insider directors and a higher proportion of independent outside 
directors. 
Sundaramurthy (1998) offers a longitudinal study of the governance factors that 
precede the implementation of antitakeover provisions. Unlike several previous 
studies, Sundaramurthy (1998) distinguishes between the antitakeover provisions 
that require the approval of shareholders, and those provisions that do not.  
Previous researches suggest that there is a significant correlation between board 
structure and characteristics, institutional ownership and executives ownership on 
one hand and an increase in governance effectiveness on the other (Jensen and 
Warner, 1988). Therefore, Sundaramurthy (1998) suggests that it would be important 
to test the influence of these factors on the adoption of 6 antitakeover provisions. 
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Five of these provisions do require shareholder’s approval (Supermajority 
requirements, elimination of cumulative voting, fair price requirements, classified 
boards and unequal voting rights) and 1 provision that do not require shareholder’s 
approval (Poison pills).  
Sundaramurthy (1998) states that previous studies were limited due to the fact that 
many researchers have tried to measure a firm’s governance using individual 
antitakeover measures (Mallette and Fowler (1992) study poison pills only; Kosnik 
(1987) studies the greenmail problem only). A wide index of antitakeover provisions 
will give a broader view of understanding the effect of governance factors on the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions. Another flaw is that several previous studies 
stressed on the provisions that do not need the approval of shareholders, giving little 
importance to the other provisions. 
Sundaramurthy (1998) finds that high levels of institutional ownership are negatively 
related to the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Moreover, institutional ownership 
will have a larger effect on the provisions that do require shareholders’ voting. This 
is consistent with the view that institutional investors are better at monitoring 
management due to their better ability to obtain information and since they have 
more capital at stake. 
Consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, Sundaramurthy (1998) 
finds that managerial ownership has a curvilinear relationship with the adoption of 
provisions. This relationship has a larger curvilinear effect on the provisions that do 
not require the shareholders’ consent since the entrenchment effect will be larger. 
Moving on to board structure and characteristics, Sundaramurthy (1998) finds no 
significant relationship between any of the board variables in the study (percentage 
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of outside directors, average outside directors’ stock ownership, board leadership) 
and the adoption of antitakeover provisions.  
However, a positive correlation is found between outside directors who are loyal to 
the CEO and the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Although independent 
directors are assumed to be more independent of a firm’s managements, the 
members who have been appointed during the current CEO’s tenure will have a 
feeling of loyalty towards the CEO and tend to have some biased decisions. 
Sundaramurthy (1998) provides some other findings obtained from the control 
variables regarding the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Firm size was found to 
have a significant and negative correlation with the rate of adopting antitakeover 
provisions (consistent with Davis, 1991, Mallette and Fowler, 1992). In addition, the 
higher the number of provisions already implemented by the firm, the lower is the 
rate of adopting new antitakeover provisions. 
In a recent paper that studies why are antitakeover provisions adopted, Straska and 
Waller (2010) also check the characteristic of firms that adopt these antitakeover 
provisions. Straska and Waller (2010) show that firms with low bargaining power 
(characterized by low ownership concentration, low managerial ownership and low 
P/E ratio relative to competitors in the industry) do actually have a significantly 
higher amount of provisions in both of their governance indexes than the firms with 
high bargaining power. This effect is found to be statistically significant for all three 
characteristics of low bargaining power for the G-Index. Using the E-Index, the 
characteristics were also found to be statistically significant in affecting the 
implementation of antitakeover provisions except for the P/E ratio. 
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 Straska and Waller (2010) also tested the joint effect of the aforementioned three 
characteristics on the adoption of antitakeover provisions using a “Bargaining 
Power” variable. The results also demonstrate a negative relationship between the 
Bargaining Power variable and both governance indexes (E-Index and G-Index), 
further reinforcing the previous results. 
Straska and Waller (2010) also report a curvilinear relationship between firm size 
and the antitakeover governance indexes. The relationship is positive at first when 
growing firms could benefit from an increase in bargaining power. However, at a 
certain point where the firm is large enough, firms become hard to takeover due to 
their complexity and high costs. This suggests that for large firms, their size becomes 
a substitute for the need of having takeover defences.  
Similarly, Straska and Waller (2010) find a curvilinear relationship between a firm’s 
leverage and the presence of antitakeover provisions. Other results suggest that there 
is a positive correlation between the governance indexes and a firm’s age and a 
negative correlation between R&D expenditure and the governance indexes. Finally, 
they report profitability has a negative but weak relationship with the G-Index while 
not having a significant effect on the E-Index. 
3.3 Conclusion 
Although several researchers study the determinants of antitakeover provisions, the 
gaps left in the literature indicate that more work should be done in this field. First, a 
significant amount of the literature focuses on the determinants of single takeover 
defences (Cochran et al., 1985; Harris, 1990; Singh and Harianto, 1990). These 
studies fail to control for the presence of other antitakeover provisions adopted by 
the firm and that could act as substitutes to the provisions under study. Furthermore, 
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many researchers focus only on the determinants of poison pills or golden 
parachutes, giving little attention to the determinants of other provisions. 
In addition to the focus on a small number of provisions, these studies also fail to 
control for a comprehensive list of variables while studying the determinants of 
takeover defences. Some studies focus on the relationship between firm or board 
characteristics on the adoption of takeover defences while other studies focus on the 
effect of a firm’s ownership structure on adopting antitakeover provisions. By failing 
to control for a combination of board, ownership and firm characteristics, studies fail 
to control for significant variables that play an important role in the adoption of 
takeover defences. 
3.4 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth: Interest Alignment 
Hypothesis Revisited 
3.4.1 Ownership Structure and Compensation 
Too little monitoring of managerial performance could provide executives with 
massive unrestricted power, which could lead to an increase in agency problems. 
Ownership concentration will help alleviate these agency problems and with time it 
is expected to improve firm performance. As explained by the efficient monitoring 
hypothesis, large shareholders will be more motivated than small shareholders to 
monitor management because they have more capital at stake and they will be able to 
do so at a lower cost (Hu and Izumida, 2008). . The methods used by shareholders to 
monitor management can vary from informal discussions to formal ones and proxy 
contests. 
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Burkart et al. (1997)  also indicate that the presence of large shareholders helps 
mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders since monitoring 
the management is too costly for small and individual shareholders. However large 
shareholders will have more resources to monitor managerial behavior and decisions. 
The literature states that the probability of a manager getting caught engaging in 
fraudulent activities increases when there is an increase in monitoring (Dalton et al., 
2007).  
However, Burkart et al. (1997) argue that too much monitoring could have an 
adverse effect on the managerial motivation and incentives. Managers working under 
a huge amount of continuous monitoring will feel that they are at danger of losing 
their jobs and tend to become more risk averse. Also, large shareholders might be 
tempted to pursue their own interests which can be different than that of other 
shareholders (Hu and Izumida, 2008) . This conflict of interest between large 
shareholders and small shareholders is referred to in the literature as the 
“expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis” (Hu and Izumida, 2008, p.p. 73) 
Therefore, further empirical tests should be implemented to test if the benefits of 
monitoring and improved firm performance can offset the costs of expropriating 
minority shareholders and the costs associated with more risk averse managerial 
decisions. 
Several authors studied the effect of ownership concentration on accounting profit in 
U.S. companies and found no significant relationship (Holderness and Sheehan, 
1988) . On the other hand, studies made in East Asian economies and Europe imply 
that firm performance is positively affected by large ownership concentrations due to 
superior monitoring (Earle et al., 2005). 
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3.4.2 CEO and managerial ownership 
The literature suggests that one of the main solutions for the agency theory is CEO 
or managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dalton et al., 2007). However, 
Researchers have not been able to identify a fixed relationship between CEO 
ownership and firm value. Moreover empirical evidence has provided contradicting 
evidence about the correlation between CEO ownership (or executives ownership) 
and firm value and performance ((Demsetz, 1983; Griffith, 1999; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Morcket al., 1988; Stulz, 1988).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) try to explain the positive impact of managerial 
ownership on firm performance by proposing the interest alignment hypothesis. If 
the manager owns a significant amount of the company’s shares, he will have more 
incentive and motivation to work to maximize firm value. Therefore, by maximizing 
the value of his own shares, the manager will also be maximizing shareholder 
wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that this convergence of interest 
hypothesis anticipates a uniform and positive correlation between managerial 
ownership and firm value 
On the other hand, Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis and state that too much managerial ownership 
can be detrimental to firm value. They argue that when a manager has too much 
power and authority, he can entrench himself in the company and thus lower the 
probability of threats such as takeovers. By doing so, the manager will guarantee not 
to lose his place at the company even if he was seeking some private benefits and the 
firm was under-performing. 
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Morck et al. (1988) explore the correlation between managerial ownership and firm 
value according to the aforementioned two hypotheses (convergence of interest and 
managerial entrenchment hypotheses).  The results show that the relation between 
ownership and Tobin’s Q is a volatile and non-monotonic relationship. Morck et al. 
(1988) find that firm value increases when managerial ownership is between 0 and 
5%, then starts decreasing as managerial ownership ranges between 5 and 25%, then 
increases back again, but at a much slower rate, when managerial ownership 
surpasses 25%.  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) argue that the relation between firm value and the 
portion of stocks owned by insiders is a curvilinear relationship.  They find out that 
managerial ownership increases firm value until the level of ownership reaches 40-
50% (convergence of interest hypothesis). After this cutoff point, the slope turns into 
a negative one and managerial ownership causes a slight decrease in firm value 
(entrenchment hypothesis). They describe this relation as an “inverted-U” shaped 
relationship between firm value and ownership. This is consistent with both 
aforementioned hypotheses. At low levels of ownership the convergence of interest 
outweighs the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and the managers’ interests are 
aligned with the interests of shareholders as the managers try to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. When ownership exceeds the cutoff point, managers will 
become more entrenched and might engage in activities that would serve their 
personal objectives, regardless if these activities have a negative effect on the 
shareholders’ wealth and firm value. 
Griffith (1999) studied the relationship between CEO ownership and firm value. 
Griffith (1999) argues that CEO ownership is the variable that dictates the relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value while other managers’ and insiders’ 
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ownership are considered insignificant. Griffith (1999) also finds evidence consistent 
with both the convergence with the convergence of interest and entrenchment 
hypothesis. Due to several market discipline arrangements at low levels of 
managerial ownership, the managers of the firm will want to maximize their own 
wealth and firm value by increasing the share price. However, at a certain point of 
CEO ownership, the relationship with Tobin’s Q turns into a negative one. This is 
because the manager will have too much control and will become “self-indulgent”. 
This is consistent with the findings of Stulz (1988) who argues that at a certain point 
of CEO managerial ownership, the probability of a takeover decreases, which causes 
the value of the firm to decrease. Stulz suggests that at 50% managerial ownership, 
the likelihood of a takeover is 0, and therefore the value of the respective firm will 
be at its minimum. 
CEOs can gain ownership in their organizations in several different ways. CEOs can 
simply buy some of the firms' stocks if they believe that the company has a positive 
potential on the long run. Another way could be the performance and equity based 
compensations and stock option grants that the managers receive as a yearly payment 
or as reward if the firm is performing positively. Jensen and Murphy (1990)  argue 
that in order to give a manager the right type of motivation to maximize shareholder 
wealth and firm value, the annual compensation must be in the form of equity 
compensation and not cash based compensation. Equity based compensation gives 
the manager ownership in the company and he will have more incentive to exert 
more effort to increase firm value. 
Therefore, it might be useful to check the determinants of executive compensation 
which is directly related to ownership. Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the 
directors, who are elected by shareholders to manage the firm, put the structure and 
65 
 
the level of compensation for executives. This shows that the board structure can 
have a direct impact on the structure of compensation. Many researchers believe that 
outside and independent directors have a positive effect on stock price and that they 
are better at representing shareholders than insiders since they are more independent 
of the firm’s management (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that there are factors other than the board structure 
that can affect executive compensation structure. They believe that large independent 
blockholders can significantly influence management’s decisions and that the 
presence of large shareholders will increase the percentage of compensation that is 
equity based. White (1990) provides an example of how the opposition of large 
blockholders to an increase in pension plans for executives at General Motors 
prevented the management from moving on with their plan. 
Mehran (1995)  finds that performance is positively correlated to executive 
compensation when the compensation is in equity based form and is also positively 
correlated with the managers’ equity holdings. These results show that the form of 
compensation is what incentivizes the manager to improve firm performance and not 
the level of compensation. The literature shows that managers are usually considered 
to be risk-averse (Harris and Raviv, 1979) while shareholders are risk neutral 
because they have their portfolios diversified over several companies. Therefore, 
managers prefer to receive cash compensations instead of equity based 
compensation, which is related to the stocks’ performance and beyond the manager’s 
direct control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;) . Accordingly, Amihud and Lev (1981)  
report that some managers pursue conglomerate mergers in order to decrease their 
undiversifiable risk. On the other hand, shareholders want the objectives of the 
managers to be aligned with their objectives and prefer the compensation to be 
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performance based. Tying the manager’s compensation to the performance of the 
firm is one of the main solutions to reduce this conflict of risk (Harris and Raviv, 
1979) which will motivate the manager to take on more risky decisions (Hirshleifer 
and Suh, 1992)  
This is consistent with the dynamic change in the amounts of reserve that U.S. firms 
assign for compensation. In 1997, large U.S. firms had 13% of their common stocks 
reserved to be distributed as compensation, while eight years earlier this number was 
lower than 7% (Morgenson, 1998).  
 Ofek and Yermack (2000) argue that this change is due to the belief held by board 
members that equity based compensation can motivate the executives and make 
them more dedicated to their work. However, managers are not expected to think the 
same way. Managers already have their human capital at stake in the company and 
its related to firm performance, they do not want their compensation to bear the same 
company-specific risk as well. Therefore, one would expect that the manager’s 
behavioral response to equity based compensation would be influenced by his 
previous stock ownership. In their study, Ofek and Yermack (2000) divided their 
sample into two parts; low and high prior managerial ownership, and studied the 
executives’ response to equity based compensation based on the yearly inflow 
(receiving equity compensation and stock options) and outflow (selling) of stocks. 
The results show that managers with low ownership are much more motivated than 
those with high ownership after receiving stock options. The managers with low 
prior ownership will have the incentive to work more in order to increase 
shareholder wealth and firm value because they are now owners in the company. On 
the other hand, managers with high prior ownership will feel that they have too much 
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at stake when they receive the new stock options and they will tend to sell a part of 
the shares they already own in order to lower their unsystematic risk.  
These results show that a manager will accept receiving stock options and holding 
part of the company’s stocks up to a certain level of ownership. After this point is 
reached, the manager will tend to sell some of the equity he has in order to keep his 
portfolio well-diversified and reduce the firm-specific risk. The findings also suggest 
that the board can use equity based compensation with executives with low prior 
ownership (more than high ownership executives). 
Sanders (2001)  argues that there is a significant difference in the CEOs’ behavioral 
response with respect to stock ownership and stock option pay. Previous researches 
used to combine stock ownership and stock options under one single measure of 
incentives assuming that these two incentives have the same effect (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995). Sanders (2001) suggests that this assumption is 
correct if the stock’s price increases, with both cases leading to an increase in the 
CEOs’ capital. However, Sanders (2001) believes that the difference in the CEOs’ 
behavioral response happens when there is a decrease in stock price. If a CEO has 
previous stock ownership in the organization, he will incur losses just as he gained 
profits when the stock’s price appreciated. On the other hand, if the manager has a 
stock option, he will simply opt not to exercise his option and therefore prevent 
himself from suffering any losses. 
This difference has a major implication on the behavioral responses of CEOs to 
different types of incentives. Knowing that stock options do not result in a decrease 
in capital, a CEO holding a stock option tends to engage in more risky investments 
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and activities than a CEO who is afraid that the price of the stocks he already owns 
will depreciate. 
These results cast serious doubts among previous researches who suspected that the 
incentives might not have enough power to change the behavioral action of CEOs 
and other top executives (Finkelstein, et al., 1996). 
3.4.3 Entrenchment  
The second measure of corporate governance that has been receiving lots of attention 
in modern research is managerial entrenchment (measured by the presence of 
antitakeover defences indicating the level of shareholder rights). Berger et al. (1997) 
define entrenchment as “the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline 
from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms. It is widely 
believed that takeovers improve firm performance by increasing the collective value 
of the acquiring and target firms together (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) . The literature 
shows that poorly performing firms are the ones subject to takeovers more than the 
well-established ones (Morck et al., 1990). Underperforming managers can be 
disciplined either internally (by the board of directors) or externally (market for 
corporate control). As a result, managers of these poorly performing firms tend to 
adopt antitakeover provisions in order to reduce the likelihood of a takeover taking 
place.  
The impact of adopting antitakeover provisions on shareholders’ wealth and firm 
value has been the subject of a long dispute among researchers.  
Manne (1965) first argued that entrenchment will insulate the managers and weaken 
shareholder rights. By entrenching themselves in the company, managers will lower 
69 
 
the probability of a takeover and thereby lower the threat of being removed from 
their position. In turn, this could lead to managers engaging in empire building and 
misuse of the company’s resources. 
On the contrary, several researchers believe that entrenchment can also have positive 
consequences. For example, the managerial myopia hypothesis suggests that 
takeover defences benefit shareholders by lowering the degree to which a takeover 
threat distorts managers from engaging in long-term project investments (Bebchuk 
and Stole, 1994; Stein, 1988). Unlike short-term investments which can generate 
cash inflows rather quickly, long-term investments target long-term growth and 
could take several years before being able to cover their costs (Stein, 1988). Due to 
information asymmetry between shareholders and the management team, 
shareholders are not able to value long-term investments correctly causing a 
devaluation in the firm’s share price. Such firms could become underpriced and 
therefore become takeover targets. Therefore, Stein (1988) suggests that providing 
managers with a protection is one of the solutions to this problem.  When managers 
feel that their position at the company is secure enough, they will focus on long term 
investments without having to engage in ineffective actions that would decrease the 
probability of a takeover (Arlen and Talley, 2003). 
Chakraborty et al. (2014) study the effect of antitakeover provisions on innovation to 
tests whether firms adopt takeover defences based on the entrenchment hypothesis or 
the managerial myopia hypothesis. Results indicate that managers of firms with a 
higher number of antitakeover provisions have relatively lower number of patents as 
well as lower citations to patents. Chakraborty et al. (2014) believe that their results 
also provide an explanation for the negative relation between antitakeover provisions 
and firm performance found in the literature.  The results provide support to the 
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entrenchment hypothesis and are in contrast to the managerial myopia hypothesis 
since managers who are more protected from the takeover market innovate less than 
those who are not protected. The authors argue that increasing the number of 
antitakeover provisions has a negative effect on firm performance through its 
adverse effect on innovation. 
Ryngaert (1988) study the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm value 
and find out that the adoption of antitakeover provisions lead to an increase in share 
price. Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) perform a longitudinal study and find out that 
there is no correlation between the adoption of antitakeover provisions and share 
price between years 1974 and 1979. However, this relation turns into a negative and 
significant relation from 1980 and 1988. Comment and Schwert (1995) study the 
relation between the implementation of poison pills and other antitakeover 
provisions on one hand and the firms’ wealth on the other. Comment and Schwert 
(1995) find out that these provisions improve the bargaining position of the target 
firm leading to an increase in takeover premiums while not having a significant 
effect in preventing takeovers from taking place.  
On the other hand, McWilliams and Sen (1997) find that there is an inverse relation 
between adopting antitakeover provisions and share price. This is consistent with 
recent studies (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 
2003). Some researchers debate that the threat of a takeover will increase a 
manager’s efficiency at work and make him more disciplined (Scharfstein, 1988). 
Others believe that a manager working under the threat of a takeover will feel 
insecure and that any work he is going to do can be lost at any moment if the 
takeover takes place (Haan and Riyanto, 2006). This threat will demotivate the 
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manager and decrease the effort he is willing to put at work and in analyzing 
projects. 
When there is a takeover threat, there are two possible scenarios. Haan and Riyanto 
(2006) argue that, for the reasons mentioned above, in some cases shareholders may 
be reluctant to have a takeover threat if the premium is low. If a takeover doesn’t 
take place, the overall wealth of the shareholders might decline because the 
managers are less motivated to do their job and maximize shareholder wealth. 
However, if the premium is high enough and a takeover takes place, shareholders 
will benefit from the additional premium they receive for their shares from the 
bidder. 
As it is the case with CEO ownership, the adoption of antitakeover provisions by a 
firm is expected to have opposite effects on firm valuation. On one hand, 
antitakeover provisions help the managers become more entrenched at the company 
and increase their managerial power and authority, and thus aid them in the 
extraction of private benefits from the company. The free cash flow hypothesis 
suggests that managers of firms with large amounts of cash flows but limited 
investment opportunities have a higher probability to engage in value destroying 
acquisitions (Jensen, 1986) . These activities provide managers with large amounts 
of profit on the expense of the shareholders’ wealth. Further studies investigated 
Jensen’s hypothesis and provided supporting evidence. Morck et al. (1990) pointed 
out different types of acquisitions (high growth targets acquisition and diversifying 
acquisitions) that are expected to provide the managers with a significant amount of 
return while negatively affecting the shareholders’ wealth at the same time. 
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On the other hand, the presence of antitakeover provisions might benefit the firm by 
increasing its bargaining power in case a takeover becomes imminent. The literature 
shows that firms with antitakeover provisions in place usually receive higher bids 
than those which do not have these provisions (Stulz, 1988). However, Bebchuk 
(2002) casts doubt about the benefits of the protecting managers claiming that the 
managers could have strong bargaining power and get a high premium without the 
need of adopting antitakeover provisions. Also, managers might use the authority 
they get from the antitakeover provisions to obtain side payments that would benefit 
them instead of negotiating for a higher premium for the shareholders (Bebchuk, 
2002; Hartzell et al., 2008).  
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) put out 24 anti-takeover 
governance provisions that would help to measure managerial entrenchment and 
shareholder rights.  Gompers et al. (2003) constructed a government index (G-Index) 
out of these 24 provisions to study the relationship between shareholder rights and 
corporate performance. The construction of the index is fairly simple: for every 
antitakeover provision adopted by the company that helps the manager become more 
entrenched in the firm, one point is added to the company except for cumulative 
voting and secret ballots. These two provisions each adds one point to the 
government index if they are absent because evidence shows that the shareholders 
are often the ones who propose that these provisions be adopted by the company 
while the managers refuse to do so. Gompers et al. (2003) divided their sample into 
several deciles and find that firms with the least amount of antitakeover provisions 
(democracy firms) outperformed those with the highest amount of antitakeover 
provisions (dictatorship firms) by 8.5% annually. This indicates that firms with 
higher shareholder rights perform better than their peers with low shareholder rights. 
73 
 
Following Gompers et al. (2003), several researchers use the GIM index of 
provisions as a proxy for a firm’s governance and/or managerial power. Kaplan and 
Minton (2006) study the effect of governance provisions on the relationship between 
firm performance and CEO turnover. Using the GIM index as an indicator of a 
firm’s governance, findings fail to support the entrenchment hypothesis of 
antitakeover provisions. The results do not show a significant effect for the 
presence/absence of takeover defences on the performance-turnover relationship. In 
addition, Jagannathan et al. (2007) find no significant difference in CEO turnover 
between US states that have the highest number of takeover defences and those that 
have the lowest number of takeover defences. Therefore, the authors suggest that the 
presence of antitakeover provisions does not necessarily lead to managerial 
entrenchment. 
However, Sokolyk (2014) claims that previous studies addressing the effect of 
governance provisions on the performance-turnover relationship fail to control for 
CEO turnover following value-reducing decisions such as mergers and acquisitions. 
Masulis et al. (2007) suggests that CEOs engage in value reducing acquisitions when 
they are protected by takeover defences. Harford et al. (2008) adds that firms with 
takeover defences have fewer cash reserves than their counterparts. Such firms opt to 
use their excess cash to engage in acquisitions instead of increasing the dividend 
given to shareholders. These acquisition decisions lead to a reduction in the acquirer 
firm’s profitability and valuation. Therefore, it is essential to control for acquisition 
decisions in such studies. Sokolyk (2014) finds that CEOs of firms with a high 
number of antitakeover provisions are less likely to be disciplined by the board of 
directors or the market for corporate control for engaging in value-decreasing 
mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis of 
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antitakeover provisions, the author concludes that the adoption of antitakeover 
provisions weakens a firm’s governance and its disciplinary mechanisms. 
Gompers et al. (2003) use takeover vulnerability, an external governance 
mechanism, as a measure for firm governance and shareholder rights. However, 
some researchers cast doubts about the validity of this approach arguing that both 
internal and external governance mechanisms interact together in shaping a firms’ 
governance structure (Cremers and Nair, 2005). 
Previous studies attempting to study the interaction between internal and external 
governance mechanisms used top-management turnover to measure the efficacy of 
internal governance (Huson et al., 2004) . (Cremers and Nair, 2005) believe that the 
problem associated with this measurement is that it is vulnerable to a selection bias 
since the study will only include the cases where the firms actually dismissed their 
top managers.  
Cremers and Nair (2005) use the percentage of shares owned by institutional 
blockholders and the percentage of shares owned by public pension funds to measure 
the level of internal governance. The presence of large shareholders is expected to 
reduce the firms’ agency costs. Large shareholders have more resources than small 
shareholders to monitor management and are expected to do so more efficiently and 
effectively (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Zerni et al., 2010). Also, large shareholders 
are expected to help the firm overcome the free-rider problem and to simplify the 
takeover process (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Cremers and Nair (2005) claim that 
the existence of large shareholders is essential for a successful takeover to take place 
and that the absence of large shareholders reduces the probability of a firm being 
taken over even if they do not have antitakeover provisions. This shows that both 
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internal and external mechanisms may interact together in affecting the governance 
of a firm.   
Consistent with Gompers et al. (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005) use the 
vulnerability to takeovers as a measure of external governance. They use the 24 
provisions of the G-index and also construct their own alternative takeover index 
(ATI) based on only 3 of the 24 provisions made by the IRRC that they considered 
crucial to takeovers. Cremers and Nair (2005) show that a portfolio with high 
takeover vulnerability and high blockholders ownership produces significantly 
higher returns than a portfolio with high takeover vulnerability and low blockholders 
ownership. These findings add to the previous literature by showing the important 
role of internal governance to reinforce the relation between the G-index (external 
governance) and firm performance.  
However, they fail to provide evidence on whether or not the other provisions in the 
G-index are correlated with Tobin’s Q. They also fail to test whether each one of the 
provisions they chose in their index is statistically significant by itself. 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)  narrowed their research even more to include only one 
of the IRRC provisions. The authors claimed the negative correlation between the G-
index and firm performance is most likely to be associated with only a small subset 
of the 24 governance provisions included in the G-Index by Gompers et al. (2003). 
They study the relationship between staggered boards and firm value, which is one 
of the main provisions used to protect managers from removal in U.S. companies. 
Staggered boards are adopted by most publicly traded companies in the U.S and they 
inhibit shareholders to change a significant number of directors in one annual 
election. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) claim that staggered boards have faced an 
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increasing amount of opposition from institutional investors in recent periods and are 
most likely to be one of the key driving factors for the pre-established relationship 
between the G-index and firm performance. Controlling for all other IRRC 
provision, staggered boards was found to have a significant and negative effect on 
firm performance. The impact of the staggered boards on firm value is found to be 
much more than the average impact of the other controlled for provisions. However, 
this paper also did not identify if any of the other provisions is significant by itself or 
not.  
This is consistent with Faleye (2007)  who shows evidence that the announcement of 
adopting a staggered board results in a decrease in stock price. These results are 
further reinforced by Guo et al. (2008)  who demonstrate how removing a staggered 
board leads to an increase in stock price. More recently, Sokolyk (2014) finds that 
the adoption of antitakeover provisions, especially staggered boards, weakens a 
firm’s internal and external disciplinary mechanisms.  
The gap in finding which provisions are the ones that really matter encouraged an 
increasing amount of research to be made in this field.  In a recent study, Bebchuk, et 
al. (2009)  study which of the provisions are the ones that play a key role for the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value. They believe that only a 
small amount of the provisions are the driving force behind the correlation between 
antitakeover provisions and firm value. Therefore, they argue that including a huge 
amount of provisions in indexes that measure corporate governance, which many of 
the famous shareholder advisory firms actually do (ISS has 61 provisions in its index 
while Metric International includes more than 600 elements in its index), distorts 
shareholders more than it actually guides them. The addition of a large amount of 
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irrelevant provision will give a lower weight for the provisions that actually count 
and therefore add more noise to the results. 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) observe which of the provisions stimulated a significant 
amount of opposition from institutional investors’ voting on precatory resolution. 
They put together an entrenchment index (E-index) based on 6 provisions from the 
G-index which were found to have the most opposition from institutional investors. 
Four of these provisions help in delaying provisions and limit the shareholders’ 
voting power while the other two are considered as “takeover readiness” provisions 
used to prepare for hostile takeovers. The purpose of the construction of this index 
was to show that only a small amount of provisions is responsible for the correlation 
between the G-Index and firm value and that the other provisions did not have any 
significant correlation with Tobin’s Q. The results showed that an increase in the E-
index is significantly related to a decrease in firm value and abnormal negative 
returns for the period. Results also showed that the other 18 provisions included in 
the G-index are not negatively correlated with firm value neither on an individual 
basis nor in aggregate. This indicates that the other 18 provisions that were used in 
previous studies did not help in the empirical tests. On the contrary, these provisions 
added noise factors to the previous tests that used them. 
Brown and Caylor (2006) use the data provided by the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) to study the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
valuation. They created their own index, Gov-Score, using 51 internal and external 
governance provisions. The construction is simple; if the specific provision provides 
acceptable governance it adds 1 point to the index, otherwise nothing will be added. 
Therefore, the higher the Gov-Score index, the higher is the governance of the 
relative firm. 
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Previous research inspects the relation between single internal governance provision 
and firm value. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) study the effect of 
board structure on firm value while Yermack (1996) studies the relationship between 
board size and firm value. Recently, many governance studies started using the G-
index although it is not a broad index and only shows information about antitakeover 
provisions (Cremers and Nair, 2005; Larcker et al., 2007). Knowing so, Brown and 
Caylor (2006) aimed to provide a more dynamic governance measure than the G-
index which includes both internal and external governance provisions and also 
includes a greater number of firms.  
The authors argue with the claim that both internal and external governance are 
significantly related to firm value (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Cremers and Nair 
(2005) used only shareholder activism as a measure of a firms’ internal governance. 
However, Cremers and Nair (2005) did not observe if any of the other internal 
governance provisions do matter when valuing firms. Therefore, Brown and Caylor 
identified which ones of the 51 provisions in the Gov-Score index are the ones that 
drive the relationship between Gov-Score and firm value and designed a smaller 
index out of these provisions, Gov-7. 
 The new index is made out of 7 provisions, which included 5 internal governance 
provisions which have not been considered in previous studies and 2 of the internal 
governance provisions used in the E-index (Staggered boards and poison pills).  
Consistent with previous findings, the results indicated that the Gov-Score index is 
significantly and positively related to firm value. Further tests also showed that the 
provisions of Gov-7 are the ones fully responsible for the relation between Gov-
Score and Tobin’s Q. These results support the findings of Bebchuk and Cohen 
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(2005) which stated that a small amount of the numerous marketed provisions on 
corporate governance are the ones that are correlated with firm value. 
Straska and Waller (2010) revisit the previous literature regarding the relationship 
between antitakeover provisions and firm value. Specifically, they take a closer look 
at the inverse relationship between Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value and the 
indexes used for takeover provisions by Gompers et. al (2003) and Bebchuk et. al 
(2009) (G-Index and E-Index respectively).  
Straska and Waller (2010) believe that the negative relationship between 
antitakeover provisions and firm value is not universal and thus cannot be 
generalized for all firms. They choose firms that have low bargaining power and at 
the same time high agency cost as the focus of their study. These firms are 
characterized in the literature to have low shareholder concentration, a small amount 
of managerial ownership and a lower price to equity ratio with respect to their 
industry competitors.  
Straska and Waller (2010) believe that firms with low bargaining power are 
particularly important for their study. On one hand, if the takeover defences improve 
the manager’s bargaining power, an increase in antitakeover provisions should have 
a positive impact on firm value. On the other hand, if these antitakeover provisions 
help increase managerial entrenchment inside corporations, the relation between firm 
value and adopting takeover defences would be expected to be a negative.  
In contrast to previous studies favouring the entrenchment hypothesis, Straska and 
Waller (2010) show that, for firms with low bargaining power, a higher value in the 
E and G-Indexes will yield a higher value of Tobin’s Q. This indicates that, in some 
cases, antitakeover provisions are in fact beneficial for shareholders and help in 
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increasing the manager’s bargaining power. Therefore, Straska and Waller (2010) 
suggest that there is no optimal level of antitakeover provisions that can be applied to 
all firms. 
In another study, Larcker et al. (2007)  explore the different scopes of corporate 
governance while developing a reliable measure different from the ones previously 
used in the literature. Previous studies about corporate governance and its 
implications provide several conflicting outcomes. Larcker et al. (2007) believe that 
the variation in previous results is due to the absence of a unified and reliable 
measure that includes all the important aspects of corporate governance.  
Although the G-index is widely used as an indicator for a firms’ governance, it only 
measures the market for corporate control while neglecting the importance of board 
structure, ownership and other important aspects in the formulation of the entire 
corporate governance of an organization. 
Therefore, Larcker et al. (2007) take an initiative in studying 39 governance indices 
and construct a 14 multi-indicator indices to measure corporate governance. These 
indices are found to be strongly correlated with “future operating performance and 
excess stock returns”. On the other hand, the relation between these indices and 
abnormal accruals and accounting restatements is negligible, indicating that more 
work needs to be done to make this index more robust. Also, Larcker et al. (2007) 
mention that their study examines the data for only one year, and thus the results 
found cannot be used to make a generalization for other years.  
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3.4.4 Board Independence 
The objectives of the board of directors can be summarized into two major activities: 
The monitoring process and the advisory process (Linck et al., 2008). 
According to the agency theory, increasing the percentage of independent directors 
would enhance the monitoring process of managerial activities (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Weisbach, 1988). Weisbach (1988) argues that, in most cases, insider directors 
are loyal to the management team. Therefore, insiders are less likely to oppose any 
actions taken by the managers even if these actions might have a negative effect on 
the shareholders’ wealth. Contrary to insiders, outside directors are independent of 
the top management and their main function is to prevent the managers from 
extracting private benefits and ensure that the managers are acting in the 
shareholders’ best interest (Linck et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, researchers suggest that independent directors are not as good as 
insiders in their advisory roles. (Linck et al., 2008) and Maug (1997) argue that there 
is an information asymmetry cost associated with independent directors. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) claim that independent directors do not have the same firm specific 
information about projects that insiders have. Due to this information asymmetry 
cost associated with independent directors,  insiders are considered to be better 
advisors for the firm (Raheja, 2005).  
Therefore, the presence of both insiders and independent directors is essential for the 
firm. However, researchers have thrived to find the ultimate combination of insiders 
and outsiders on the board of directors that would maximize shareholder wealth and 
firm value.  
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To test the impact of board composition on firm performance, researchers have 
studied the correlation between the percentage of outside directors and different 
measures of a firm’s performance.  
Consistent with the agency theory, several researchers find that increasing a board’s 
independence can actually increase firm value in specific cases (Brickley et al., 
1994; Cotter et al., 1997, Weisbach, 1988).  
Weisbach (1988) demonstrates how independent directors can be beneficial to the 
firm indirectly through their monitoring process. Weisbach (1988) presents evidence 
that CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance especially when the 
board of directors is dominated by outsiders. Resignations of CEOs of poorly 
performing firms have a positive impact on performance when the board of directors 
consists of a majority of outsiders.  
Brickley et al. (1994) study the effect of poison pills on firm value with respect to 
the percentage of outside directors. They believe that if the assumptions of outside 
directors being better monitors of managerial decisions and are more aligned with 
the shareholders’ interests, then the likelihood of using a poison pill to harm the 
shareholders would be significantly lower when the board is dominated by outsiders. 
On the other hand, if the interests of independent directors are not well aligned with 
those of the shareholders, then the percentage of independent directors would have 
no significant impact on the relation between the adoption of poison pills and firm 
value. 
Consistent with the agency theory, Brickley et al. (1994) find results supporting the 
interest alignment hypothesis between independent directors and shareholders. The 
results indicate a positive and significant change in the stock price to the adoption of 
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poison pills when the board of directors is controlled by outsiders. In the absence of 
a majority of independent directors, the relationship between firm value and the 
adoption of a poison pill provision turns into a significantly negative relation. 
Cotter et al. (1997) present similar results to Brickley et al. (1994), indicating that 
the presence of a majority of outside directors is beneficial to the shareholders. 
Cotter et al. (1997) study the effect of independent directors on the shareholders’ 
wealth during tender offers. The authors believe that since tender offers and 
takeovers might reflect a conflict of interest between a company’s shareholders and 
the management team, studying the role of independent directors can provide 
insights about the effectiveness of independent directors in their monitoring process. 
 Cotter et al. (1997) find that the overall shareholders’ gains, resulting from the 
initial and bid premiums, from a tender offer are significantly larger for firms with a 
majority of outsider directors. Consistent with Brickley et al. (1994), Cotter et al. 
(1997) find that in the presence of a poison pill, the gains that shareholders extract 
from a successful takeover process are higher when the majority of the board 
consists of outside directors. 
Contrary to the aforementioned studies, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find a negative 
relationship between board independence and a firm’s performance. Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) study seven measures of a firm’s governance mechanisms and their 
impact on firm performance. Although several of these mechanisms were positively 
correlated with firm performance, board independence provides some striking 
results. Assuming that increasing board independence leads to a better monitoring 
process and a better governance structure, recent governance regulations in 2002-
2003 (SOX, NYSE and NASDAQ) have require from companies to have a majority 
84 
 
of independent directors on their boards. On the positive side, board independence 
was found to be positively correlated with management turnover in poorly 
performing firms. Therefore, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) conclude that independent 
directors are successful at disciplining poorly performing management teams, but 
fail in improving a firm’s performance. 
Brick et al. (2006) argue that there is a “mutual back scratching” (Brick et al., 2006, 
p.403) between outside directors and CEOs. They find that there is a positive 
association between a CEO’s compensation and directors’ compensation. In 
addition, excess values for both of these compensations were found to lead to poor 
firm performance. Brick et al. (2006) conclude that the occurrence of excess 
compensation is due to the mutual back scratching process, also referred to as 
cronyism, where both parties benefit from increasing each other’s compensation 
regardless of the effect on firm value. 
A CEO typically plays an important role in appointing outside directors (Crystal, 
1991). When outside directors are hired by the company and retained for a long 
period, the directors will have a feeling of loyalty and devotion towards the current 
CEO (Dalton et al., 2007). Crystal (1991) further reinforces this point by finding that 
outsiders chosen by the CEO have a lower probability of voting against a CEO’s 
decisions. Sutton (2004) suggests that all directors lose their independency after 
serving on a board for five years.  
Bhagat and Black (1999) find that different U.S. firms with a majority of 
independent directors act in different ways. The impact of this difference in behavior 
is random; positive in some cases and negative in others. Therefore, Bhagat and 
Black (1999) argue against the notion that firms should have a supermajority of 
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independent directors on their boards (with only one or two inside directors). On the 
contrary, the authors provide some evidence that firms with a supermajority of 
independent directors are actually less profitable than other firms with more diverse 
boards. They suggest that for optimal firm performance, a company should have a 
reasonable amount of inside directors (35 out of 11) while also keeping a good 
amount of outside directors. 
On the other hand, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2000) 
report no such correlations as their results failed to show any significant impact of 
the percentages of outside directors on firm performance.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) provide several explanations for their results. They 
believe that, consistent with the argument that management teams play a key role in 
the selection of board members, there is no significant difference between the 
presence of insiders and outsiders in representing the shareholders’ interests. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) add that although the tests showed insignificant 
results, the coefficient of board composition in the regression was negative. This 
negative coefficient might be due to the necessary trade-off between the monitoring 
process of outsiders and the advisory process of insiders, indicating that too much 
outside directors (the lack of insider directors) will adversely affect the decision 
making process. 
Consistent with the notion that increasing the number of independent directors can 
have a positive impact on firm performance, Bhagat and Black (2000) report that 
firms tend to move towards increasing board independence after a poorly profitable 
year. However, contrary to expectations, Bhagat and Black (2000) report no 
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significant increase in the performance of these firms, suggesting that greater board 
independence does not necessarily improve a firm’s profitability. 
Although various researchers have addressed the board composition and whether it 
has a significant effect on firm value, results are still inconsistent. (Linck et al., 
2008) describes the ideal board composition as a tradeoff between the expenses and 
revenues associated with increasing the monitoring and advising functions of the 
company. They claim that there is no optimal board composition for all firms. For 
complex firms whose operations are widely distributed over different geographical 
locations it might not be wise to have a huge amount of independent directors 
because of the costs of transferring information (Linck et al., 2008). Maug (1997) 
adds that when a firm has a high information asymmetry due to its complex nature, it 
is very likely that the asymmetry costs offset the benefits of increased monitoring.  
3.4.5 CEO Duality 
The last governance mechanism used in this model is concerned with the role duality 
of CEOs. Firms can be governed using a single or dual leadership structure. A single 
leadership structure implies that one person serves as both the CEO and chairman of 
the board of directors. On the other hand, a dual leadership structure implies that two 
independent persons are serving as CEO and chairman of the board. From a 
theoretical perspective, the effect of CEO duality on board independence has 
witnessed a long dispute among researchers.  
Agency theorists argue that CEO duality gives too much power to one individual 
allowing the CEO to act opportunistically in order to extract private benefits. Levy 
(1981) and Dayton (1984) suggest that role duality allows the CEO to dominate the 
decisions of the board of directors, which is one of the main mechanisms to monitor 
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managerial behavior. In other words, in the case of CEO duality, CEOs will be 
dominating the entity that is supposed to monitor their performance (Rhoades et al., 
2001). Therefore, supporters of the agency theory believe that the presence of CEO 
duality increases agency problems. 
On the other hand, supporters of the stewardship theory believe that role duality 
provides managers with the power needed to take value enhancing decisions.  
Advocates of this theory believe that managers are already motivated to work in the 
shareholders’ best interest but could sometimes lack the necessary power and 
freedom. Therefore, role duality solves this problem and provides managers with the 
necessary power and unity of command. 
Numerous empirical studies have been implemented to test the two aforementioned 
arguments. However, empirical findings have not reached a clear argument 
concerning the relationship between role duality and firm performance.  
Several studies report that CEO duality leads to a decrease in shareholder wealth 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 1993). Aside from the direct relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance, combining the roles of CEO and 
chairman of the board is also linked with weaker board control increased CEO 
entrenchment (Brick et al., 2006) and increased CEO compensation (Core et al., 
1999).  
Rechner and Dalton (1991) study the direct impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance for a sample of 141 US companies that had a stable governance 
structure between 1978 and 1983. The authors find that firms with independent 
leadership structure had significantly higher accounting returns than firms with CEO 
duality. Pi and Timme (1993) also find that US banks with no role duality had 
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significantly higher return on asset ratios than other US banks with CEO duality 
during the 1988-1990 period. 
Core et al. (1999) test the relationship between several governance mechanisms and 
CEO compensation on a sample of 495 observations. Results indicate that CEOs in 
firms with role duality receive, on average, $152,577 extra CEO compensation than 
their counterparts in firms with no role duality. The authors suggest that this is due to 
the weaker governance structure inspired by the presence of CEO duality. Further 
results indicate that firms in which CEOs receive excess compensation perform 
worse than firms with lower CEO compensation. 
Using a large sample of US firms between 1992 and 2001, Brick et al. (2006) report 
evidence of cronyism. The authors suggest an act of “mutual back scratching” (Brick 
et al., 2006; p.p. 403) between managers and directors where both parties increase 
each other’s compensation for mutual benefits. Consistent with Core et al. (1999), 
Brick et al. (2006) also report that excess director compensation and cronyism is 
more apparent in the presence of CEO duality. They believe that this is due to 
managerial entrenchment, where a CEO with role duality has higher power and is 
more entrenched than a CEO with no role duality. These results maintain that this 
mutual back scratching process has an adverse effect on firm value. 
Goyal and Park (2002) also find that CEO duality affects the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance. The authors use a sample of firms between 1992 and 
1996 and find that CEO duality decreases the probability of CEO turnover resulting 
from poor firm performance. A decrease of one standard deviation in firm 
performance increases the probability of CEO turnover by 5.3% in non-duality firms 
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and 2.5% in duality firms. The authors explain that role duality reduces the 
effectiveness of boards of directors in monitoring CEOs.  
Although theories (agency and stewardship) suggest that CEO duality significantly 
affects firm performance, yet a large group of researchers fail to find such a 
relationship. Several researchers provide empirical evidence of no significant 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Abdullah, 2004; Baliga et 
al., 1996; Chagnati et al., 1985) 
Chaganti et al. (1985) study the relationship between board characteristics and 
corporate failure for US retailing firms in the 1970s. Using pair-wise analysis 
techniques, the authors match 21 failing firms with 21 non-failing firms with similar 
characteristics. Chaganti et al. (1985) control for industry-specific and economic 
factors, such as recession or the level of market competition, in order to measure the 
associations between firm-specific factors on the likelihood of failure. Results 
suggest that chairmen holding multiple offices, mainly chairman of the board and 
CEO, are not associated with a higher probability of corporate failure.  
Baliga et al. (1996) suggest that CEO duality has been blamed for weakening 
governance structure and firm performance without conclusive empirical evidence. 
The authors test the announcement effect of firms changing their leadership status, as 
well as the operating and long term performance of such changes. Results suggest 
that the announcement effect of changing leadership structure from duality to non-
duality, and vice versa, is insignificant
2
. Results also provide insignificant results for 
changing a firm’s leadership structure on operating and long-term performance. 
Baliga et al. (1996) argue that their results are in contrast with previous studies due 
                                                          
2
 The results are consistent for different announcement effect time periods. The authors test 2-day, 
5-day, 10-day and 60-day announcement returns. 
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to different methodologies. Some studies fail to control for variables that could affect 
firm performance (such as Rechner and Dalton, 1991) while others focus on a single 
industry (Pi and Timme (1993) only study firms in the banking industry).  
Abdullah (2004) tests the effect of CEO duality on firm performance for the 
companies listed in the Kuala Lampur Stock Exchange between 1994 and 1996. 
Although various performance measures were used (ROA, ROE, profit margin ratio, 
earnings per share), results suggest that CEO duality does not have any significant 
effect on firm performance. Abdullah (2004) also finds no significant interaction 
between CEO duality and the percentage of independent directors serving on a 
company’s board. 
On the other hand, Donaldson and Davis (1991) provide evidence supporting the 
stewardship theory. The authors find that the return on equity for firms with CEO 
duality (14.75%) is significantly higher than the return on equity for firms with 
independent persons serving as CEO and chairman of the board (11.49%). However, 
the same tests were insignificant when a financial market measure of performance 
was used. The authors conclude that although their results provide only partial 
support for the stewardship theory, both of their profitability measures do not 
support the propositions of the agency theory. 
Boyd (1995) believes that the contradicting evidence in previous literature can be 
explained by integrating the arguments of both agency and stewardship theories. The 
author argues that neither one of these theories can explain the different aspects of 
corporate governance on its own.  Results suggest that CEO duality improves 
performance for firms with a high degree of complexity and for firms with a scarce 
amount of resources. However, for firms with a low degree of complexity and wide 
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availability of resources, a role duality provides CEOs with unnecessary power that 
would adversely affect firm performance. Findings also indicate a positive 
relationship between duality and firm performance after controlling for the 
uncertainty of a firm’s environment. 
Therefore, Boyd (1995) believes that assessing the advantages and disadvantages of 
providing a CEO with a role duality should be done on a case by case basis due to 
the specific characteristics of different firms. Boyd (1995) concludes by claiming 
that “unilateral governance reform on this issue may adversely affect some firms” 
(Boyd, 1995; p.p. 309). Other researchers also provide support for this argument. 
Elsayed (2007) finds that the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance for Egyptian firms depends on the industry under study. Certain 
industries benefit from having a single leadership structure while other industries 
benefit from an independent leadership structure. Lam and Lee (2008) also find that 
non-family controlled firms in Hong Kong enjoy an increase in firm performance in 
the presence of CEO duality. On the other hand, family-controlled firms perform 
better in the absence of CEO duality. 
Consistent with this argument, Faleye (2007) claims that the benefits and costs of 
CEO duality vary from one firm to another depending on different CEO and firm 
characteristics. The author starts by studying the determinants of CEO duality. 
Specifically Faleye (2007) proposes that CEO ownership, CEO reputation, and firm 
complexity moderate the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
Consistent with Boyd (1995), Faleye (2007) maintains that for complex firms, there 
is a high cost of transferring firm-specific information from the CEO to the chairman 
of the board. Therefore, such companies should benefit from CEO duality since the 
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benefits of decreased information asymmetry outweigh the costs of decreased board 
monitoring. 
Faleye’s (2007) second hypothesis posits that CEOs with high reputation do not risk 
losing their reputation in order to engage in opportunistic activities. Therefore, CEOs 
with high reputation could benefit from the extra power given to them, rather than 
extra monitoring provided by an independent chairman of the board. 
Consistent with previous studies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), Faleye (2007) also 
suggests the interest alignment hypothesis of CEO ownership. By working hard to 
maximize shareholder wealth, CEOs with a high level of ownership are maximizing 
their own wealth as well. In the same sense, Faleye (2007) believes that as CEO 
ownership increases, agency conflicts decrease. Therefore, a non-duality structure 
would provide a needless cost for firms with high CEO ownership. Consistent with 
his hypothesis, Faleye (2007) finds that firm complexity, CEO ownership and CEO 
reputation increase the likelihood of appointing a CEO as chairman of the board. In 
addition, the author reports that, in these specific cases, a firm with a role duality 
outperforms its counterpart with no role duality.  
Aside from studying the direct relationship between duality and performance, 
researchers test the effect of CEO duality on a wide variety of governance variables. 
Studies address the effect of role duality on CEO compensation (Brick et al., 2006; 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Wang et al., 2011), CEO turnover (Goyal and 
park, 2002), earnings management (Davidson et al., 2004; Klein, 2002) and the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions (Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 
1996; Sundaramurthy et al., 1996). All of these aspects provide a better insight on 
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whether the presence of CEO duality inspires a better or weaker governance 
structure. 
3.5 Conclusion 
One of the main reasons of corporate governance studies is to test the effect of 
different internal and external governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
Researchers suggest that a firm’s board and ownership structures (internal 
governance mechanisms) have a significant effect on firm performance. Ownership 
and compensation schemes as well as a majority of independent directors are 
assumed to reduce the agency conflicts and, therefore, increase firm value. In 
addition, having an independent leadership structure provides managers with less 
room for opportunistic behavior.  
Empirical studies have been made throughout the literature to provide support for the 
aforementioned suggestions. However, the results have been largely inconsistent. A 
significant amount of researchers find board independence and CEO duality do not 
have a significant effect on firm performance (Bhagat and Black, 2000; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Other studies suggest that these 
mechanisms can be positive in some cases and negative in others (Boyd, 1995; 
Elsayed, 2007). Regarding the ownership-performance relationship, researchers 
report an inverted U relationship. However, the cutoff point during which any 
additional CEO ownership will become detrimental to firm performance differs from 
one study to another. Although there is a large amount of literature covering the 
relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance, most of 
these studies fail to control for the interaction between internal and external 
governance mechanisms. 
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Cremers and Nair (2005) claim that internal and external governance mechanisms 
interact in affecting firm performance. The market for corporate control is one of the 
main external governance mechanism used to reduce agency conflicts and discipline 
opportunistic managers. By adopting antitakeover provisions, managers are 
deactivating one of the mechanisms to discipline them. As such, takeover defences 
are assumed to increase agency conflicts and have a negative effect on firm 
performance. Therefore, a firm’s optimal ownership and board structures could differ 
based on its level of external governance. Failing to control for such interaction 
effects will provide inconsistent results similar to the ones found in the literature. 
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4.1 Introduction  
The theoretical framework of this study focuses on the managerial motives for 
choosing certain antitakeover provisions over others. The study also gives particular 
attention to the interaction between takeover defences and other governance 
mechanisms in affecting firm value. Recent financial scandals and crises prove that 
corporate governance mechanisms and theories cannot ensure a world free of 
manipulations and fraud. However, the importance of building a theoretical 
framework for a research is to establish a basis for setting the hypotheses as well as 
guiding the interpretation of the results. In addition, a theoretical framework helps 
the researcher consider several theories which will widen the researcher’s knowledge 
and help explain complex scenarios where more than one theory can be applicable. 
Previous researchers use different theoretical approaches when studying the complex 
aspects of corporate governance. Some of the most prominent theories used in the 
literature are the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983), stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991), stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984) and the resource dependence theory (Christopher, 2010; Hillman et 
al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The agency theory is concerned with the principal agent relationship and the 
conflicts of interest that could occur due to the opportunistic behavior of managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists believe that a high level of board 
independence could reduce agency conflicts by increasing the monitoring process of 
managers and thus decreasing CEO power. Unlike agency theory, the stewardship 
theory suggests that CEOs are good stewards and are self-motivated to increase firm 
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value without the need of a high level of board independence. Therefore, 
shareholders should empower CEOs by providing them with a role duality and 
surround them with more insider directors that have high firm specific expertise 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). On the other hand, the stakeholder theory believes that 
too much focus is given to the principal-agent relationship with little focus on the 
other stakeholders. Proponents of this theory believe that all stakeholders are equally 
important and, therefore, should be treated with equal importance (Freeman, 1984). 
Finally, the resource dependence theory focuses on the interdependence between a 
firm and its external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Supporters of this 
theory suggest that powerful independent directors with interlocks are beneficial to 
firms since they can reduce the firm’s dependence on its external environment. More 
recently, researchers have been suggesting that a single theory cannot explain the 
various aspects of corporate governance (Elsayed, 2007). Therefore, several studies 
adopt a multi-theoretical approach that integrates more than one theory in an attempt 
to cover wider aspects of corporate governance (Christopher, 2010; Elsayed, 2007; 
Hillman and Daziel, 2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003) 
4.2 Theories of Corporate Governance 
4.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been subject to a significant amount of debate among scholars, 
researchers and practitioners. The agency theory concept was introduced to the 
public by Berle and Means in 1932 who talked about the conflict of interest that 
might occur between managers and shareholders. 
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means issued a book named “The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property” in year 1932. The authors describe that, prior to the publishing 
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of their book, large ownership concentrations had been significantly reduced which 
led to a more diversified structure of ownership in large firms. The ownership of 
private firms was spread more among smaller shareholders and formed what is 
known today as market ownership (Coffee, 2001). As the ownership became more 
diverse, owners started losing their supervisory role over the firm and qualified 
managers took over this position. However, these managers might have their own 
interests and goals that would adversely affect shareholders’ wealth. This evolution 
in the ownership structure laid the foundation for the establishment of the agency 
theory. 
After Berle and Means (1932), many researchers studied the agency theory and the 
divergence of interest between managers and shareholders. However it was Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) who formalized the previous work on agency theory. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) state that, in some cases, the interests of shareholders and 
managers might diverge. In such a case, managers pursue personal goals and 
interests that are not in line with their main objective: maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth. This lack of interest alignment between principals (shareholders) and agents 
(managers) could lead to managerial abuse of power or engaging in activities that are 
value enhancing for the manager and not the shareholders such as empire building or 
shirking (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition to its 
significant contribution to corporate governance literatures, the agency theory can be 
extended to any framework involving a party (the principal) delegating its work to 
another party (the agent). It explains the conflicts that could occur between these two 
parties due to conflicts of interest or lack of trust. 
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4.2.1.1 Agency Conflicts: 
Heath and Norman (2004) state that the principle-agent relationship becomes of 
significant importance when there is an information asymmetry between both 
parties. This information asymmetry could lead to several types of agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. 
4.2.1.1.1 Moral Hazard 
The moral hazard problem occurs when a manager takes a decision whose outcome 
is to be incurred by the shareholders (Heath and Norman, 2004). In such a case, 
managers might not exert their full effort to increase shareholder wealth since the 
benefit of this extra effort is to be gained by the shareholders and not by the 
managers. Moreover, managers might engage in risky investments because the 
shareholders are the ones to endure the burdens of such a decision. 
4.2.1.1.2 Adverse Selection 
Another possible conflict of interest between managers and shareholders stems from 
the fact that managers do not have a residual claim on firm performance (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994). Managers might spend a significant amount of money on non-
profit activities since they are not bearing the expenses of such activities. Spending 
on environmental issues would enhance a manager’s image and guarantee that they 
stay in their position while not providing any direct benefit to shareholders (Halme 
and Huse, 1997; Wang and Coffey, 1992). 
4.2.1.2 Agency Costs: 
An agency cost is an internal cost incurred due to the fact that shareholders are not in 
complete control of the firm. According to the agency theory, different types of 
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agency costs could be incurred in order to decrease the divergence of interest 
between managers and shareholders and therefore reduce agency conflicts (Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
4.2.1.2.1 Monitoring Cost: 
Shareholders are expected to sustain monitoring costs in order to monitor managerial 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Some managers could have personal goals to 
achieve private benefits and, therefore, monitoring costs are incurred to prevent such 
behavior. Monitoring costs could take various forms such as the cost of performing 
audit which should be able to limit a manager’s suspicious actions. Another type of a 
monitoring cost is represented by the board of directors. Aside from the advisory 
role, boards of directors help in monitoring managerial behavior. Accordingly, part 
of the salary for directors is considered as a monitoring cost incurred by shareholders 
to reduce agency conflicts. 
4.2.1.2.2 Bonding Cost: 
The second type of agency costs is the bonding cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The bonding cost is incurred by managers as a pledge that they would not act engage 
in self-profitable activities at the expense of the shareholders. If the managers break 
their promise and engage in such activities, they might have to pay the shareholders 
as compensation. Bonding costs can also be in the form of contractual obligations 
that serve to restrict a manager’s actions. For example, a manager may commit to 
staying with the firm for a certain period of time or to stay with the firm following a 
successful takeover attempt. Such an obligation will cause managers to forfeit any 
possible employment opportunities and are considered as a bonding cost for 
managers. 
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4.2.1.2.3 Residual Loss: 
Finally, and even after the monitoring and bonding costs are incurred, there would 
still be some divergence of interest between the two parties (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
The decisions taken by the management team could not be the optimal decisions that 
the shareholders desire and other alternatives might have been available that would 
increase the shareholders’ wealth. The difference in the dollar amount between the 
best alternative and the decision taken by the manager is called the residual loss 
(Jensen and Mecklin, 1976). 
Thus, even if these solutions are implemented, evidence shows that the interests of 
managers and shareholders are still not perfectly aligned.   
The need to find a solution for the agency problems stimulated a huge amount of 
studies addressing the agency theory. Almost 80 years have passed on Berle and 
Means’ famous book and researchers are still thoroughly studying the agency theory 
and looking for new ways to decrease its associated costs as much as possible 
4.2.1.3 Mitigating Agency Problems: 
One of the recent studies summarizes the previous work done on the agency theory, 
suggesting that there are three ways that would help in the monitoring and 
compensation processes discussed previously (Dalton et al., 2007).  
The first way is to increase board independence. It is widely accepted that increasing 
the percentage of outside directors would enhance the monitoring process of 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, several 
researchers have argued that directors can never be fully independent (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). A CEO typically plays an 
important role in appointing outside directors. When outside directors are hired by 
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the company and retained for a long period, the directors will have a feeling of 
loyalty and devotion towards the current CEO (Dalton et al., 2007). Sutton (2004) 
suggests that all directors lose their independency after serving on a board for five 
years.  
Moreover, even though independent directors provide better monitoring of 
managerial performance (Borokhovich et. al, 1996; Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Weisbach, 1988), their lack of company-specific information could prove costly. 
Maug (1997) believes that for firms with relatively high information asymmetry, 
increasing the percentage of independent directors could prove detrimental for the 
firm as the coordination and asymmetry costs could be greater than the benefits of 
increased monitoring. Therefore, Bhagat and Black (1999) believe that the optimal 
combination of directors is a small majority of independent directors while keeping a 
reasonable amount of insiders (3 5 out of 11). 
The second mechanism to alleviate the agency conflicts is providing equity 
ownership and compensation for managers, which will allow the managers to share 
ownership with the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dalton et al., 2007). In 
such a case, managers will be more motivated in increasing the shareholders’ wealth 
in order to increase their own wealth as well. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), there might be a significant gap in the 
risk taking behavior of managers and the risk preference that shareholders are willing 
to have. On one hand, managers might sometimes act in a risk-averse manner.  
Managers already have their human capital at stake to lose, and therefore would not 
want a significant amount of additional risk. On the other hand, shareholders have 
their portfolios well diversified in different investments and as a result would be 
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subject to little company-specific risk. Based on this low unsystematic risk, 
shareholders would prefer if the managers are willing to take a moderate amount of 
risk. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that by increasing the managerial ownership, 
the interests of managers and shareholders will converge and the gap in risk taking 
preferences will decrease. 
However, it should be noted that if the incentives given to the CEOs are not well 
structured, they can have an adverse and unintended effect on the firm (Kerr, 1975) . 
Vroom (1964) suggests that the individual performance is usually driven by two 
factors: motivation and ability. By granting the CEOs certain types of ownership 
compensations and incentives, the directors are giving CEO the motivation required 
to improve their performance without taking into consideration their abilities. 
Sanders and Hambrick (2007)  provide evidence that although stock options 
incentivize the managers to take on more risky decisions, these risky decisions are 
not always successful ones. 
Even if the CEO has a good ability, he is still vulnerable to systematic decision 
biases (Bazerman and Moore, 2008).  The ill-ability of the CEO to take a certain 
decision, or taking a biased decision, could prove to be too costly for the company 
given the CEO’s wide level of authority in decision making (Nyberg et al., 2010). 
Dalton et al. (2007) claim that if the aforementioned two governance mechanisms 
fail to solve the agency problems inside a firm, the third mechanism becomes active: 
the market for corporate control. Manne (1965) argues that the market for corporate 
control will lower the number of “wasteful bankruptcy proceedings” (Manne, 1965, 
p.p. 119) In addition, the presence of an active market for corporate control is 
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expected to increase the efficiency of the management team as well as offer 
reasonable protection for firms with dispersed ownership (Manne, 1965). 
The presence of the market for corporate control is an important disciplinary 
mechanism for inefficient managers, or for managers who are extracting private 
benefits on the expense of shareholders (Masulis et al., 2007). If the managers are 
engaging in activities that would increase their own wealth but at the same time are 
value-destroying for the firm, the stock price is likely to decrease and become 
underpriced which will make the company an attractive target for bidders. 
However, management teams have started heavily adopting antitakeover provisions 
since the late 1980s. Many types of antitakeover provisions are used, some of which 
make the takeover more costly while other could cause the takeover process to be 
delayed for a certain period of time (Gompers et al., 2003). Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
find that six of these antitakeover provisions (combined to form the E-index) are 
adopted by managers to entrench themselves in the company and have a significantly 
negative effect on firm value. 
Although the aforementioned mechanisms seem to provide logical solutions to 
reduce agency problems, many researchers cast doubt about their effectiveness in the 
real world and have been criticized to have some disadvantages of their own (Dalton 
et al., 2007). Moreover, empirical research fails to provide a definite support for the 
suggestions of the agency theory (Daily et al., 2003). Ghoshal (2005) indicates that 
fifty four studies find no significant relationship between increasing the percentage 
of independent directors and firm performance. Consistently, thirty one other 
researches show that removing CEO duality (assigning two separate individuals to 
work as CEO and chairman of the board respectively) does not affect firm 
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performance. Ghoshal (2005) states that these studies have been made in different 
countries and using different measures of corporate performance, yet they still fail to 
provide support for agency theory suggestions.  
Accordingly, agency theory assumptions have received criticism for being 
excessively simplistic. That is, the assumptions of the agency theory do not replicate 
the real business environment and do not have enough evidence to support them as 
well. For example, Williamson (1985) criticizes the assumption of a definite conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders. Although this could be a valid 
assumption for many firms, it cannot be generalized for a universal theory of 
corporate governance. Hill (1990) suggests that even if managers had lots of room to 
extract private benefits, not all managers engage in opportunistic activities. Some 
managers prefer to work ethically in order to gain the trust of their shareholders and 
environment.  
These criticisms of the assumptions of agency theory, along with the lack of 
significant empirical support for its suggestions triggered the need to search for 
alternatives or substitutes for this theory. Brickley et al. (1997) and Elsayed (2007) 
provide evidence that CEO duality could be beneficial for firms in some cases and 
detrimental in others. Muth and Donaldson (1998) also provides partial support for 
agency and stewardship theory suggestions regarding the independence-performance 
relationship. Accordingly, researchers claim that one theory on its own cannot solely 
explain the various characteristics of corporate governance. Therefore, several 
researchers claim that integrating more than one theory in a multi-theoretical 
approach can cover a wider aspect of corporate governance than any single theory 
would do (Daily et al., 2003). 
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All of these complications require more work to be done in order to address agency 
theory and how to reduce its respective costs. Understanding the key governance 
mechanisms that are associated with agency problems is crucial in resolving the 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.  
This study focuses on the conflicts of interest in the principal-agent relationship and, 
therefore, relies heavily on the foundations of the agency theory. It speaks directly to 
the agency costs associated with monitoring managers and the costs to the 
shareholders’ wealth when managers engage in opportunistic activities. The study 
also tests the cases where the governance mechanisms suggested by agency theorists 
are valid and the cases in which they are not. In doing so, this research provides an 
explanation for the inconsistent results found in previous literature on corporate 
governance. In addition, by highlighting the cases in which agency theory 
suggestions are not valid, this research opens the door for a multi-theoretical 
approach that integrates the agency theory with other theories of corporate 
governance. 
4.2.2 Stewardship Theory:  
Unlike the agency theory, which is built on an economic model, the stewardship 
theory has its roots in the literature of sociology and psychology (Albrecht et al., 
2004). The managers, also known as stewards, in this theory are motivated factors 
other than their own self-interest. The psychological satisfaction obtained from 
successfully completing jobs and overcoming challenges plays an important role in 
the stewardship theory (Albrecht et al., 2004). Managers are also motivated by the 
fact that they want to have a superior performance to achieve self-esteem and their 
achievements would be well recognized from their board of directors (Donaldson 
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and Davis, 1991). Moreover, the role of the board of directors in the stakeholder 
theory is completely different than the monitoring role provided by the agency 
theory. Here, the board of directors is available to help the manager in effectively 
completing his job (Albrecht et al., 2004). 
Another major difference between the agency theory and stewardship theory is the 
issue of CEO duality. Agency theorists argue that the interests of managers and 
shareholders are not well-aligned, which causes several agency problems (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, CEO duality gives a CEO more power and 
authority, leading to empire building and an increase in agency conflicts. On the 
other hand, unlike agency theorists, proponents of the stewardship theory support 
CEO duality.  
Donaldson (1985) states that the difference in executives’ performances among firms 
is due to the organizational structure of the firm. In other words, the more power and 
trust given to a CEO, the better the performance should be. To achieve this superior 
performance, stakeholder theorists argue that the leadership of the firm should be 
given to one person (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). They believe that if two persons 
where to hold the positions of CEO and chairman of the board, conflicts might occur 
as to which person has the authority over a specific matter. On the other hand, CEO 
duality provides a sense of unity and strong leadership. In addition, a CEO serving as 
the chairman of the board would have a better understanding of firm-specific 
matters. This would provide the CEO with better chances at maximizing shareholder 
value than an outside directors serving as the chairman of the board would do. The 
function of the  
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Davis et al. (1997) state that the stewardship theory perceives managers as good 
agents whose interests are already aligned with that of the shareholders. The fact that 
a CEO actually works for the owners of the corporation and that his future job and 
cash inflows are tied to the corporation is enough to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
However, as it is the case with agency theory, empirical evidence on the propositions 
of the stewardship theory is still inconclusive. Rechner and Dalton (1991) perform a 
longitudinal study and find out that firms with independent leadership structures 
outperform their counterparts with single leadership structures. Others find that the 
presence of CEO duality increases the adoption of poison pills (Mallette and Fowler, 
1992), which in turn has a negative effect on firm value (Bebchuk et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, Donaldson and Davis (1991) find that firms with CEO duality have a 
higher return on equity than non-duality firms. Daily and Dalton (1994) find that 
CEO duality does not directly affect firm performance, however, it enhances the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance. Others find that 
CEO duality can act as a double edged sword having a positive effect on firm 
performance in some cases and a negative effect in others (Brickley et al., 1997; 
Elsayed, 2007; Krause and Semadeni, 2013; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
An interesting fact that contradicts with the arguments of the stewardship theory is 
the presence of CEO duality in several firms were huge scandals occurred. Albrecht 
et al. (2004) report that eight out of ten firms that recently witnessed major scandals 
had a CEO that was also serving as the chairman of the board of directors (e.g Enron 
and Tyco). Beasley et al. (2000) also report that out of all of the fraud cases in their 
study of financial statements, 72% of the times the CEOs were involved in these 
fraudulent activities. These facts suggest that treating managers as stewards whose 
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first priority is maximizing shareholder wealth, and not personal interest, could have 
several flaws. 
Given the large amount of inconsistent results in previous literature, with some 
studies supporting the agency theory while others support the stewardship theory, 
this study undertakes that both theories have to be valid in some cases. Certain firms 
should have the ability to benefit from the leadership role of CEOs with a role 
duality as well as the expertise of insider directors. Therefore, this study assumes 
that the suggestions of the stewardship theory are valid for firms that are already 
enjoying high levels of shareholder rights. The superior quality of governance 
available at such firms is capable of ensuring that the principal-agent conflicts are 
kept at a minimum. Accordingly, this research adopts a multi-theoretical approach 
that follows the suggestions of the stewardship theory (agency theory) in the 
presence of high (low) levels of governance and shareholder rights. 
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Table Summarizing the differences between the Agency Theory and the Stewardship 
Theories (Davis et al., 1997) 
  Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Model of Man Economic Man Self-actualizing Man 
Behaviour Self-Serving Collective Serving 
Motivation 
Extrinsic: Lower order/economic needs 
(physiological, security, economic) 
Intrinsic: Higher order needs (growth, 
achievement, self-actualization) 
Social Comparison Other Managers Principal 
Identification Low Value Commitment High Value Commitment 
Power Institutional (legitimate, coercive, reward) Personal (expert, referent) 
Management 
Philosophy 
Control Oriented Involvement Oriented 
Risk Orientation Control Mechanism Trust 
Time Frame Short-term Long-term 
Objective Cost Control Performance Enhancement 
Cultural Individualism; High Power Distance Collectivism; Low Power Distance 
 
4.2.3 Stakeholder Theory: 
Apart from agency and stewardship theories, other theories have also been used to 
explain the governance of corporations around the world. Another dominant theory 
that covers a wider aspect of corporate governance is the stakeholder theory. Unlike 
the agency and stewardship theories, which focus on the principal-agent relationship, 
the stakeholder theory suggests that all stakeholders are essential for a firm’s success 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984). 
Freeman (1984) was the first researcher to provide a complete framework for the 
stakeholder theory. In addition to shareholders, other interest groups such as 
customers, employees, suppliers, financial institutions and communities share a stake 
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in the corporation (Heath and Norman, 2004). All of these groups provide the 
company with various services or resources, and they expect to receive personal 
benefits in return (Hill and Jones, 1992). Freeman (1984) argues that a successful 
manager should be able to see a common path where the interests of all stakeholders 
go through without neglecting any group of stakeholders. This approach won the 
support of several researchers seeking a more socially responsible environment 
(Laplume et al., 2008). 
Throughout its evolution, researchers have struggled to have a definite view of the 
stakeholder theory and its characteristics. Who is considered a stakeholder of the 
firm? How can a firm rank categorize its stakeholder? Which stakeholder group is 
more important to the firm? Friedman and Miles (2006) claim that from years 1963 
to 2003, researchers have used fifty five different definitions for stakeholders. Some 
researchers use a narrow view of a firm’s stakeholders claiming that an entity is 
considered as a stakeholder if they have share in in the firm or if they have a mutual 
interest with it (Carroll, 1993). On the other hand, Starik (1993) adopts a very broad 
view of stakeholders. The author believes that any person or organization that can 
affect or be affected by the firm should be considered as a stakeholder. 
Hinings and Greenwood (2003)/Stern and Barley (1995) argue that the importance of 
the stakeholder theory lies in addressing the effect of corporations on their 
surrounding environment and society. Weick (1999) adds that the emergence of the 
stakeholder theory is due to its emotional character and humanitarian virtues. Heath 
and Norman (2004) claim that proponents of the stakeholder theory give little 
attention to shareholder rights because shareholders already have enough authority to 
influence some managerial decisions. Therefore, stakeholder theorists believe that 
more attention and power should be directed from shareholders to other stakeholders.  
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A company is expected to gain the support of all of its stakeholders through several 
ways. Jones (1995) believes that a firm should simply treat its stakeholders equally 
in order to achieve a two-way trust between both parties. Others believe that each 
stakeholder should be given special treatment based on their specific needs. For 
example, employees could be given stock options as a bonus or compensation for 
their hard work (Maren and Wicks, 1999). Brammer and Millington (2004) also 
suggest that firms could please some stakeholders by showing environmental 
concerns and donating a small percentage of their profit for charity work. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argues that there are three different approaches for the 
stakeholder theory. These approaches are: The descriptive approach, the instrumental 
approach and the normative approach. The descriptive approach is used to describe a 
firm’s characteristics and its behavior. For example, stakeholder theory has been 
used to explain the nature of firms and the way firms are being managed (Brenner 
and Cochran, 1991; Clarkson, 1991). The instrumental approach identifies the 
connections between managing stakeholders and achieving business targets (such as 
profitability) using empirical data. From a firms’ point of view, stakeholders are in 
control of valuable resources that are essential for running the business (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Therefore, by managing the concerns of its stakeholder, a firm 
decreases the likelihood of having stakeholders hinder managers from achieving 
their goals. Instrumental studies can be made either using statistical methodologies 
or using interviews and direct observations. Regardless of the methodology, 
instrumental stakeholder studies maintain that the ability to manage various 
stakeholders leads to achieving business and profitability targets as well as 
outperforming other competitors. Therefore, this approach is referred to as a mean to 
an end (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In other words, it is a hypothetical approach 
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in which managers search for the optimal strategies to achieve their business goals 
and targets. 
Finally, the normative approach observes the function of firms and detects the 
“moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and management of the 
corporation.” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Researchers identify the normative 
approach as the fundamental approach in the stakeholder theory (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Unlike the instrumental approach, the normative approach is a 
categorical approach that recognizes ethical guidelines for managing firms and their 
decision making processes. Instead of setting strategies to achieve certain business 
goals, the normative approach thinks of a firm’s actions in a scope that is 
independent of a firm’s performance. It maintains that for firms to set certain 
strategies, the actions involved in implementing this strategy should be ethical.  
Kotter and Heskett (1992) suggest that most successful firms, even if they are from 
different industries, have one thing in common; these firms treat all of their 
stakeholders with ultimate respect in order to achieve their objectives. Different 
researchers have tried to classify a firm’s stakeholders into different groups. 
Clarkson (1995) suggests that there are two types of stakeholders: primary and 
secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders, such as customers or employees, are 
those stakeholders whose presence is necessary for a firm to survive. On the other 
hand, secondary stakeholders, such as the media or a firm’s competitors, are 
stakeholders that are not involved in official transactions with the firm. Secondary 
stakeholders are not as crucial as primary stakeholders for a firm’s survival, but their 
actions can have a significant effect on firms. Other researchers group stakeholders 
into different categories. For example, Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that the 
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importance of stakeholders to the firm should be ranked according to three attributes: 
urgency, legitimacy and power. 
4.2.3.1 Critics of the Stakeholder Theory 
However, the quick emergence of the stakeholder theory led to a number of 
criticisms from advocates of other theories (Laplume et al., 2008). Sundaram and 
Inkpen (2004) believe that such an approach will further increase the complexity of 
governing firms. Jensen (2002) believes that the stakeholder theory challenges the 
concept of maximizing shareholder wealth, which is the main objective of most 
modern corporations. The author adds that maximizing shareholder wealth is the 
factor required to maximize the well-being of the society. 
Laplume et al. (2008) also mentions some vague concepts in the stakeholder theory. 
The stakeholder theory does not provide a clear definition of which stakeholders the 
firm should pay attention to. Kaler (2006) adds that the stakeholder theory fails to 
provide a clear solution when a firm is faced with two different stakeholders with 
conflicting interests. 
Carson (2003) suggests that the stakeholder theory is missing barriers that would 
make managers follow its norms and practices. Jensen (2002) and Heath and 
Norman (2004) claim that the stakeholder theory intensifies agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. 
From another perspective, Kaler (2006) and Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) believe 
that the stakeholder theory is too complex to be implemented in real life. The 
foundations of the theory might have some positive virtues, but focusing on a large 
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number of stakeholders would be hard to achieve. Kline (2006) adds that the 
stakeholder theory is very broad. 
Concerning this study, the research is focused on one aspect of the stakeholder 
theory, which is the principle-agent problems that occur when managers try to 
entrench themselves in their jobs. Therefore, it is more logical to follow the 
philosophy of the agency theory, which Shankman (1999) labels as “a narrow form 
of stakeholder theory” (Shankman, 1999 p.p. 320). 
Table Summarizing the differences between shareholder firms (Agency Theory) and 
Stakeholder firms (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000) 
 
4.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory: 
Resource dependence theory focuses on the relationship between a firm’s external 
environment and resources on one hand and organizational behavior on the other 
hand (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This theory recognizes a firm’s risk and 
uncertainty due to its dependence on other organizations and resources, and attempts 
to reduce this dependence (Hillman et al., 2009). This highlights the importance of 
the board of directors as providers of resources and professional expertise. 
Attribute Shareholder Firm  Stakeholder Firm 
Goals Maximizing shareholder wealth 
Pursue multiple objectives of parties with 
different interests 
Governance Structure 
and Key Processes 
Principal-Agent Model: Managers are agents of 
shareholders. Control is the key task 
Team Production Model: Coordination, 
cooperation, and conflict resolution are the key 
tasks 
Performance Metrics 
Shareholder value sufficient to maintain investor 
commitment 
Fair distribution of value created to maintain 
commitment of multiple stakeholders 
Residual Risk Holders Shareholders All stakeholders 
Stakeholder 
Salience/Influence 
Finance/investor/owners only stakeholder with 
sufficient power and legitimacy to achieve 
"definitive" status in governance processes 
More than one stakeholder with sufficient power 
and legitimacy to achieve "definitive" status in 
governance processes 
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Large boards would provide the firm with wider interlocks and a wider access to 
resources. Early resource dependence theorists focused on the importance of having 
a large board size in order to provide the firm with the necessary resources (Hillman 
et al., 2009). Pfeffer (1972) and Sanders and Carpenter (1998) find that board size 
increases as the level of a firm’s interdependence increases. However, this argument 
is refuted by researchers claiming that the board size depends on several other 
factors (such as a firm’s strategy or a firm’s previous performance) other than a 
firm’s external environment only (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Boyd (1990) also 
criticizes the focus on board size and suggests that researchers should focus on the 
type of directors instead.  
Independent directors who have interlocks with law firms could provide their 
organization with legal services (Daily et al., 2003). Furthermore, other independent 
directors who work in financial institutions can help their firm in acquiring 
favourable lines of credit that could be costly otherwise. Mizruchi and Stearns 
(1988) provide results supporting the latter argument. Findings show that firms with 
liquidity problems hire new directors who have interlocks with financial institutions 
due to their skill and wide access to resources/funding. Thus, powerful independent 
directors with a wide range of interlocks are beneficial to firms due to their access to 
critical resources (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Supporting this argument, Provan 
(1980) finds that companies that hire powerful directors on their boards enjoy better 
access to vital resources than their counterparts.   
Daily (1995) provides further support for the resource dependence theory by 
studying the relationship between board characteristics and firms that successfully 
re-emerged from bankruptcy. Firms on the verge of bankruptcy usually experience a 
decrease in the availability of resources and, therefore, the presence of independent 
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directors should help these firms obtain the necessary resources (Cameron et al., 
1987). Consistent with expectations, Daily (1995) finds that as the number of 
independent directors on company’s board increases, the probability of re-emerging 
from bankruptcy increases as well. 
In addition to the presence of powerful independent directors, resource dependence 
theorists claim that firms also engage in mergers and acquisitions in order to reduce 
the uncertainty of their external environment (Pfeffer, 1976). One way for a firm to 
do so is to acquire a direct competitor and, therefore, reduce the competitiveness in 
the market. Another way could be acquiring one of the firm’s main suppliers of raw 
material. In such a case, the acquiring firm will reduce its level of dependence on the 
supplier and therefore reduce its risk and uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1976). Galbraith and 
Stiles (1984) provide empirical evidence supporting Pfeffer’s (1976) assumptions. 
Results show that mergers and acquisitions decrease the interdependency between 
sellers and buyers. However, critics of the resource dependence theory argue that 
there are other determinants for mergers and acquisitions that are as important as the 
interdependency between buyers and sellers (Hillman et al., 2009). For example, 
Finkelstein (1997) recreates a similar sample to that of Pfeffer (1976) and finds that 
the historical context of the firm is an important determinant of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Similar to mergers and acquisitions, Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) argue that buyers and 
suppliers form joint ventures in order to decrease the interdependency between them. 
Goes and Park (1997) find that such joint ventures successfully alleviate 
environmental risks and provide firms with better access to resources.  
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While the resource dependence theory addresses the importance of independent 
directors in acquiring critical resources, it neglects the significant role that 
independent directors in monitoring managerial actions. Governance regulations, 
such as the Nasdaq and NYSE standards, require companies to have a majority of 
independent directors on their boards due to the importance of the monitoring 
function of independent directors. The resource dependence theory, however, does 
not address the role of independent directors in monitoring and disciplining 
managers, adopting takeover defences and protecting the firm’s shareholders.  This 
study is more focused on the balance of power between independent directors and 
managers and how does their interaction with takeover defences affect shareholder 
wealth. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to adopt a theoretical framework that 
stresses on the role of independent directors and CEOs in the principal-agent 
relationship rather than the ability of independent directors to obtain valuable 
resources. 
4.2.5 Multi-theoretical Approaches: 
Daily et al. (2003) state “A multi-theoretic approach to corporate governance is 
essential for recognizing the many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably 
enhance organizational functioning.” (Daily et al., 2004, p.p 372) 
The large amount of conflicting evidence in the corporate governance literature 
stimulated modern researchers to integrate several theories in their research. For 
example, Brickley et al. (1997) argue that CEO duality could be beneficial for some 
firms and harmful for others. Their results provide partial support for the contrasting 
points of views on role duality that are adopted by the agency theory and stewardship 
theory. In the same sense, Elsayed (2007) presents mixed results for the effect of 
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CEO duality on firm performance. Findings suggest that the relationship between 
CEO duality on firm performance, for Egyptian firms, depends on the industry type 
of the firm. Elsayed (2007) concludes that a no single theory could explain the 
different and complex aspects of corporate governance. In addition, Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) provide partial support for both agency and stewardship theories 
regarding the effect of board independence on firm performance suggesting that both 
theories can be used as alternatives. Similarly, Lam and Lee (2008) find that CEO 
duality is beneficial for non-family controlled companies in Hong Kong while an 
independent leadership structure is beneficial for family controlled companies. 
Daily et al. (2003) add that too much focus is being placed on the monitoring and 
oversight functions of the board of directors while paying minimal attention to other 
board functions
3
. Such studies fail to control for the dynamic nature of board 
characteristics that may differ with firm characteristics and, therefore, fail to find any 
significant result. Daily et al. (2003) believe that this is one of the main reasons that 
previous researchers fail to find any significant relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance
4
. Therefore, adopting a multi-theoretical 
approach could provide a solution and explain the large amount of contradicting 
evidence found in the literature.  
Hillman and Daziel (2003) also provide an example of how researchers should 
benefit from integrating different theories of corporate governance. The authors state 
that a multi-theoretical approach combining agency and resource dependence 
theories could better explain the roles of the board of directors. Agency theorists 
                                                          
3
 Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) state that aside from the monitoring function, the board of 
directors provides important strategic roles and services for the company as well as being a main 
provider of resources. 
4
 Such as the meta analysis by Dalton et al. (1998), Dalton et al. (2003), Rhoades et al. (2001) 
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focus on the monitoring function of independent directors while resource 
dependence theorists focus on the independent directors’ interlocks and their ability 
to obtain resources. However, both frameworks fail to consider that the monitoring 
and the provision of resources functions are not mutually exclusive and can both 
affect a firm’s performance simultaneously. 
Christopher (2010) criticizes the over-dependence on agency theory in corporate 
governance literature and suggests that other theories should be incorporated with 
the agency theory to form a multi-theoretical approach. Notwithstanding the 
importance of agency theory, Christopher (2010) claims that the agency theory is 
based on an economic model and, therefore, fails to account for other forces that 
could affect a firm’s governance structure. As a result, the author states that other 
corporate governance theories, such as stakeholder theory, resource dependence 
theory and stewardship theory, should be incorporated with the agency theory to 
form a better theoretical framework of corporate governance. 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) conclude that “it is not a matter of agency theory or 
stewardship theory or resource dependence theory. Rather each theory has a 
contribution to make to the governance debate.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
4.3 Framework for this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
High Governance and 
Shareholder Rights 
No Extra 
Monitoring is 
Needed 
No Room for 
CEOs to Extract 
Private Benefits 
Stewardship Theory Suggestions (CEO 
Duality and Increasing Insider 
Directors) Increase Firm Performance 
Low Governance and 
Shareholder Rights 
Extra 
Monitoring is 
Needed 
CEOs have 
Room to Extract 
Private Benefits 
Agency Theory Suggestions (No CEO 
Duality and Increasing Independent 
Directors) Increase Firm Performance 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This study is concerned with the divergence of interest between managers and 
shareholder in the process of adopting takeover defences. Specifically, it tackles how 
managers adopt certain takeover defences to achieve private benefits even though 
they have an adverse effect on firm value. In addition, the research will also address 
how other governance mechanisms, such as CEO ownership and board 
characteristics, affect firm performance in the presence/absence of different types of 
takeover defences.  Therefore, the agency theory will be the core foundation of this 
research due to its focus on the principal-agent relationship. However, the literature 
provides inconsistent results regarding the relationship between the aforementioned 
governance mechanisms and firm performance.  
Although several studies find that the suggestions of agency theorists (increasing 
board independence, increasing CEO ownership and removing role duality) does 
reduce agency costs, other studies report the opposite or provide insignificant results. 
This suggests that certain variables moderate the relationship between these 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. This study proposes that the 
presence of takeover defences, as a proxy for shareholder rights and managerial 
entrenchment, moderate the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. In other words, the level of takeover defences available at a certain 
company will direct the governance-performance relationship and failing to control 
for the presence of antitakeover provisions will provide insignificant results.  
It is expected that the suggestions of the agency theory are valid for specific cases 
only. For example, increasing board independence is beneficial for companies with 
powerful managers and low shareholder rights (high number of takeover defences). 
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In addition, assigning a role duality for a CEO who is already highly entrenched in 
the company by a large number of takeover defences will most likely have an 
adverse effect on firm performance. 
On the other hand, if the company is enjoying a high level of governance and 
shareholder rights are high (low number of takeover defences), increasing board 
independence will provide the company with additional and unnecessary monitoring. 
Instead, such companies would benefit more from the firm-specific expertise of 
insider directors. This is in line with the suggestions of the stewardship theory which 
supports the expert role of insider directors more than the monitoring role of 
outsiders. In the same sense, firms with good governance and high shareholder rights 
could benefit from the leadership role of CEOs having a role duality. As a result, this 
study adopts a multi-theoretical approach integrating both agency and stewardship 
theories based on the level and type of antitakeover provisions adopted by firms. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
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5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to set the hypotheses to be tested as well as the 
research methodologies used to test the research hypotheses. This chapter is split into 
two main sections. The first section sets the research methodology for the 
determinants of antitakeover provisions. Fixed effect regressions will be used when 
studying the determinants of the E-index since it is a categorical variable. On the 
other hand, probit regressions will be used when addressing the determinants of 
individual takeover defences since the dependent variable will be a dummy variable. 
The main independent variables in this model are CEO duality and the percentage of 
independent directors serving on a firm’s board of directors. These two variables are 
particularly important in addressing the determinants of antitakeover provisions due 
to the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. CEO duality is used 
as a proxy for powerful CEOs who might have more power to influence the adoption 
of takeover defences that would protect their positions. On the other hand, the 
monitoring role of independent directors should limit the adoption of any 
unnecessary takeover defences. Other important board, ownership and firm 
characteristic explanatory variables are also included in this model. In addition to 
studying the determinants of the E-index, this section provides a novel way of 
grouping antitakeover provisions as they relate to CEO monetary benefits. That is, 
the provisions are split into two groups based on whether the provision under study 
provides a firm’s CEO with private benefits or not. The importance of this new way 
of grouping provisions is that it helps in identifying which provisions are CEOs 
expected to support over other provisions. 
The second section of this chapter sets the research hypotheses and methodology for 
the effect of governance mechanisms on firm performance. Following previous 
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researchers, Tobin’s Q, the dependent variable, is used as a proxy for firm value. For 
the explanatory variables, a combination of board, ownership and firm characteristics 
is used as independent and control variables. The main independent variables in this 
model are: antitakeover provisions adoption, board independence and CEO 
ownership. However, the importance of this model is in the interaction variables 
created among these governance mechanisms. Interaction variables are created 
between antitakeover provision indices (external governance mechanism) on the on 
hand and CEO ownership and board independence on the other hand. These 
variables will capture the effect of CEO ownership and board independence on firm 
performance in the presence/absence of takeover defences. 
5.2 Model One: Determinants of Antitakeover Provisions 
5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
5.2.1.1 Entrenchment 
Previous research uses the 24 governance provisions by the IRRC (Investor 
Responsibility Research Center) to construct the G-index for shareholder rights 
(Gompers et al., 2003).  
Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct the “E-index” out of the 6 of the 24 previously used 
provisions that they hypothesized and found to be negatively related to firm value. 
These provisions were found to be the driving factor behind the G-Index and 
supposedly help the managers to entrench themselves in the company and reduce the 
likelihood of a takeover. The six provisions are: poison pills, golden parachutes, 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments and supermajority 
requirements for charter and merger amendments. 
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As mentioned earlier, Bebchuk et al. (2009) showed that all six provisions of the E-
index are associated with a negative effect on firm value. However, several 
researches study the determinants of two provisions of the E-index; poison pills 
(Davis, 1991; Mallette and Fowler, 1992) and golden parachutes (Cochran et al., 
1985; Singh and Harianto, 1989; Wade et al., 1990) while giving little attention to 
the other provisions. This research studies the determinants of the E-index as a 
whole, as well as studying the determinants of each provision of the E-index 
individually.  
The E-index is a scale variable where the presence of each provision adds a point to 
the E-index. Thus, the E-index can have any value between zero and six, where a 
value of zero indicates a low entrenchment level and the absence of all antitakeover 
provisions of the E-index. On the other hand, a value of six indicates a high level of 
entrenchment with the presence of all six antitakeover provisions. 
Since the IRRC does not put out data on antitakeover provisions every year, we 
follow previous literature and use a filling method to fill in the missing data 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). We assume that, for a missing year, the 
antitakeover provisions present at a certain company are the same as the ones 
reported in the previous year. Other filling methods do not significantly affect our 
results. 
As mentioned before, the E-Index will be split into two categories of provisions 
based on the monetary outcome provided to a manager. 
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5.2.1.2 The Grouping Process 
Sokolyk (2011) argues that different antitakeover provisions have different effects on 
the firm adopting them. Building up on this argument, we hypothesize that managers 
and independent directors have different preferences for different antitakeover 
provisions. Antitakeover provisions could serve as a one-line defence or as a two-
line defence for managers. The first line of defence, which is common among all 
antitakeover provisions, is that these provisions do make a takeover process harder. 
The second line of defence, which is only applicable to certain provisions, is that 
even if a takeover successfully takes place, a manager would receive a monetary 
compensation. The provisions of the E-Index are split into two categories based on 
the monetary benefits acquired by a manager after a successful takeover takes place. 
The two categories of provisions are as follows: 
5.2.1.2.1 Category A Provisions 
Category A provisions are the provisions that are expected to provide, or help in 
providing, a manager with a two-line defence facing a takeover threat. One of the 
assumptions of agency theory is that the interests of managers and shareholders 
could diverge due to the self-interested human behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Therefore, managers may prefer some provisions over others based on the monetary 
outcome provided to the manager. In other words, we expect managers to prefer 
having two lines of defence against takeover rather than the non-monetary 
compensating one line defence.  
The provisions included in this category are: Poison pills, golden parachutes and 
staggered boards. Poison pills and golden parachutes are included because they 
directly provide managers with monetary benefits when a takeover takes place. On 
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the other hand, staggered boards are included because the presence of a staggered 
board is crucial for a poison pill to be effective (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). 
Although staggered boards do not provide a direct monetary benefit to managers, 
they help in providing the monetary benefit from poison pills and, therefore, are 
included in the Category A provision. 
5.2.1.2.2 Category B Provisions 
Category B provisions are the remaining provisions of the E-Index which only 
provide the first line of defence for managers. These provisions simply make a 
takeover process harder without providing any benefit for a manager in case a 
takeover takes place. The provisions included in this category are: Supermajority 
requirement to approve a merger, limits to bylaw amendments and limits to charter 
amendments. 
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
Different studies have tried to find a relationship between board composition, stock 
ownership and firm characteristics on one hand and adopting antitakeover provisions 
on the other (Cochran al., 1985; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Davis, 1991; Singh 
and Harianto. 1989; Sundaramurthy, 1998; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Straska and 
Waller, 2010; Wade et al., 1990). Some studies have been using a single antitakeover 
provision as their dependent variable (Cochran et al. (1985) studies the effect of 
different firm characteristics on the adoption of golden parachutes) while others have 
constructed indexes out of a set of antitakeover provisions (Danielson and Karpoff 
(1998) and Sundaramurthy (1998) test the effect of different ownership structures 
and board characteristics on the adoption of a set of antitakeover provisions). 
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5.2.3 Board Characteristics 
Since the board of directors is the body responsible for approving and adopting 
antitakeover provisions, it is reasonable to expect that several board characteristics 
might play an important role in whether or not a firm chooses to implement takeover 
defences (Rechner et al., 1993).  
5.2.3.1 CEO Duality 
A firms’ leadership can be controlled in two possible ways: single leadership or dual 
leadership. Single leadership, also referred to as CEO duality, is when a single 
person serves as the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors as well. On the 
other hand, dual leadership occurs when two different directors are appointed; one as 
a CEO and the other as a chairman of the board. 
Researchers claim that one of the main reasons behind recent scandals and 
governance problems is the presence of CEO duality, which leads to a weak 
governance structure (Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
According to agency theory, researchers believe that CEO duality gives too much 
power to one individual, allowing him to dominate the board of directors and making 
the boards’ governance functions inefficient (Boyd, 1994; Dayton, 1984; Mallette 
and Fowler, 1992). In addition, using his power, this individual might influence 
certain decisions to extract private benefits or to adopt takeover defences in order to 
safeguard his position at the company (Sundaramurthy, 1998). Therefore, the usage 
of a dual leadership structures is recommended to increase board independence and 
thus enhance the alignment of interest between managers and stockholders (Coles et 
al., 2001). 
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These assumptions were further reinforced by Mallette and Fowler (1992), finding 
significant results that a dual leadership structure decreases the passage of poison 
pills. However, Sundaramurthy (1998) did not get the same results, as tests showed 
an insignificant relationship between CEO duality and a set of antitakeover 
provisions under study. 
Accordingly, this study tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1-a-: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions 
When the E-Index is split into categories A and B, a significant difference in the 
relationship between these categories and CEO duality is expected. Powerful CEOs 
act in an opportunistic way to increase their wealth (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 
2012).   Core et al. (1999) find that CEOs acting as chairmen of the board abuse the 
power given to them by seeking to maximize their own personal wealth. Building up 
on these arguments, CEOs are expected to influence the adoption of Category A 
provisions, which provide them with a financial benefit in the case of a takeover. 
Consistent with previous findings, this study tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1-b: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and the 
adoption of Category A provisions. 
CEOs already have structural power due to their position in their firm, which could 
also be enhanced if they serve as chairmen of the board (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 
2012). However, the monitoring of independent directors attempts to control the 
power given to a CEO (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Brickley et al., 1994; Combs et al., 
2007). This creates a fair balance of power at some firms and, therefore, we expect 
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that a CEO could only influence the adoption of a limited amount of takeover 
provisions. As a result, we investigate if an opportunistic CEO opposes the adoption 
of Category B provisions in order to have a higher probability of adopting Category 
A provisions.  
Hypothesis 1-c: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the 
adoption of Category B provisions. 
Measurement of Board Leadership  
CEO duality is a dummy variable (Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1998) 
where it will have a value of 1 if one person serves as both the CEO and the 
chairman of the board or 0 otherwise. 
5.2.3.2 Board Independence 
The composition of the board of directors is expected to have a significant impact on 
the adoption of antitakeover defences. A company’s board of directors is considered 
one of the main instruments used in corporate governance to monitor managers 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) and, therefore, align the interests of managers and 
shareholders (Kang et al., 2007). From an agency theory perspective, independent 
directors are more independent of top management than insiders. Therefore, 
independent directors are considered to be better monitors of the managerial 
performance and their presence is expected to lead to better shareholder rights and 
protection (Dalton et al., 2007; Jensen and Meckling). This can be clearly seen in 
governance reforms such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Following several 
corporate governance scandals, the Sarbanes Oxley Act was enacted requiring firms 
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to have at least half of the members serving on the firm’s board to be independent 
directors. 
Mallette and Fowler (1992) argue that, according to agency theory, increasing the 
percentage of independent directors on the board would lead to better governance 
over the decisions taken by the board of directors. This is because, unlike insiders, 
outside directors are more independent of the top management, and thus would 
represent the shareholders’ best interest without any bias. Empirical tests support the 
aforementioned claim by providing evidence that increasing the percentage of 
independent directors has been linked with an increase in firm value (Setia-Atmaja, 
2009), higher CEO turnover when a firm is underperforming (Weisbach, 1988) and a 
higher degree of transparency (Chiang and He, 2010). 
Knowing that antitakeover provisions lead to lower shareholder rights (Gompers et 
al., 2003), many researchers hypothesized that an increase in the percentage of 
independent directors would be inversely related to the adoption of antitakeover 
provisions (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Singh and 
Harianto, 1989; Sundaramurthy, 1998). On the other hand, since antitakeover 
provisions provide the management team with a higher bargaining power (Comment 
and Schwert, 1995; Heron and Lie, 2005), researchers claim that independent 
directors should favour the adoption of some takeover defences (Evans and Hefner, 
2009; Harris, 1990). 
Although Singh and Harianto (1989) believed that independent directors will try to 
repel a managers’ attempts to influence managerial compensation arrangements 
(such as golden parachutes), results showed the opposite. Their findings indicate that 
as the percentage of independent directors increases, the probability of adopting a 
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golden parachute increases. Cochran et al. (1985) found similar results indicating 
that the percentage of insider directors is negative related to the incidence of golden 
parachutes (in other words, a positive relation between outsiders and the adoption of 
golden parachutes).  
Regarding other antitakeover defences, Davis (1991) also shows that there is a 
positive association between the percentage of independent directors and the 
adoption of poison pills. On the other hand, Mallette and Fowler (1992) provide 
results showing an insignificant effect of the percentage of outside directors on 
poison pills. Sundaramurthy (1998) provide results consistent with Mallette and 
Fowler (1992), indicating that the percentage of outside directors has little to do with 
the adoption of a set of 6 different provisions. 
Consistent with the agency theory and the monitoring role of independent directors, 
and consistent with the hypotheses of the previous literature, the following 
hypothesis will be tested: 
Hypothesis 2-a: There is a negative and significant relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors and the adoption of antitakeover provisions. 
Upon splitting the E-index into categories A and B, we also expect a behavioral 
difference from independent directors towards the two sub-indices. Since Category 
A provisions are hypothesized to be more entrenching to managers due to the private 
benefit received, it is expected that independent directors will strongly oppose the 
adoption of such provisions. In addition, since the literature provides two different 
explanations for the adoption of takeover defences (interest alignment and 
entrenchment hypotheses), this study suggests that the monetary benefit received by 
managers moderates the relationship between independent directors and the adoption 
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of antitakeover provisions. In other words, the interest alignment hypothesis is valid 
for the adoption of provisions that do not provide managers with private benefits 
(Category B provisions) while the entrenchment hypothesis will be valid for the 
provisions that provide managers with private benefits (Category A provisions) 
Accordingly, this study tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2-b: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and the adoption of Category A provisions. 
Hypothesis 2-c: Independent directors prefer the adoption of Category B provisions 
rather than the adoption of Category A provisions. 
Measurement of Board Composition 
Director independence is measured as the ratio of directors that are independent of 
top management to that of the total number of directors (Mallette and Fowler, 1992; 
Sundaramurthy, 1998). This study uses the definition of independent directors as 
provided by the RiskMetrics database. According to the RiskMetrics database, 
independent directors are those who are independent of top management, are not ex-
employees and do not have any business relationship with the company. 
5.2.3Control Variables 
5.2.3.1 Board Size 
Another important variable related to a firm’s board characteristics is the board size. 
As Yermack (1996)   claims, many researchers emphasize the importance of the 
composition of the board of directors while giving little importance to the size of the 
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board. Few researchers have studied whether the board size is a key determinant in 
whether a firm adopts antitakeover provisions or not. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001)  suggest that as the size of the board increases, 
agency problems tend to increase as well. They believe that a large board can lose its 
effectiveness as an efficient governing body and become more of a symbol. 
Jensen (1993) argues that the additional costs of adding more directors to the board 
(such as coordination costs) are higher than the benefits that they could provide 
through additional monitoring. Consistent with Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996) finds 
a negative relationship between a firm’s value and the size of its board of directors. 
Yermack (1996) adds that the governance of the firm improves when the boards are 
smaller. The author shows that firms with larger boards tend to use their assets in a 
less efficient way than firms with smaller boards. Yermack (1996) also show that the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal for poorly performing firms is higher when the board of 
directors is smaller. Finally, Yermack (1996) shows that compensations to motivate 
CEOs are stronger in firms that have smaller boards of directors. 
All of these findings suggest that the board size can be a key determinant of a firm’s 
governance structure. Results show that companies with smaller boards have a better 
governance structure. Consequently, a smaller board might be more active in 
fighting managerial entrenchment and opposing the adoption of antitakeover 
provisions.  
Measurement 
The board size is measured as the number of directors serving on the board (Singh 
and Harianto, 1989). 
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5.2.3.2 Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure has been extensively used in the literature as a significant 
determinant of antitakeover provisions (Boyle et al., 1998; Cochran et al., 1985; 
Heron and Lie, 2005; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Singh and Harianto, 1989; 
Sundaramurthy, 1998). 
From an agency theory perspective, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that the 
interests of managers and stockholders converge as the ownership level of managers 
increases. Therefore, Singh and Harianto (1989) maintain that in the case of high 
managerial ownership, managers, as well as shareholders, would benefit from the 
premium paid by the bidding firm if a takeover successfully takes place. Thus, high 
ownership levels can act as a substitute for golden parachutes or other antitakeover 
provisions (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Walkling and Long, 1984). Consequently, 
Singh and Harianto (1989) hypothesized and found a negative relationship between 
ownership levels and the adoption of golden parachutes. Similarly, Malatesta and 
Walkling (1988) and Mallette and Fowler (1992) find a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and the adoption of poison pills. 
However, Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that too much 
managerial ownership could lead to managerial entrenchment and empire building 
and could therefore have an adverse effect on the interest alignment between 
managers and shareholders. As a result, Sundaramurthy (1998) believes that the 
negative relationship found in the previous literature between antitakeover 
provisions and managerial ownership is valid for low levels of ownership. At higher 
levels of ownership the relationship, Sundaramurthy (1998) suggests that this 
relationship would become positive as the managers would seek the extraction of 
private benefits and entrenching themselves in the company by adopting more 
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antitakeover provisions. The results found by Sundaramurthy (1998) reinforce her 
suggestions, as the results show a U-shaped relationship between a set of 
antitakeover provisions and managerial ownership, with a cutoff point of 30% 
ownership. This is consistent with other views that also find a curvilinear impact of 
insiders ownership on firm value (Griffith, 1999; Morck, et al., 1988). These results 
show that the linear relationships found by previous researchers (such as Davis 
(1991) and Singh and Harianto (1989)) could in fact be deceptive. 
Boyle et al. (1998) also provide evidence that partially supports Sundaramurthy’s 
(1998) findings. Boyle et al. (1998) find that the number of extraordinary 
antitakeover provisions is inversely related to managerial ownership at low levels of 
ownership (less than 10.3% ownership). However, there is no significant relationship 
between extraordinary antitakeover provisions and insiders ownership for ownership 
levels above 10.3%.  
Measurement of ownership 
Various measures have been used for ownership throughout the literature. Some 
researchers measure ownership as the percentage of shares owned the top officers 
and executives combined (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Davis, 1991 Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992; Singh and Harianto, 1989). However, this thesis is more concerned 
with CEOs and their power to adopt takeover defences. Therefore, CEO ownership 
will be used to account for the power given to CEOs through share ownership as 
well as the interest alignment caused by this ownership. Consistent with Walkling 
and Long (1984), Davis (1991) argues that ownership should be measured without 
including stock options since stock options were found not to have a significant 
effect on a manager’s resistance to a takeover threat. Accordingly, this study will use 
the percentage of CEO ownership excluding stock options.  
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5.2.3.3 Firm Characteristics 
Several firm characteristics can play a major role in whether or not a firm would 
adopt antitakeover provisions (Cochran al., 1985; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Straska 
and Waller, 2010; Wade et al., 1990).  
Among these different studies, some study the effect of different firm characteristics, 
such as firm size, leverage, financial performance, on the adoption of a single 
antitakeover provision or an index of provisions taken as a whole. For example, 
Cochran et al. (1985) study the effect of different firm characteristics on the adoption 
of a golden parachute while Straska and Waller (2010) study the effect of some firm 
characteristics on a set of governance provisions (G and E indexes). 
5.2.3.3.1 Firm Performance 
Another important firm characteristic when studying the determinants of firms that 
adopt antitakeover provisions would be the company’s profitability and performance.  
This variable is particularly important because it could provide some insights about 
the reasons why firms adopt these provisions. Mallette and Fowler (1992) believe 
that it is important to study the prior performance of a company because it would 
show if the adoption of these takeover defences was triggered by managers because 
of their poor performance in the past years. Firms whose managers have been under-
performing are expected to be undervalued and therefore have a relatively low 
market to book ratio (Davis, 1991). Accordingly, poorly performing companies 
would be more attractive takeover targets (Jensen, 1988) and their management 
teams would feel that there is more need to adopt takeover defences in order to 
secure their jobs (Cochran et al., 1985). 
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Previous researchers have reached different conclusions when studying the effect of 
the performance on the adoption of takeover defences (Davis, 1991; Heron and Lie, 
2005; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Straska and Waller, 2010; Wade et al., 1990). 
While Davis (1991) and Mallette and Fowler (1992) find no significant relation 
between their measures of a firm’s performance and the adoption of poison pills, 
Heron and Lie (2005) find a negative and significant relation between a company’s 
prior performance and the incidence of poison pills. Regarding other provisions, 
Cochran et al. (1985) and Wade et al. (1990) find a negative correlation between a 
firm’s performance and the adoption of golden parachutes. 
Measurement for Performance  
One reason for the inconsistency of previous researchers might be due to the 
measurement used for firm performance. Previously used measures include: Return 
on assets (ROA) (Cochran et al., 1985; Straska and Waller, 2010), total market 
return and market to book ratio of the previous year (Davis, 1991), the average return 
on equity (ROE) of the previous three years (Mallette and Fowler, 1992), and a 
measure for performance called EXCESS (Cochran et al., 1985; Wade et al., 1990). 
Consistent with Cochran et al. (1985) and Straska and Waller (2010), the 
performance will be measured by calculating the ROA. Also consistent with Mallette 
and Fowler (1992), the performance of the previous year will be used to check if the 
prior poor performance caused the adoption of antitakeover provisions. 
5.2.3.3.2 Firm Size 
Many studies have used firm size to monitor its effect on the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions (Cochran et al., 1985; Davis, 1991; Straska and Waller, 
2010; Wade et al., 1990). Although different researchers study the effect of the firm 
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size on different antitakeover provisions, most of the results were found to be 
consistent.  
Consistent with their expectations, most researchers have found a negative 
relationship between firm size and the adoption of different types of takeover 
defences. For example, Cochran et al. (1985) and Wade et al. (1990) report an 
inverse relationship between firm size and the presence of golden parachutes while 
Davis (1991) and Mallette and Fowler (1992) find a negative relationship between 
firm size and the adoption of poison pills. Sundaramurthy (1998) also provides 
evidence of a negative correlation between firm size and a group of antitakeover 
provisions. 
However, a recent study by Straska and Waller (2010) hypothesizes and finds a 
curvilinear relationship between firm size and antitakeover indexed where the 
relationship is positive for slightly large firms and then becomes negative for firms 
with a relatively large size.  
Measurement of Firm Size  
Although the previous literature shows consistent results regarding firm size, 
different studies have used different approaches to measure the size of a firm. These 
measurements include the book value of total assets and the sales volume (Cochran 
et al., 1985); net sales (Mallette and Fowler, 1992); total market value (Davis, 1991); 
number of employees (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Sundaramurthy, 1998); log sales 
(wade et al., 1990); market value of equity (Straska and Waller, 2010). The measure 
of firm size for this paper will be the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
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5.2.3.3.3 Capital Structure 
Another factor that might affect a company’s likelihood of facing a takeover threat is 
its capital structure. Cochran et al. (1985) believe that as the amount of leverage 
increases, companies will less likely face a takeover threat as their high liabilities 
will make the bidders lose interest in the company. 
Therefore, researchers have hypothesized that there will be an inverse relation 
between a firm’s debt positions and its probability of adopting a poison pill (Mallette 
and Fowler, 1992) or a golden parachute (Cochran et al., 1985). Surprisingly, results 
have shown that both tests were insignificant as the debt position had little to do with 
the presence of takeover defences. Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and Arikawa and 
Mitsusada (2011) have also reported no significant difference in the leveraged 
position between companies that have already adopted a poison pill and those that 
have not. 
Measurement for Capital Structure: Most of the previous studies have measured 
debt as the ratio of debt to total assets (Arikawa and Mitsusada, 2011; Bizjak and 
Marquette, 1998; Cochran et al., 1985). Others have preferred to use the debt ratio 
compared to the firm’s common equity (Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Following 
Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011), Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and Cochran et al. 
(1985), this study uses the ratio of debt to total assets as a measure of a firm’s capital 
structure. 
5.2.3.3.4 Long-term Investments 
Stein (1988) argues that the presence of a takeover threat could lead to managerial 
myopia. When managers engage in long term investments, which could provide the 
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company with minimal amounts of profits on the short run, the company’s 
performance might seem poor to some investors and the stock price might decrease 
and become undervalued. A company with an undervalued stock price might be an 
attractive investment for corporate bidders and would therefore increase the 
probability of a takeover. Therefore, the managerial myopia hypothesis states that, 
fearing a possible takeover threat, managers might focus on short-term investments 
to boost their current profit and give little attention to long-term investments (Stein, 
1988).  
Stein (1988) suggests that one of the possible solutions to solve the managerial 
myopia problem is to adopt antitakeover provisions that would decrease the 
likelihood of a takeover threat. Managers acting in the absence of a takeover threat 
will be free to invest in long-term projects that could provide the company with 
growth opportunities. 
To test if managers who invest in long-term projects, and thus have high R&D 
expenditures, adopt antitakeover provisions to protect themselves from managerial 
myopia, this research controls for the R&D expenditure. A positive relation between 
the E-index and R&D expenditures would support the managerial myopia 
hypothesis, indicating that managers who invest in long term projects tend to adopt 
antitakeover provisions to protect themselves. 
Measurement for Long-term Investments  
Consistent with previous researches (Arikawa and Mitsusada, 2011; Straska and 
Waller, 2010), R&D expenditure will be used to test a manager’s investment in long 
term projects. 
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Accordingly, the first model of this research will be as follows 
E = β0 + β1BCt + β2Dualt + β3OWNt + β4BS + β5 ROAt-1  + β6 R&D t + β7FSt + β8LEVt 
+ ε 
In addition to studying the determinants of antitakeover provisions, the first model of 
this research tests the effect of CEO duality on firm performance in the 
presence/absence of different types of antitakeover provisions. Since CEO duality is 
used as a proxy of CEO power and the ability to influence the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions, it is particularly important to study the interaction between 
antitakeover provisions and CEO duality in affecting firm performance. 
Variable Measure Previous studies using the same 
measure 
Entrenchment (E) E-Index Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
Ownership (OWN) CEO Ownership  
Board Composition 
(BC) 
Percentage of 
Independent Directors 
Mallette and Fowler (1992); 
Sundaramurthy (1998)  
CEO Duality (DUAL) Dummy (1 if CEO is also 
chair of board, 0 
otherwise) 
Mallette and Fowler (1992); 
Sundaramurthy (1998) 
Board Size (BS) Total number of directors 
on the board 
Singh and Harianto (1989) 
Previous 
Performance (ROAt-
1) 
Return on Assets Cochran et al. (1985); Straska and 
Waller (2010) 
Firm Size (FS) Total Assets  
Leverage (LEV) Ratio of Debt to Total 
Assets  
Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011); Bizjak 
and Marquette (1998); Cochran et al. 
(1985) 
Long-term 
Investments (R&D) 
R&D Expenditure Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011); Straska 
and Waller (2010) 
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5.3 Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Duality  
Although many researchers argue against the presence of a role duality in firms, the 
literature fails to reach a clear consensus on the effect of CEO duality on firm 
performance. Supporters of the agency theory claim that a role duality provides a 
company’s CEO with too much power, leading to empire building and the extraction 
of private benefits. Thus, agency theorists argue that there is a negative relationship 
between role duality and firm performance. On the other hand, supporters of the 
stewardship theory argue that assigning one person as both a CEO and chairman of 
the board will provide the firm and its employees with a sense of leadership and 
unity. This would allow the company’s executives to have clear strategic goals and 
enhance firm performance. However, empirical tests fail to provide clear support for 
either of the two competing theories. The inability of several tests to provide a 
certain relationship between CEO duality and firm performance suggests that certain 
variables moderate this relationship. This study proposes that both theories could be 
valid depending on a firm’s governance structure. Firms that are enjoying a good 
governance structure and high shareholder rights should benefit from the presence of 
a role duality. In such firms CEOs are well monitored and they are motivated by the 
presence of their role duality. On the other hand, a CEO acting as a chairman of the 
board in a firm with poor governance structure and weak shareholder rights has more 
room for the extraction of private benefits and would negatively affect firm 
performance.  
Since the provisions of categories A and B were constructed based on CEO 
monetary benefits, it would be interesting to find how the presence/absence of CEO 
duality affects the relationship between each of the two sub-indices and firm value. 
Therefore, two interaction variables are constructed (one between CEO duality and 
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Category A provisions while the other between CEO duality and Category B 
provisions) to test the credibility of the aforementioned claims. CEOs with a role 
duality already have structural power at their corporation. Providing such CEOs with 
Category A provisions could further increase their power leading to high levels of 
entrenchment and empire building. Therefore, the presence of Category A provisions 
is expected to worsen the relationship between CEO duality and firm value. Thus, 
this study tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3-a: The presence (absence) of Category A provisions will have a 
negative (positive) effect on the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance 
On the other hand, CEOs with a role duality will not have a significant additional 
power in the presence of Category B provisions since these provision do not lead to 
any private benefits. Category B provisions just make a takeover process harder and 
could be used to provide the management team with a higher bargaining power in 
case of a takeover threat. Therefore, although Category B provisions are expected to 
have a negative effect on firm performance, the presence of a role duality in this case 
should not worsen this relationship. 
Hypothesis 3-b: There is no significant effect for the presence/absence of Category 
B provisions on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance 
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5.4 Model Two: Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth 
5.4.1 Dependent Variable 
5.4.1.1 Firm Value 
The primary goal of managers is to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and therefore 
maximize firm value. However, according to the agency theory, conflicts of interest 
might occur between managers and shareholders that would have an adverse effect 
on firm value. This could occur when managers pursue their own goals and interests 
which might not be consistent with maximizing firm value. Among the solutions 
provided by Dalton et al. (2007) to solve these agency conflicts are: increasing board 
independence, increasing managerial ownership and the activity of the market for 
corporate control. 
Various researchers study the effect of the aforementioned governance mechanism 
on firm value. For example, Griffith (1999) and Hu and Izumida (2008) study the 
effect of CEO and managerial ownership on firm value; Gompers et al. (2003) and 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) study the effect of different antitakeover provisions on firm 
value; Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) study the effect of outsider directors on firm 
performance. 
Measuring firm value has been fairly consistent throughout the literature. Although 
other measures can be taken as alternatives (Mehran (1995) measures firm value 
using both Tobin’s Q and ROA), Tobin’s Q has been extensively used in the 
literature to measure firm performance. Chung and Pruitt (1994) suggest that the 
previous measures of Tobin’s Q were not used extensively due to their complex 
calculations and the difficulty of obtaining their relative data. Therefore, Chung and 
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Pruitt (1994) construct a simpler version of Tobin’s Q and claim that the simpler 
versions are highly correlated with the original ones and are easily calculated. 
Consistent with recent studies (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2009; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Straska and Waller, 2010), this 
research follows Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in calculating the value of Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as follows: 
Q =
Market Value (MV) of Assets
Book Value (BV) of Assets
 
𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝐵𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 − (𝐵𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥)  
5.4.2 Independent Variables 
Although all three governance mechanisms mentioned before are expected to affect a 
firm’s performance, very few have talked about the interaction between these 
governance mechanisms and how does their interaction affect firm value. In 
particular, this research gives special attention to the effect of antitakeover protection 
on the relationship between each of the other two mechanisms (ownership structure 
and board composition) and firm value. Each mechanism is studied on its own, as 
well as the interaction among these mechanisms. Specifically, interaction variables 
will be constructed to measure the effect of the takeover provisions indices on the 
relationship between CEO ownership and firm value on one hand and board 
independence and firm value on the other. 
5.4.2.1 Entrenchment 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) label the antitakeover provisions in their study as “entrenching 
provisions” (Bebchuk et al., 2009, p.p. 785). The market for corporate control is one 
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of the main mechanisms used to discipline under-performing managers. Therefore, 
trying to deactivate the market for corporate control, by using antitakeover 
provisions to fight off takeover threats will help managers secure their jobs and 
entrench themselves in the company. 
Gompers et al. (2003) constructed an index for measuring shareholder rights called 
the G-index. This index was made out of 24 provisions corporate governance 
provisions put out by the Investor Responsibility Research Center. These governance 
provisions are considered as takeover deterrents and Gompers et al. (2003) believe 
that they are adopted by the management teams in order to entrench themselves in 
the company. Therefore as the G-index increases, the number of antitakeover 
provisions adopted increase and the shareholders’ rights decrease. To further 
reinforce their claims, Gompers et al. (2003) find a negative correlation between the 
G-index and firm value. That is, as the number of antitakeover provisions increase, 
the value of the firm, as well as its sales and profit, decrease. 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that testing all of the provisions in the G-index might be 
misleading because only a small subset of the provisions might be behind the 
relation. Accordingly, Bebchuk et al. (2009) test the significance of each provision 
on its own while controlling for the other provisions in the G-index. Results show a 
negative significant correlation between firm value and six of the provisions used in 
the G-index. Bebchuk et al. (2009) therefore claim that these six provisions are the 
driving force behind the correlation between the G-index and firm value. They group 
these provisions to form the entrenchment index (E-index). Therefore, this study will 
use antitakeover provisions, specifically the provisions used in the E-index, as a sign 
that managers seek to entrench their position in the company.  
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Previous researchers present mixed evidence regarding the impact of antitakeover 
provisions on firm value. While Ryngaert (1988) finds a positive relation between 
poison pills and firm value, Malatesta and Walkling (1988) report a negative 
correlation between the adoption of poison pills and firm value. Other studies, such 
as Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) perform a longitudinal study from 1974 to 1988. 
Results show an insignificant relationship between 1974 and 1979. However, after 
1979, this relationship turns into a significantly negative relationship between 
antitakeover provisions and firm value. However, most of the recent studies report a 
negative relationship between firm value and the presence of several antitakeover 
provisions (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Faleye, 2007; Gompers 
et al., 2003). Accordingly, this research will test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative and significant relationship between all 
antitakeover provision indices and firm value. 
Measurement: Different studies have used different types of antitakeover provisions 
to test their relative effect on firm value. Some of the previous studies have used a 
single antitakeover provision such as poison pills (Ryngaert, 1988) or staggered 
boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005) while others have designed a set of provisions to 
test their combined effect on firm value (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). 
As mentioned before, the antitakeover provisions of the E-index will be the focal 
point of this study since they were found to be the ones negatively related to firm 
value. In addition to studying the E-index, two sub-indices (Categories A and B) will 
be constructed from the provisions of the E-index based on whether the provision 
provides the CEO/managers with a monetary benefit or not. 
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5.4.2.2 Antitakeover Provisions and Board Independence 
The second major corporate governance mechanism in resolving the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders is increasing the independence of the 
board of directors (Dalton et al., 2007). Although the agency theory predicts a 
positive relationship between the percentage of insider directors and firm value, 
results are still inconsistent. Consistent with the agency theory, researchers show that 
increasing the percentage of independent directors increases the CEO turnover rate 
of poorly performing firms (Weisbach, 1988), enhances the stock market reaction to 
the adoption of poison pills (Brickley, 1994) and increase the gains achieved from 
tender offers (Cotter et al., 1997) 
On the other hand, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report that the percentage of 
independent directors serving on a firm’s board is negatively related to firm value. 
Brick et al. (2006) argue that in some cases CEOs and directors increase each other’s 
compensation seeking private benefits while having an adverse effect on firm value.  
Given the inconsistency of the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance, this study suggests that a firm’s governance structure moderates this 
relationship.  
Researchers argue that internal governance mechanisms and external governance 
mechanisms interact in affecting firm performance (Cremers and Nair, 2005). 
Cremers and Nair (2005) show that a decrease in antitakeover provisions (high 
external governance) leads to a larger positive impact on firm performance in the 
presence of large blockholders (high internal governance). Another study shows that 
increasing the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect on firm 
performance for firms with powerful CEOs and a negative relationship otherwise 
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(Combs et al., 2007). In addition, Brickley et al. (1994) find that adopting poison 
pills leads to a positive stock market reaction when the majority of the board consists 
of independent directors and a negative reaction otherwise. 
In a similar sense, this study argues that the presence/absence of antitakeover 
provisions, as a proxy for the wellness of a firm’s governance structure and the level 
of shareholder rights, moderate the board independence-firm performance 
relationship. In other words, in the presence of takeover defences, shareholder rights 
are low and the firm’s governance structure is weak. Therefore, in such a case, a firm 
could benefit from increasing the percentage of independent directors and thus 
increasing the monitoring of managers. On the other hand, in the absence of takeover 
defences, there is no need for such strict monitoring. Therefore, increasing board 
independence when the firm is already enjoying a good level of governance is 
expected to have an adverse effect on firm value. Such firms should find the 
advisory role of insider directors to be more beneficial than the monitoring role of 
independent directors. 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, interaction variables will be created between 
the different indices of antitakeover provisions and the percentage of independent 
directors. The first part of this model will test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5-a: There is a positive (negative) relationship between the percentage 
of independent directors and firm value in the presence (absence) of antitakeover 
provisions (E-Index). 
In this hypothesis, it is important to differentiate between Category A and Category 
B provisions.  
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The presence of Category A provisions signals weaker shareholder rights and higher 
managerial entrenchment. In such a case, a firm could benefit more from increasing 
the percentage of independent directors in order to monitor managerial behavior 
more efficiently and effectively.  
On the other hand, the presence of independent directors is expected to be less useful 
for firms having Category B provisions. Since Category B provisions provide 
managers with a lower level of entrenchment than Category A provisions, the effect 
of independent directors on firm value in the presence of Category B provision is 
expected to be less significant than that where Category A provisions are present. 
Accordingly, this study also tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5-b: There is a positive (negative) relationship between the percentage 
of independent directors and firm value in the presence (absence) of Category A 
provisions 
Hypothesis 5-c: There is an insignificant relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and firm value in the presence (absence) of Category B 
provisions 
Measurement of Board Independence 
 Board independence is measured as the ratio of independent directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. This study utilizes the classification of 
independent directors as mentioned in the RiskMetrics database. According to the 
RiskMetrics database, independent directors are those who are independent of top 
management, are not ex-employees and do not have any business relationship with 
the company. 
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5.4.2.3 Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Ownership  
The interest alignment hypothesis suggests that providing managers with ownership 
in their corporation would alleviate agency conflicts and motivate managers to work 
harder (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis suggests that excessive levels of ownership lead to 
managers being entrenched in their position (Demsetz, 1983). Managers with 
excessive ownership levels have a sufficient level of voting power that would 
guarantee their position at the company and therefore protect themselves from the 
disciplinary market forces such as the market for corporate control (Hu and Izumida, 
2008). Such managers feel that their position at the company is guaranteed and might 
therefore engage in activities that would provide them with personal benefits, 
regardless of its effect on firm value.  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find evidence consistent with both the interest 
alignment hypothesis and managerial entrenchment hypothesis. They report that the 
interest alignment hypothesis is dominant and there is a positive relation between 
ownership and performance for low levels of insiders’ ownership. However, as the 
ownership levels of insiders reaches the 40-50% level, the entrenchment effect 
becomes the dominant effect, and a slight inverse relationship can be found between 
insiders’ ownership and firm value. Griffith (1999) presents evidence of a negative 
correlation between firm value and CEO ownership for ownership levels between 15 
and 50% and positive otherwise. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also find results 
indicating a positive relationship between CEO ownership and firm value for 
ownership level of 0  1 percent and 5  20 percent; the relationship is negative 
otherwise. Accordingly, this section starts by testing the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 6-a: There is a positive and significant relationship between CEO 
ownership and firm value at low levels of ownership 
Hypothesis 6-b: There is a negative and significant relationship between CEO 
ownership and firm value at high levels of ownership 
Both antitakeover provisions and managerial ownership can act as a double edged 
sword and lead to managerial entrenchment. As mentioned earlier, high levels of 
ownership provide managers with too much power leading to managerial 
entrenchment (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Also the presence of antitakeover 
provisions can either increase manager’s bargaining power or relieve the manager 
from the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control (Straska and Waller, 
2013). This would lower the need for managers to work effectively because his 
position in the company is guaranteed and therefore can lead to more managerial 
entrenchment. As such, it is interesting to test the interaction between these two 
variables and how can their interaction affect firm value. It is expected that the 
combination of high ownership levels and a high number of takeover defences is 
detrimental to firm value. On the other hand, the absence of takeover defences 
signaling high shareholder rights is expected to decrease the entrenchment effect of 
ownership on firm value. As a result, interaction variables are generated to test how 
the interaction between the indices of antitakeover provisions and managerial 
ownership affects firm value. Specifically, the following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 6-c: Low (high) shareholder rights, signalled by a high (low) value from 
the E-index, increases (decreases) the entrenchment effect of ownership on firm 
value. 
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This model also controls for the type of provision present at companies. Since 
Category A provisions provide a higher level of entrenchment for managers than 
Category B provisions, it is expected that the presence of Category A provisions 
would lead to a worse effect of ownership on firm value than the presence of 
Category B provisions would do. 
Hypothesis 6-d: Category A provisions would increase the entrenchment effect of 
ownership on firm value in a more negative and significant way than Category B 
provisions. 
Measurement of ownership 
The literature contains several studies using different methods of calculating data 
regarding the ownership structure. These different measures include: Board 
ownership (Morck et al., 1988), CEO ownership (Griffith, 1999) and top 
management and insiders’ ownership (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990). Since the splitting of the E-index is made according to CEO 
monetary benefits, the main concern in this model is the ownership of a firm’s CEO. 
Thus, ownership is measured as the ownership of a firm’s CEO excluding stock 
options. 
5.4.3 Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables mentioned above, this study controls for 
several other variables used in previous literature, and that are expected to affect firm 
value. 
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5.4.3.1 Long-term Investments 
We can find a considerable amount of researches controlling for long-term 
investments, through R&D expenditures, when studying the effect of different 
variables on firm value. For example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Gompers et al. 
(2003) control for R&D expenditure when studying the effect of antitakeover 
provisions on firm value while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) R&D expenditures when studying the effect of ownership structure 
on firm value. Most of these previous studies find a positive and significant 
relationship between R&D expenditures and firm value (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). However, Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005) find that spending on research and development activities does not 
have a significant effect on firm value 
Measurement for Long-term Investments Consistent with the aforementioned 
studies, this research will control for long-term investments using R&D 
expenditures. 
5.4.3.2 Advertising Expenditure 
Similarly, most studies that use R&D expenditure in their models also include 
advertising expenses as a control variable (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). Likewise, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive and significant 
relationship between advertising expenses and firm value while Morck et al. (1988) 
reports an insignificant relationship. 
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Measurement 
The measurement will be equal to the dollar amount of money spent on advertising 
divided by total assets. 
5.4.3.3 Firm Size:  
Another control variable used extensively in the literature is the size of the firm. 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) all control for firm size and find a negative and significant 
relationship between size and firm value. On the other hand, Faleye (2007) and 
Morck et al. (1988) include firm size in their models and find that its effect on firm 
value is insignificant. 
Measurement of Firm Size 
Following Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Gompers et al. (2003), the measure of firm size 
in this study will be the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
5.4.3.4 Leverage 
According to the agency theory, debt can help resolve conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders due to free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Managers with 
excess free cash flow might invest in projects that negatively affect the shareholders’ 
wealth. 
Bebchuk et al. (2009), Faleye (2007) and Morck et al. (1988) all include leverage in 
their models and find a negative and significant relationship between leverage and 
firm value. On the contrary, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a positive and 
significant relationship between leverage and firm value. 
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Measurement of Leverage  
Following Morck et al. (1988) and Faleye (2007), this study uses the long-term debt 
to total assets ratio as the measure for leverage. 
5.4.3.5 Profitability 
Several studies in the literature control for a company’s accounting performance 
when studying the effects of several variables on firm value. Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) use the return on assets in their model and find that 
its effect on firm value is insignificant. However, Faleye (2007) finds a positive 
relationship between ROA and firm value. 
Measurement of profitability  
Consistent with the previous literature (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 
2009; Faleye, 2007), ROA will be used to control for a firm’s current profitability.  
5.4.3.6 Firm Age  
Studies by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Gompers et al. 
(2003) control for firm age to isolate the effect of antitakeover provisions on firm 
value. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that a company’s age is inversely related to 
its firm value. Bebchuk et al. (2009) find similar results. However, after controlling 
for firm fixed effects, Bebchuk et al. (2009) report that the relationship remained 
negative but insignificant. 
Measurement for Firm Age  
Consistent with the previously mentioned researches, this study uses the natural 
logarithm of age as a measure for a firm’s age.  
160 
 
5.4.3.7 Capital Expenditures 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Faleye (2007) also include a 
firm’s capital expenditure in their models while studying the effect of antitakeover 
provisions on firm value. Notably, all three studies find a positive and significant 
relationship between their measures of capital expenditure and firm value. 
Measurement for Capital Expenditures  
Consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Faleye 
(2007), the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets will be used to control for 
capital expenditure. 
5.4.3.8 Board Size  
Yermack (1996) finds a negative and significant relationship between board size and 
firm value. Yermack (1996) also provides evidence that a smaller board enhances the 
overall governance structure of the firm by increasing the CEO turnover for poorly 
performing firms and using the assets more efficiently. Faleye (2007) further 
reinforces this point by finding a negative and significant relationship between board 
size and firm value. 
Measurement for Board Size  
Consistent with the afore-mentioned studies, board size will be measured as the 
number of directors serving on a company’s board. 
5.4.3.9 Board Leadership 
Goyal and Park (2002) report that CEO duality weakens a firm’s governance 
structure by finding that CEO turnover is less sensitive to performance in the case of 
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a unitary board leadership. Therefore, Faleye (2007) includes CEO duality in his 
model when studying the effect of staggered boards on firm value. However, results 
were insignificant. 
Measurement for Board Leadership  
CEO duality is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the same person serves 
as a CEO and chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.  
The overall models are as follows: 
Q = β0 + β1Ent + β2OWNt + β3BCt + β4E*BCt + β5R&D + β6ADVt + β7FSt + β8LEVt + 
β9ROAt + β10AGEt + β11CAPXt + β12BSt + β13DUALt + ε 
Q = β0 + β1Ent + β2OWNt + β3BCt + β4E*OWNt + β5R&D + β6ADVt + β7FSt + β8LEVt 
+ β9ROAt + β10AGEt + β11CAPXt + β12BSt + β13DUALt + ε 
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Variable Measure Previous studies using the same measure 
Firm Value Tobin’s Q Bebchuk et al. (2009); Brown and Caylor 
(2006); Gompers et al. (2003); Straska and 
Waller (2010) 
Entrenchment E-Index Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
Ownership CEO Ownership Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
Board Composition Percentage of Independent 
Directors 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Cotter et al. 
(1997) 
Entrenchment * 
Independence 
Entrenchment * 
Independence 
 
Entrenchment * 
Ownership 
Entrenchment * Ownership  
Long-term Investments R&D Expenditure Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Gompers et 
al. (2003); McConnell and Servaes (1990); 
Morck et al. (1988) 
Advertising Expenses Advertising Expenses Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); 
McConnell and Servaes (1990); Morck et 
al. (1988) 
Firm Size Natural Logarithm of Total 
Assets 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk et al. 
(2009); Gompers et al. (2003) 
Leverage Ratio of Long-term debt to 
Total Assets  
Faleye (2007); Morck et al. (1988) 
Profitability Return on Assets (ROA) Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk et al. 
(2009); Faleye (2007) 
Firm Age Natural Logarithm of a 
Firm’s Age 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk et al. 
(2009); Gompers et al. (2003) 
Capital Expenditures CAPEX/Total Assets Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk et al. 
(2009); Faleye (2007) 
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5.5 Conclusion 
As mentioned previously, this study is composed of two empirical models. The first 
empirical model is concerned with the determinants of antitakeover provisions. The 
importance of this model is the differentiation between the provisions that provide 
managers with a monetary benefit and those that do not. In addition to identifying 
these provisions and splitting them into two different categories, the determinants of 
the individual antitakeover provisions are studied. Studying the determinants of 
individual takeover defenses confirms the validity of the previous grouping method 
of takeover defenses. 
After establishing the base for the two categories of provisions, this study attempts to 
explain the mixed evidence found in previous literature for the effect of different 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Following previous 
researchers, the number of antitakeover provisions adopted by a company is used as 
a proxy for a firm’s governance and shareholder rights levels (Gompers et al., 2003). 
However, unlike previous literature, this research also takes into consideration the 
type of antitakeover provision adopted by a company and not just the number of 
provisions adopted.   
Various statistical tools are employed in the empirical chapters in order to test the 
validity of the aforementioned assumptions. First, chapter six uses various regression 
techniques to confirm the validity of the grouping process used in this research. 
Second, chapter seven builds on the results of chapter six and attempts to explain the 
mixed results found in previous literature using interaction variables between the 
categories of provisions and mechanisms used to reduce agency conflicts. 
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Chapter 6 
Determinants of Antitakeover 
Provisions 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two empirical chapters in this research and it is divided 
into three sections. The first section starts by providing descriptive statistics that help 
explain the nature of the data. Although descriptive statistics cannot be used to draw 
conclusions, they deliver a better visualization of the data and some relationships 
among the variables. 
The second section addresses the determinants of antitakeover provisions. 
Regression tests are implemented to study the determinants of the E-index as well as 
the determinants of the individual provisions. This is done in order to check if the 
relationship between CEO duality and adopting individual takeover defences 
supports our grouping process. In other words, CEO duality should be positively 
related to all three Category A provisions and negatively related to the other three 
Category B provisions. Probit regressions are implemented when investigating the 
determinants of individual provisions since the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable (Gujarati, 2003). 
Finally, the third section of this chapter studies the effect of antitakeover provisions 
on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. Since powerful 
CEOs are hypothesized to be a significant determinant of antitakeover provisions, it 
is important to study how does the presence/absence of powerful CEOs and 
antitakeover provisions affect firm performance. Industry fixed-effect regressions are 
applied and all three indices of takeover defences are used in these regressions. It is 
expected that the presence of takeover defences moderates the duality-performance 
relationship. Accordingly interaction variables are created between the indices of 
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provisions and CEO duality to check the effect of duality on firm value in the 
presence/absence of antitakeover provisions. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the sample data 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
          
 
  
E-Index 2.45 1.34 0.00 6.00 0.10 2.64 
Golden Parachute 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.67 1.45 
Poison Pill 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.15 1.02 
Staggered Board 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.27 1.07 
Supermajority Req. 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.27 1.07 
Bylaw Amendment 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.71 3.92 
Charter Amendment 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.99 1.97 
% Independent Directors 61.28 27.28 0.00 100.00 -1.18 3.39 
CEO Duality 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.61 1.37 
CEO Ownership 2.40 5.63 0.00 32.92 3.59 16.50 
Board Size 8.52 3.78 1.00 39.00 -0.13 4.19 
Lag ROA 0.12 0.24 -28.40 1.39 -64.61 6814.37 
Firm Size 7.53 1.80 -6.21 14.99 0.31 3.57 
Leverage 0.24 0.81 0.00 120.94 119.01 16284.58 
R&D Expenditure 0.03 0.12 -0.81 14.86 74.03 8649.61 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables to be used in this model. It 
can be seen that, on average, companies have around two or three of the takeover 
defences comprising the E-index (2.45). Among the six antitakeover provisions, the 
golden parachute provision has the highest level of adoption in this sample (66%) 
while the limitations on Bylaw amendment provision has the lowest level of 
adoption (18%). The last two columns in Table 1 display the skewness and kurtosis 
for each variable to test whether the data is normally distributed or not. For a data to 
be normally distributed, all variables in the model should have a skewness value 
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ranging from -1.96 to +1.96. In addition, variables should also have a kurtosis value 
ranging from -3 to +3 (Gujarati, 2003). The importance of knowing whether the data 
is normally distributed or not is to know what kind of tests should be used in the 
other result sections. If the data not normally distributed, non-parametric tests should 
be used. 
Referring to the skewness of the variables, it is clear that several variables have 
values that lie outside the normality ranges (such as CEO ownership having a value 
of 3.59). In addition, several variables, such as board size, CEO ownership and the 
percentage of independent directors, have a kurtosis value higher than the normality 
value of three (Such as board size (4.19), firm size (3.57), percentage of independent 
directors (3.39)). This indicates that the data used in this model is not normally 
distributed and, therefore, non-parametric tests should be used in the next section. 
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Table 2: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix 
 
E 
INDEX 
Categor
y A 
Catego
ry B 
% 
Indep. 
Dir. 
CEO 
Duality 
CEO 
Ownership 
Board 
Size 
Lag 
ROA 
Firm 
Size 
Leverage 
R&D 
Exp. 
Liquidity 
Adv. 
Exp. 
Capital 
Exp. 
E INDEX 1.000 
            
  
Category A 0.723 1.000 
           
  
Category B 0.678 0.016 1.000 
          
  
% Indep 
Directors 
0.214 0.100 0.216 1.000 
         
  
CEO 
Duality 
-0.102 0.110 -0.270 -0.207 1.000 
        
  
CEO 
Ownership 
-0.046 -0.062 -0.001 -0.154 0.010 1.000 
       
  
Board Size 0.111 0.060 0.101 0.413 -0.060 -0.197 1.000 
      
  
Lag ROA -0.042 -0.026 -0.031 -0.045 0.042 0.013 -0.038 1.000 
     
  
Firm Size 0.047 -0.039 0.111 0.197 0.008 -0.345 0.476 -0.118 1.000 
    
  
Leverage 0.072 0.102 0.003 0.029 0.127 -0.089 0.154 -0.089 0.288 1.000 
   
  
R&D Exp. -0.013 0.040 -0.067 0.056 0.028 -0.099 -0.157 0.055 -0.211 -0.233 1.000 
  
  
Liquidity -0.041 -0.085 0.028 0.057 -0.159 0.041 -0.174 0.091 -0.281 -0.439 0.405 1.000 
 
  
Adv. Exp. -0.048 -0.085 0.018 0.003 -0.054 0.023 0.021 0.125 -0.018 -0.108 0.033 0.162 1.000   
Capital 
Exp. 
-0.057 0.023 -0.104 -0.114 0.131 -0.027 -0.074 0.437 -0.110 0.102 -0.045 -0.109 0.003 1.000 
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To test for multicollinearity, we run spearman’s rank correlation and find that the 
correlation coeffecient of all variables is well below 0.8. Gujarati (2003) states that 
for a multicollinearity problem to exist between two variables, the correlation 
coefficient should be greater than or equal to 0.8. Results for Spearman’s rank 
correlation are displayed in table 2. The highest correlation coefficient in this model 
is between firm size and board size (0.476). As the size of a firm increases, its 
complexity increases as well. Therefore, more board members are needed to manage 
the different and complex aspects of the firm.  
Although the correlation coefficients of the E-Index on one hand and provisions of 
categories A and B on the other hand are 0.723 and 0.678 respectively, little 
attention should be given to these correlations. Categories A and B are subsets of the 
E-Index and, therefore, a high correlation is expected between them. However, the 
different indices of provisions are used in different regression tests, which means 
that correlation between them is not a concern. 
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Table 3: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
      
Category A*Duality 4.980 0.201 
CEO Duality 4.510 0.222 
E*Duality 4.310 0.232 
Board Size 2.200 0.455 
% Independent Directors 2.050 0.488 
Category A  1.570 0.636 
R&D Expenditure 1.570 0.638 
Category B*Duality 1.510 0.662 
E Index 1.460 0.683 
Firm Size 1.440 0.693 
Liquidity 1.420 0.705 
Advertising Expenditure 1.320 0.760 
ROA 1.220 0.822 
Leverage 1.190 0.843 
Capital Expenditure 1.150 0.871 
Category B 1.120 0.892 
CEO Ownership 1.110 0.904 
      
Mean VIF 2.010   
 
In addition to Spearman’s correlation matrix, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
calculated for each variable in this model. Gujarati (2003) states that for collinearity 
problems to be present, variables should have a VIF value greater than 10. Table 3 
shows that the mean VIF for all the variables is 2.01. Concerning individual 
variables, the highest VIF is for the interaction variable between Category A 
provisions and CEO duality (4.98). Therefore, it is safe to assume that no 
multicollinearity problems are expected between the variables.  
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Table 4: Hausman Test 
 
(b) (B) (b-B) 
  Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b-B) 
% Independent Directors 0.009 0.009 0.000 
CEO Duality -0.234 -0.235 0.001 
CEO Ownership -0.035 -0.035 0.000 
Board Size -0.023 -0.023 0.000 
Lag ROA -0.313 -0.334 0.020 
Firm Size -0.039 -0.040 0.000 
Leverage 0.285 0.274 0.011 
R&D Expenditure -1.857 -1.876 0.019 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi (2) 
 
= (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
= 35.50 
 
 Prob > chi (2) =      0.0000 
 (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
A Hausman test is implemented to check whether a fixed effect model or a random 
effect model should be used in the regression analysis. The null hypothesis states 
that the difference between the coefficients of the fixed effect model and the random 
effect model is not systematic. Gujarati (2003) states that fixed effect regressions 
should be used if the null hypothesis is rejected (p-value is significant). However, if 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the usage of random effect models is 
supported.  Table 4 reports the results for the Hausmen test. Results reveal a 
significant p-value indicating that the null hypothesis is rejected and, therefore, fixed 
effect models should be used.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of Category A provisions by CEO Duality 
  
Figure 2: Percentage of Category B provisions by CEO Duality 
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Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate how the percentages of Category A and Category B 
provisions vary across firms in the presence or absence of CEO duality. Figure 1 
shows that the probability of having all 3 provisions from Category A increases in 
the presence of CEO duality (30.71% in the presence of CEO Duality; 20.96% 
otherwise). On the other hand, Figure 2 indicates that 63.23% of the firms with CEO 
duality do not have any provision from Category B. In the absence of CEO duality, 
this percentage decreases to 42.01%. These preliminary findings tend to support our 
trade-off hypothesis between the two categories of provisions. Powerful CEOs seem 
to favour the adoption of Category A provisions and oppose the adoption of 
Category B provisions.  
Figure 3: Relationship Between Category A provisions and Firm Value by CEO 
Duality 
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Figure 4: Relationship Between Category B provisions and Firm Value by CEO 
Duality 
 
 
Regarding the other hypotheses, Figures 3 and 4 display how the interaction between 
the two categories of provisinos and CEO duality affects firm performance. Figure 3 
designates that firms with no role duality outperform their counterparts with role 
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number of Category A provisions increases, the difference in performance increases 
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results presented in Figure 4 are in contrast with the ones in Figure 3. This confirms 
that there are major differences between the two categories of provisions and that it 
is beneficial to divide the E-Index according to CEO monetary benefits. One 
explanation could be that Category B provisions support the interest alignment 
hypothesis and should be provided to a CEO in order to have a bargaining power 
when the firm is passing through a takeover. On the other hand, Category A 
provisions support the interest alignment hypothesis due to the private benefits 
received by CEOs and managers. 
Figure 5: Sub-graphs for the Relationship Between CEO Duality and Firm 
Performance for each Level of Category A provisions 
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Figure 6: Sub-graphs for the Relationship Between CEO Duality and Firm 
Performance for each Level of Category B provisions 
 
  
In order to have a deeper look at this interaction, Figures 5 and 6 display how each 
specific number of takeover defences, for both categories of provisions, interacts 
with CEO duality in affecting firm performance. The results of Figures 5 and 6 
confirm our previous findings. Figure 5 reveals that CEO duality worsens the effect 
of Category A provisions on firm value. However, as previously mentioned, when 
Category A provisions equal to zero, the graph has a positive slope indicating a 
positive effect of CEO duality on firm performance. On the other hand, Figure 6 
shows that CEO duality worsens the effect of Category B provisions on firm 
performance except for the case where all Category B provisions are present. The 
results provided by figures 5 and 6 provide support to our previous results and 
confirm the need to split the E-Index into two categories of provisions. 
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6.3 Hypothesis Testing 
6.3.1 Studying the determinants of the E-index 
This section starts by studying the provisions of the E-Index. Then we split the E-
Index into Categories A and B and the determinants of each category of provisions 
are tested. This will test if there are any significant differences between the 
determinants of the E-index and the determinants of the two categories of provisions. 
Table 5: Industry Fixed Effect Regression for the Determinants of the E-Index 
 
E-Index 
% Independent Directors 0.009*** 
 
(0.000) 
CEO Duality -0.233*** 
 
(0.020) 
CEO Ownership -0.035*** 
 
(0.002) 
Board Size -0.022*** 
 
(0.004) 
Lag ROA -0.299*** 
 
(0.096) 
Firm Size -0.044*** 
 
(0.007) 
Leverage 0.272*** 
 
(0.058) 
R&D Expenditure -1.870*** 
 
(0.226) 
Constant 2.228*** 
 
(0.112) 
Adjusted  R2 0.1261 
N 19971 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 investigates the determinants of antitakeover provisions. Contrary to agency 
theory suggestions, the percentage of independent directors is positively related to 
the adoption of antitakeover provisions. In addition, CEO duality has a negative 
relationship with the E-index. Although antitakeover provisions entrench managers 
in their position, the results show that independent directors favour the adoption of 
these entrenching provisions. On the other hand, powerful CEOs oppose the 
adoption of takeover defences that would provide them with a protection from the 
market for corporate control. These striking results indicate that, contrary to agency 
theory, antitakeover provisions increase with board independence and decrease with 
CEO duality. However, as shown below, the division of the anti-takeover provisions 
into categories A and B helps explain these surprising and unanticipated results.  
6.3.2 Studying the determinants of individual provisions 
In this section, the provisions of the E-Index are split into the two aforementioned 
categories (Category A and Category B provisions). We run probit regressions for 
each provision to test if the individual provisions support our method of grouping the 
takeover defences. In any given regression, we also control for the presence of the 
other five provisions. Two different indices are used when controlling for the 
remaining provisions. When studying the determinants of a provision from Category 
A, an index of the other two Category A provisions will be created as a control 
variable along with the index for Category B provisions
5
. This grouping process is 
chosen since the provisions of each category could act as substitutes to one another. 
For example, the compensation obtained from having a poison pill may replace the 
need of having a golden parachute to obtain another kind of compensation. In the 
                                                          
5
 Probit regressions are also run where we control for each provision on its own. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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same sense, the entrenching effect of one Category B provision acts as a substitute 
for the entrenching effect of another Category B provision.   
Table 6: Probit regressions for individual Category A provisions while controlling 
for the remaining Category A and Category B provisions. 
 
Golden 
Parachutes 
Poison  
Pills 
Staggered 
Boards 
    % Independent Directors 0.009*** -0.001 -0.005*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.137*** 0.458*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
CEO Ownership -0.042*** -0.033*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board Size -0.022*** 0.005 0.038*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Lag ROA -0.541*** 0.140 -0.046 
 
(0.103) (0.104) (0.099) 
Firm Size -0.030*** -0.076*** -0.095*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.394*** 0.412*** -0.095 
 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.060) 
R&D Expenditure -1.645*** 1.482*** -1.608*** 
 
(0.242) (0.278) (0.238) 
Category B -0.154*** -0.081*** 0.213*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Remaining Cat. A provisions 0.328*** 
  
 
(0.013) 
  Remaining Cat. A provisions 
 
0.481*** 
 
  
(0.014) 
 Remaining Cat. A provisions 
  
0.413*** 
   
(0.013) 
Constant -0.002 -0.392*** 0.056 
 
(0.140) (0.135) (0.128) 
Adjusted  R2 0.1098 0.1051 0.0583 
N 19971 19971 19971 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 shows that the three Category A provisions (poison pills, golden parachutes 
and classified boards) support hypothesis 1-b. As expected, there is a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and each of the three provisions. CEOs with a role 
duality influence the adoption of takeover defences that provide them with a two line 
defence against a takeover threat. We also demonstrate that as the percentage of 
independent directors increases, the probability of adopting a poison pill or a 
staggered board decreases. This confirms our previous assumption that a powerful 
CEO is more likely to favour the adoption of these provisions than independent 
directors. However, surprisingly, the relationship between independent directors and 
golden parachutes is significantly positive. We will address this result later on in the 
paper. 
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Table 7: Probit regressions for individual Category B provisions while controlling 
for the remaining Category B and Category A provisions. 
 
 
Supermajority 
Req. 
Bylaw 
Amendments 
Charter 
Amendments 
    % Independent Directors 0.005*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO Duality -0.474*** -0.205*** -0.790*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.041) 
CEO Ownership 0.001 -0.003 -0.007** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Board Size -0.013*** -0.008** -0.060*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Lag ROA 0.070 -0.118 0.135 
 
(0.110) (0.104) (0.133) 
Firm Size 0.041*** 0.018** 0.035*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Leverage -0.216*** 0.151** 0.135* 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.079) 
R&D Expenditure -2.418*** 0.039 0.059 
 
(0.343) (0.260) (0.298) 
Category A 0.099*** 0.101*** -0.251*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Remaining Cat. B provisions 0.148*** 
  
 
(0.013) 
  Remaining Cat. B provisions 
 
0.861*** 
 
  
(0.016) 
 Remaining Cat. B provisions 
  
1.263*** 
   
(0.021) 
Constant -1.420*** -1.684*** -1.614*** 
 
(0.146) (0.154) (0.176) 
N 19971 19971 19971 
Adjusted R2                                                             0.0769       0.1447       0.3092 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Moving on to the next set of provisions, Table 7 shows the determinants of the 
individual category B provisions. Consistent with hypothesis 1-c, results suggest a 
negative relationship between CEO duality and the adoption of Category B 
provisions. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between the percentage of 
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independent directors and two of the Category B takeover defences (Supermajority 
Requirements and Limits on Charter Amendments). This is in compliance with our 
findings regarding the determinants of the E-index in table 5 and seems to be the 
driving factor behind it.  
Independent directors seem to favour the adoption of these provisions while a CEO 
who is also the chairman of the board does not support their adoption. Although 
these three provisions do make a takeover process harder for a bidder firm, the 
negative sign of the CEO duality coefficient could indicate that CEOs do not have 
the power to influence the adoption of numerous takeover defences. As a result, 
CEOs oppose the adoption of Category B defences in order to have a higher 
probability or more power in influencing the adoption of Category A defences. 
To confirm the validity of this assumption, we observe the coefficient estimates of 
the Category B Index in table 6. Specifically, we check if there is a trade-off between 
the provisions that yield a monetary benefit to a CEO in case of a takeover and those 
that do not. As expected, table 6 highlights a negative relationship between poison 
pills and golden parachutes on the one hand and Category B provisions on the other. 
That is, the adoption of category B provisions reduces the likelihood of adopting a 
poison pill or a golden parachute. On the other hand, staggered boards increase with 
the adoption of both Category A and Category B provisions. This explains the 
negative relationship between CEO duality and Category B provisions. Although 
Category B provisions do help in entrenching a CEO in his company by making a 
takeover process harder, a CEO would be better off by adopting an entrenching 
provision that would also provide him with a monetary compensation in case a 
takeover attempt is successful. Therefore, a CEO opposes the adoption of Category 
B provisions in order to have a higher probability of adopting a poison pill or a 
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golden parachute. These results confirm the validity of grouping takeover defences 
based on the monetary outcome provided to managers in case a takeover takes place. 
Powerful CEOs support the adoption of all Category A provisions and oppose the 
adoption of all Category B provisions. 
6.3.3 The Case of Golden Parachutes 
Most of the results presented in tables 6 and 7 support the aforementioned 
hypotheses. Managers of firms with a single leadership structure tend to oppose the 
adoption of Category B provisions in order to support the adoption of Category A 
provisions. On the other hand, independent directors support the adoption of 
Category B defences and oppose Category A defences (except for golden 
parachutes). The only puzzling provision that is supported by both independent 
directors and a CEO with a role duality is the golden parachute.  
A recent article by Evans and Hefner (2009) helps explain the unanimous support for 
golden parachutes. They state that a golden parachute “is a recruitment tool that 
attracts a new management team that can return a financially risky firm to a 
satisfactory level of profitability” (Evans and Hefner, 2009; p.p. 66). Their results 
show that firms hiring new CEOs have a higher probability of adopting a golden 
parachute than firms that do not, thus confirming the argument that golden 
parachutes are given to attract new managers. Other findings also indicate that the 
adoption of golden parachutes significantly reduces the threat of internal control 
contests such as proxy fights or bankruptcy. The presence of a golden parachute 
eases the occurrence of value enhancing takeovers rather than the value destroying 
internal control contests (Evans and Hefner, 2009). The authors conclude by arguing 
that the presence of a golden parachute is an ethical process that should be supported 
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by directors as well as managers. In addition, Zhao (2013) suggests that the presence 
of severance packages (such as golden parachutes) in a manager’s contract will 
enhance the manager’s engagement in investments with a positive but risky net 
present value. 
Another possible explanation for supporting golden parachutes can be observed by 
studying the compensation schemes of newly hired executives. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1998) report that a golden parachute acts as a substitute for extra 
compensation for senior executives. Poorly performing firms cannot afford to pay 
excessive compensation packages to attract high quality managers in order to 
enhance the profitability of their firms. Therefore, by providing managers with a 
golden parachute, directors are transferring the liability of paying executive 
compensation from the shareholders to the bidding firm (by paying a higher 
premium) in case a takeover takes place (Choi, 2004). Studies show that there is a 
positive relationship between the size of a golden parachute and the premium paid to 
shareholders when a takeover takes place (Harris, 1990; Machlin et al., 1993). Harris 
(1990) also suggests that, in most cases, the additional premium paid to shareholders 
when a golden parachute is present exceeds the value of the parachute itself. 
Therefore, despite its entrenching effect for a firm’s manager (Bebchuk et al., 2009), 
both managers and independent directors favour their adoption. Table 1 provides 
support for this argument by showing that golden parachutes are the most common 
antitakeover provisions in our sample
6
. Accordingly, golden parachutes could be 
similar to other necessary costs incurred by firms
7
.  
 
                                                          
6
 65.7% of the firms in our sample have golden parachutes 
7
 Such as compensation plans for manager, independent directors and auditors 
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6.3.4 Further Implications on Firm Value 
In a meta-analysis conducted to find the effect of CEO duality on firm performance, 
Rhoades et al. (2001) conclude that the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance depends on the focus of the study. Their findings provide partial 
support for both supporters and opponents of CEO duality. In the same sense, we 
expect to find different effects of CEO duality on firm value based on the levels of 
CEO entrenchment. 
According to agency theory, CEO duality further increase agency problems at 
companies as CEOs abuse the power given to them and look to extract private 
benefits (Dayton 1984). Therefore, when a CEO with a role duality adopts certain 
provisions for his own benefit (Category A provisions), the impact on firm value 
might be even worse.  
In order to test the following assumption, two interaction variables will be 
introduced. Interaction variables between each of the two indices (Category A and 
Category B) and CEO duality will be generated to test for the marginal impact of 
adopting these provisions in the presence of CEO duality.   
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Table 8: Industry fixed effect regressions measuring the effect of the interaction 
between antitakeover provisions and CEO Duality on firm value. 
 
 model1 model2 model3 model4 
Category A -0.043*** -0.021** -0.043*** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
 Category B -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.110*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 E INDEX 
   
-0.068*** 
    
(0.007) 
Category A*duality 
 
-0.069*** 
  
  
(0.019) 
  Category B*duality 
  
-0.024 
 
   
(0.020) 
 E*duality 
   
-0.033** 
    
(0.014) 
CEO Duality 0.021 0.146*** 0.032 0.124*** 
 
(0.019) (0.044) (0.024) (0.043) 
% Independent Directors -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Ownership 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Board Size 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.037 
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Liquidity 1.464*** 1.460*** 1.462*** 1.435*** 
 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
ROA 5.913*** 5.916*** 5.913*** 5.921*** 
 
(0.219) (0.219) (0.219) (0.219) 
R&D Expenditure 6.893*** 6.891*** 6.891*** 6.909*** 
 
(0.390) (0.389) (0.390) (0.389) 
Advertising Expenditure 1.053*** 1.060*** 1.047*** 1.027*** 
 
(0.376) (0.376) (0.376) (0.377) 
Capital Expenditure 1.516*** 1.523*** 1.513*** 1.505*** 
 
(0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261) 
Constant 0.082 0.047 0.080 0.128 
 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) 
N                                                        19971                  19971      19971      19971 
Adjusted R2                                      0.3615                   0.3627               0.3616               0.3622 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 8 displays the interaction between CEO Duality and different indices of 
antitakeover provisions
8
. Following recent literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk 
et al., 2009) Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for firm value. Moreover, advertising and 
capital expenditures and liquidity are added to control for their effect on firm value 
(Faleye, 2007; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnel and Servaes, 1991).  
Results show that, consistent with the previous literature, both Category A and 
Category B provisions have a negative effect on firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen, 
2005; Faleye, 2007). However, the coefficient estimate of the interaction variable 
between Category A and CEO duality is significantly negative. This implies that 
when a CEO acting as the chairman of the board adopts provisions from Category A, 
the effect on firm value is significantly worse than when a CEO with no role duality 
does so.  
Another important finding in table 8 is the coefficient of CEO duality. The 
coefficient estimate of CEO duality shows the impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance in the absence of all Category A provisions. Unlike the propositions of 
agency theory, CEO duality increases firm value in this case
9
. The absence of all 
Category A provisions could imply that this firm has a high level of shareholder 
rights and is enjoying a good governance level. In such firms, consistent with the 
stewardship theory, CEOs are motivated to achieve superior performance and act as 
stewards whose primary role is to maximize shareholder value (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Introducing an interaction variable between the E-Index and CEO 
duality yields similar results. The interaction coefficient between the E-Index and 
                                                          
8
 OLS regressions are run for the interactions between Category A, Category B, and the E-Index 
provisions on one hand and CEO duality on the other. 
9
 The first column of table 8 shows that CEO duality has an insignificant effect on firm value when no 
interaction variable is introduced. 
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CEO duality negatively affects firm value. In addition, the absence of all the E-Index 
provisions enhances the relationship between CEO duality and firm value. This is 
consistent with researchers who claim that a single theory (agency theory or 
stewardship theory) cannot fully explain the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm value on its own (Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997; Elsayed, 2007). Brickley 
(1997) concludes that both leadership structures have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Therefore, a single leadership structure could be beneficial to a firm 
while a dual leadership structure could be beneficial to another. On the other hand, 
table 8 shows that there is no significant marginal impact of adopting provisions 
from Category B on firm value in the presence of CEO duality. The coefficient of 
CEO duality on its own is also insignificant, indicating that the presence or absence 
of all Category B provisions does not affect the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm value. This confirms our previous suggestions that CEOs with a role duality 
are affected by the presence/absence of Category A provisions more than they are 
affected by the presence/absence of Category B provisions. CEO duality can be 
beneficial for a firm with a high level of shareholder rights and a high level of 
governance (absence of Category A provisions) 
Although both sets of provisions adversely affect firm value, the results above show 
that the presence of CEO duality leads to a further decrease in firm value for 
Category A provisions. This could imply that, in the presence of CEO duality, a 
CEO with category A provisions may not be motivated to work in the shareholders’ 
best interest leading to a decrease in firm value. Providing a CEO with a role duality 
job, along with provisions that provide him with a monetary benefit in case the firm 
was taken over, gives a CEO too much power. This leads to the ultimate 
expropriation of shareholders’ rights, where a CEO can freely extract private benefits 
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from a company. In such a case, a CEO does not fear the occurrence of a takeover, 
since the takeover will also provide the CEO with monetary benefits. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Comparing the results for the determinants of the E-Index and the determinants of 
single provisions, it can be noted that the E-Index determinants may be easily 
misinterpreted. While the determinants of individual antitakeover provisions suggest 
that CEOs with a role duality support (oppose) the adoption of all three Category A 
provisions (Category B provisions), the E-Index findings show a significantly 
negative relationship between CEO duality and takeover defences. This could be due 
to a significantly high and negative correlation between one of the E-Index 
provisions and CEO duality, which makes this provision drive the relationship 
between the whole index and CEO duality. Therefore, previous studies testing the 
effect of randomly selected takeover defences on a firm’s governance structure or 
performance could be better off by grouping takeover defences based on CEO’s 
preferences and monetary benefits. The results also indicate that even powerful 
CEOs can only influence a limited amount of takeover defences. Therefore, a CEO 
may oppose the adoption of Category B provisions in order to have a higher 
probability of influencing the adoption of Category A provisions. 
Further tests also show that, in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship between 
Category A provisions and firm value worsens. On the other hand, the relationship 
between Category B provisions and firm value is unaffected by the presence of CEO 
duality. This indicates that CEOs with a role duality feel safe after adopting Category 
A provisions because of the monetary outcome provided if the firm was taken over. 
Therefore, CEOs acting as chairmen of the board are not motivated to work hard to 
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increase shareholder wealth in the presence of Category A provisions, which leads to 
a worse effect on firm value than when Category B provisions are present. 
All of these results indicate that the entrenching effect differs from one provision to 
another. CEOs having Category B provisions still feel the need to continue working 
hard in order to protect their firm from a takeover and thus protect their position in 
their company. On the other hand, CEOs with Category A provisions are highly 
entrenched in their company and have their position backed up with a monetary 
compensation if they are removed from the company.  
The results of this empirical model lay the foundation for the next empirical chapter. 
After confirming the validity of the grouping process of takeover defenses, this 
research attempts to use this ideology to explain contradicting effect of governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. In other words, failing to control for the presence 
of antitakeover provisions could be one of the main reasons why the literature 
provides lots of conflicting evidence. This study, however, controls for both the 
number and type of takeover protection adopted by the company as a proxy for the 
soundness of the firm’s governance structure and shareholder rights. Thus, the next 
chapter uses the two categories of provisions, as well as the E-index, to create 
various interaction variables between the indices of provisions and governance 
mechanisms. Interacting different indices of provisions with governance mechanisms 
provides valuable insights regarding the effect of each type of provisions on the 
relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
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Chapter 7 
Corporate Governance and 
Shareholder Wealth: Interest 
Alignment Hypothesis Revisited 
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MODEL 2: Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth 
7.1 Introduction 
This is the second and final empirical chapter of this research and it is divided into 
four sections. The first chapter provides descriptive statistics and figures for the 
regression tests that are implemented in the second and third sections of this chapter. 
Descriptive statistics are particularly important in this chapter because they provide a 
simple way to visualize interaction effects that can be difficult to do using only 
regression tables. The descriptive statistics include two different sets of figures; one 
for the effect of antitakeover provisions on the independence-performance 
relationship and the other for the effect of antitakeover provisions on the ownership- 
performance relationship. The figures display the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and firm performance for each level of E-index provisions separately. 
Other figures display the relationship between the aforementioned governance 
mechanisms and firm performance according to the number of Category A or 
Category B provisions adopted by the firm. 
The second and third sections of this chapter test the effect of antitakeover 
provisions on the independence-performance and ownership-performance 
relationships respectively. Following the descriptive statistics, interaction variables 
between the governance mechanisms and antitakeover provision indices are created.  
Interaction variables are created for all three indices in each model and fixed-effect 
regressions are implemented. Previous researchers argue that internal and external 
governance mechanisms interact in affecting firm performance (Cremers and Nair, 
2005). Consistently, these regression tests check whether the level of antitakeover 
provisions (external governance mechanism), used as a proxy for shareholder rights, 
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moderates the relationship between other internal governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. 
The last section of this chapter provides additional robustness analysis tests to 
address any causality concerns that might arise in this model. Endogeneity is always 
a concern in corporate governance studies. Therefore, further correlation and 
regression tests are made to test whether the relationship runs from the governance 
mechanisms to firm performance or the other way around. The same tests done in 
sections two and three are repeated in section four using the lagged value of all 
explanatory variables. This will confirm if the explanatory variables are the cause for 
the relationship found in previous sections between governance mechanisms and 
firm performance. 
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7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 7: Sub-graphs for the Relationship Between Board Independence and 
Firm Performance for each Level of the E-Index  
 
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of antitakeover provisions on the relationship between 
the percentage of independent directors and firm performance. For each level of the 
E-Index, a separate graph is presented in order to check the marginal impact of the 
E-Index provisions on the independence-performance relationship. It can be seen 
that for low levels of takeover defences (E-Index less than four), increasing the 
percentage of independent directors has an adverse effect on firm performance. This 
is consistent with hypothesis 5-a, indicating that firms with a low number of 
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antitakeover provisions already have high shareholder rights. Increasing the 
percentage of independent directors isn’t beneficial for such firms since they are 
already enjoying a good governance structure and no extra monitoring is needed. 
However, for high levels of antitakeover provisions (E-Index greater than four), 
increasing the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect on firm 
performance. As the number of takeover defences starts to increase, a firm’s 
governance structure becomes weaker and there is more room for managers to 
extract private benefits. Therefore, such firms benefit from increasing the monitoring 
process of managers by increasing the percentage of independent directors. 
Figure 8: Independence-Performance relationship by Category A Provisions 
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Figure 9: Independence-Performance relationship by Category B Provisions 
 
 
In figures 8 and 9, the E-Index provisions are split into Category A and Category B 
provisions to test the impact of each on the independence-performance relationship. 
These figures show the impact of three different levels of independent directors on 
firm performance for all levels of Category A and Category B provisions. It can be 
seen in Figure 8 that in the absence of all Category A provisions, firms with the least 
percentage of independent directors outperform their competitors. On the contrary, 
for firms with all three Category A provisions adopted, results are reversed. In such a 
case, firms with the highest percentage of independent directors outperform those 
with lower percentages of independent directors. These results are consistent with 
the results provided in figure 7 and hypothesis 5-b. 
On the other hand, Figure 9 does not provide consistent results for the presence (or 
absence) of Category B provisions. Although firms with lower percentages of 
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independent directors slightly outperform other firms with higher percentages in the 
presence of one or two Category B provisions, results are not consistent in the 
presence or absence of all Category B provisions. Figure 9 shows that for firms with 
Category B provisions equal to zero or three, firm performance is not affected by the 
percentage of independent directors. This could indicate that Category B provisions 
are not as entrenching as Category A provisions, and the presence of all Category B 
provisions does not necessitate an increase in the percentage of independent directors 
as it is the case with Category A provisions.  
Figure 10: Sub-graphs for the Relationship Between CEO Ownership and Firm 
Performance for each Level of the E-Index  
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The next set of figures illustrates the effect of antitakeover provisions on the 
ownership-performance relationship. Although CEO ownership is said to have a 
positive effect on firm performance, excessive ownership levels combines with 
takeover defences could lead to excessive CEO power and entrenchment. Figure 10 
shows that for low levels of takeover defences (E-Index less than three), CEO 
ownership has a strictly positive effect on firm performance. As the number of 
takeover defences increases, the positive effect of CEO ownership on firm 
performance decreases. As displayed in Figure 10, when all six E-Index provisions 
are present, increasing CEO ownership barely increases firm performance. This is 
consistent with hypothesis 6-c which states that the presence of antitakeover 
provisions increases the entrenchment effect of CEO ownership on firm value rather 
than the interest alignment effect.  
Figure 11: Ownership-Performance relationship by Category A Provisions 
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Figure 12: Ownership-Performance relationship by Category B Provisions 
 
The provisions of the E-Index are then split into Categories A and B. Figure 5 
illustrates that in the absence of all Category A provisions, firms with CEO 
ownership equal to five percent outperform those with no CEO ownership by a 
significant margin. As the number of Category A provisions increases, the difference 
in performance between different high and low CEO ownership levels diminishes. 
This difference keeps diminishing until firms with firms with no CEO ownership 
have almost the same performance as those with high CEO ownership levels (five 
percent CEO ownership) in the presence of all Category A provisions. 
Similar to Category A provisions, Figure 12 demonstrates that, in the absence of all 
Category B provisions, firms with high CEO ownership levels outperform other 
firms with no CEO ownership. However, the difference in performance between 
these firms is larger in the absence of Category A provisions than it is in the absence 
of Category B provisions. Figure 12 also shows that the difference diminishes as the 
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number of Category B provisions increases until it reaches a very slight difference in 
the presence of all Category B provisions. 
Although the presence of both Category A and Category B provisions decrease the 
effect of CEO ownership on firm performance, Category A provisions seem to have 
a larger impact. This provides support to the argument that Category A provisions 
are the more entrenching than Category B provisions. Although both categories lead 
to an adverse effect on firm performance, Category A provisions seem to have a 
larger impact on other governance mechanisms than Category B provisions. It is 
important to note that the results provided in this section are descriptive results that 
can provide preliminary results for the hypotheses. Descriptive statistics provide 
researchers with insights about the direction of the results and the research but 
cannot be used as final results because they fail to control for other important 
variables that could affect the relationships under study. Therefore, regression tests 
are used in the upcoming sections to test the research hypotheses. 
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Table 9: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
E * Independence 7.990 0.200 
Category A * Independence 6.910 0.212 
Category B * Independence 6.150 0.223 
CEO Ownership 2.640 0.379 
E * Ownership 2.550 0.392 
Category A * Ownership 2.300 0.434 
Board Size 2.180 0.459 
% Independent Directors 2.030 0.493 
Category B * Independence 1.640 0.609 
Liquidity 1.410 0.709 
Firm Size 1.390 0.718 
R&D Expenditure 1.310 0.761 
E-Index 1.230 0.811 
ROA 1.190 0.844 
Leverage 1.180 0.848 
Capital Expenditure 1.140 0.880 
CEO Duality 1.090 0.914 
Advertising Expenditure 1.040 0.960 
  
 
  
Mean VIF 2.521   
 
Before starting the regression analysis, additional descriptive statistics are made. 
Similar to the first model, a variance inflation factor test is implemented to test 
whether any multicollinearity problems exist using this data. Table 9 shows that the 
variable with the highest VIF value is the interaction between the E-index and board 
independence (7.990) while the VIF value for the whole model is 2.521. Since all of 
the VIF values are below the normality value of ten which was suggested by Gujarati 
(2003), it is safe to assume that no collinearity problems exist in this model. 
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Table 10: Hausman Test 
 
(b) (B) (b-B) 
 
fe re Difference 
      
 E Index -0.076 -0.076 0.000 
% Indep. Directors -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
CEO Ownership 0.015 0.014 0.000 
own_squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Duality 0.047 0.047 0.000 
Board Size 0.010 0.010 0.000 
Firm Size -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
Leverage 0.025 0.025 0.000 
Liquidity 1.451 1.461 -0.010 
R&D Expenditure 6.930 6.960 -0.029 
Adv. Expenditure 1.060 1.081 -0.021 
Capital Expenditure 1.521 1.520 0.000 
ROA 5.928 5.930 -0.002 
    b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 chi2(9)  =       26.56 
 
     Prob>chi2 =      0.0220 
    
In addition to the VIF test, a Hausman test is also employed to test whether fixed or 
random effect models should be used in the upcoming regressions. Table 10 shows 
that the p-value of the Hausman test is positive significant. Therefore, using a fixed 
effect regression is recommended in the next section. 
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7.3 Hypothesis Testing  
 
7.3.1 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance 
Table 11: Fixed Effect Regression for the effect of corporate governance variables on firm 
value 
 
(1) 
Tobin's Q 
  E Index -0.089*** 
 
(0.008) 
% Independent Directors -0.001 
 
(0.001) 
CEO Ownership 0.022*** 
 
(0.005) 
Ownership Squared -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.037 
 
(0.029) 
Board Size -0.002 
 
(0.004) 
Firm Size -0.005 
 
(0.011) 
Leverage 0.054 
 
(0.088) 
Liquidity 1.696*** 
 
(0.178) 
R&D Expenditure 6.674*** 
 
(0.471) 
Advertising Expenditure 0.683 
 
(0.453) 
Capital Expenditure 2.100*** 
 
(0.339) 
ROA 5.488*** 
 
(0.262) 
Constant 0.159 
 
(0.141) 
  N 19,006 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3848 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 11 displays the results of an industry fixed effect regression before introducing 
any interaction variable and before splitting the provisions of the E-Index into 
Category A and Category B provisions. Consistent with hypothesis 4 and with 
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previous studies, there is a negative relationship between the E-Index and firm value 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). The results are also consistent for both Category A and 
Category B provisions throughout the different models used in this study. Table 11 
also shows a positive relationship between the number of shares owned by a CEO 
and firm value. This is consistent with the interest alignment hypothesis where a 
CEO becomes more motivated to increase firm value when he shares a certain part of 
the ownership with the firm’s shareholders. We also add the squared value of the 
ownership to control for the curvilinear relationship between CEO ownership and 
firm value. However, the percentage of independent directors does not seem to have 
a significant effect on the respective firm’s value. Other board characteristics such as 
board size and CEO duality also seem to have an insignificant effect on firm 
performance. Further tests are made to explain how the presence/absence of 
antitakeover provisions could affect the relationship between the other governance 
mechanisms and firm value. The tests also split the provisions of the E-Index into 
Category A and Category B provisions. 
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7.3.2Antitakeover Provisions and Board Independence 
Table 12: Fixed Effect Regression for the interaction of antitakeover provisions and board 
independence in affecting firm value 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
E Index -0.130*** 
  
 
(0.022) 
  Category A 
 
-0.162*** -0.071*** 
  
(0.032) (0.012) 
Category B 
 
-0.105*** -0.107*** 
  
(0.010) (0.027) 
% Independent Directors -0.002* -0.003** -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
A * % Indep. Directors 
 
0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 B* % Indep. Directors 
  
-0.000 
   
(0.000) 
E * % Indep, Directors 0.001** 
  
 
(0.000) 
  CEO Ownership 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ownership Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.037 0.023 0.024 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Board Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm Size -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.055 0.050 0.049 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Liquidity 1.697*** 1.710*** 1.705*** 
 
(0.178) (0.179) (0.179) 
R&D Expenditure 6.672*** 6.686*** 6.674*** 
 
(0.471) (0.472) (0.472) 
Advertising Expenditure 0.681 0.702 0.699 
 
(0.453) (0.452) (0.453) 
Capital Expenditure 2.090*** 2.087*** 2.104*** 
 
(0.338) (0.338) (0.339) 
ROA 5.491*** 5.486*** 5.484*** 
 
(0.262) (0.262) (0.262) 
Constant 0.252* 0.266* 0.122 
 
(0.152) (0.155) (0.146) 
    N 19,006 19,006 19,006 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3848 0.3862 0.3859 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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The first column of table 12 introduces the first interaction variable between board 
independence and antitakeover provisions (E-Index). In this test, we give special 
attention to the coefficient of independent directors and the coefficient of the 
interaction variable. The coefficient of independent directors indicates the effect of 
board independence on firm value in the absence of all E-Index provisions (E-Index 
equals to zero). Table 12 shows a negative coefficient for independent directors. This 
indicates that, in the absence of all antitakeover provisions, increasing the percentage 
of independent directors reduces firm value. The absence of takeover defences 
signals a high level of shareholder rights and a high level of external governance 
from the market for corporate control. An active market for corporate control 
disciplines poorly performing managers and can act as a substitute for the monitoring 
role for independent directors. Therefore, in the absence of antitakeover provisions, 
firms could benefit more from the advisory role of insider directors than the 
monitoring role of independent directors. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction variable demonstrates the effect 
of increasing board independence on firm value as the number of E-Index provisions 
increases. In this case, the coefficient of the interaction variable becomes 
significantly positive, indicating that as the level of antitakeover provisions increase, 
the relationship between board independence and firm value becomes increasingly 
positive. An increase in the level of antitakeover provisions signals weak shareholder 
rights and reduces the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control on 
managers. Therefore, firms with a high number of antitakeover provisions could 
benefit from the monitoring role of independent directors more than firms with a low 
number of antitakeover provisions. 
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The next step is to split the provisions of the E-Index into Category A and Category 
B provisions to check if independent directors have any behavioral differences 
towards each of the two categories of provisions. As mentioned previously, Category 
A provisions are those that help CEOs in receiving a monetary outcome when a 
takeover takes place. Therefore, these provisions have a higher entrenching effect for 
CEOs and could demotivate CEOs because of the financial gains that they receive 
even if they were removed from their position following a takeover. 
The second column of table 12 illustrates the interaction between Category A 
provisions and board independence. The results are similar to the interaction between 
the E-Index and board independence. The relationship between board independence 
and firm value is enhanced (worsened) in the presence (absence) of Category A 
takeover defences.  
On the other hand, the third column of table 12 shows that the results are not 
consistent when an interaction variable between Category B provisions and board 
independence is introduced. In this model, the coefficients of both independent 
directors and the interaction variable become insignificant. This indicates that the 
presence or absence of Category B provisions does not significantly affect the 
relationship between board independence and firm value. 
The results from splitting the E-Index into Categories A and B support the previous 
descriptive results and the assumptions behind the grouping process. Consistent with 
the research hypothesis, the E-Index provisions moderate the independence-
performance relationship. In the presence of takeover defences, firms could benefit 
from increasing the monitoring process of their entrenched managers. However, 
when a company is already enjoying a good governance structure and no takeover 
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defences are adopted, increasing the percentage of independent directors adds 
unnecessary monitoring that can have an adverse effect on firm performance. 
Moreover, Category A provisions seem to be the driving factor behind the results of 
the E-Index and lead to a lower level of shareholder rights and a weaker governance 
structure than Category B provisions. Therefore, firms could benefit from increasing 
the percentage of independent directors in the presence of Category A provisions 
more than they would do in the presence of Category B provisions. 
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7.3.3 Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Ownership 
Table 13: Fixed Effect Regression for the interaction of antitakeover provisions and CEO 
ownership in affecting firm value 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    E Index -0.065*** 
  
 
(0.008) 
  Category A 
 
-0.038*** -0.069*** 
  
(0.013) (0.012) 
Category B 
 
-0.105*** -0.088*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) 
CEO Ownership 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
E * Ownership -0.007*** 
  
 
(0.002) 
  A * Ownership 
 
-0.009*** 
 
  
(0.003) 
 B * Ownership 
  
-0.006*** 
   
(0.002) 
Ownership Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.038 0.025 0.023 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
% Independent Directors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm Size -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.062 0.057 0.051 
 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.088) 
Liquidity 1.702*** 1.713*** 1.705*** 
 
(0.178) (0.179) (0.179) 
R&D Expenditure 6.699*** 6.697*** 6.681*** 
 
(0.471) (0.472) (0.471) 
Advertising Expenditure 0.634 0.669 0.675 
 
(0.449) (0.448) (0.451) 
Capital Expenditure 2.098*** 2.111*** 2.097*** 
 
(0.340) (0.339) (0.339) 
Constant 0.059 0.025 0.092 
 
(0.149) (0.150) (0.148) 
    N 19,006 19,006 19,006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3864 0.3873 0.3865 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 13 displays the interaction between CEO ownership and the different indexes 
of antitakeover provisions. The effect of antitakeover provisions is consistently 
negative for all three regressions using the three different indexes. As it was the case 
with the previous interaction, the coefficient of CEO ownership in the interaction 
models demonstrates the effect of CEO ownership on firm performance when the 
interaction term equals to zero (that is when the number of takeover defences equals 
to zero). Table 13 indicates that the coefficient of CEO ownership is consistently 
positive for all three regressions. This shows that, in the absence of antitakeover 
provisions, firms could motivate CEOs by granting them ownership in their 
corporation. 
Consistent with hypothesis 6-c, the first column of table 13 shows that the 
interaction coefficient between the E-Index and CEO ownership is negative and 
significant. This designates that the presence of antitakeover provisions worsens the 
relationship between CEO ownership and firm value. The results are also consistent 
for the other categories of provisions. Columns 2 and 3 shows that the interaction of 
CEO ownership with Categories A and B respectively negatively affects firm value. 
The results, however, fail to support hypothesis 6-d, indicating no significant 
difference between the effects of Category A or Category B on the relationship 
between CEO ownership and firm value. 
Several studies in the literature report an inverted “U” shaped or a positive but 
decreasing relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance 
(Griffith, 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Morck, Schleifer, and Vishney, 1988). However, each study finds a different cut-off 
point where the effect of CEO or managerial ownership starts on firm value to 
decrease. This suggests that certain variables moderate the ownership-performance 
211 
 
relationship and their presence (or absence) affects this relationship as well as the 
cut-off points for which additional ownership becomes detrimental to firm 
performance. The results provided in this research suggest that the presence 
(absence) of antitakeover provisions as proxies of managerial entrenchment 
(shareholder rights) moderate the relationship between CEO ownership and firm 
performance. The presence of both takeover defences and high ownership levels 
together lead to an excessive level of CEO power. In such cases, CEOs abuse the 
power given to them leading to a high level of managerial entrenchment and to a 
worse effect on firm value. On the other hand, CEO ownership has a significantly 
positive effect when shareholder rights are high and CEOs are not protected from the 
market for corporate control by takeover defences. 
7.3.4 Additional Robustness Analysis 
While the dominant approach in the literature supports the idea that causality runs 
from the E-index and other governance mechanisms to firm value, there is a still a 
need to address matters of endogeneity and reverse causality. Chi (2005) states that 
there are two cases for which antitakeover provisions can be endogenous when 
studying their effect on firm performance.  
The first case of endogeneity could happen if managers adopt takeover defences after 
experiencing periods of poor performance. In such firms, shareholders will be 
looking to discipline managers for their poor performance, and managers react by 
adopting antitakeover provisions that can limit shareholder rights. This will also 
protect managers from a possible takeover attempt since their firm is 
underperforming and could become undervalued. In this case, the relationship runs 
from firm performance to takeover defences and not the other way around.  
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Table 14: Correlations between the Current Difference in E-Index Provisions and Other Past 
and Future Differences in Firm Performance.  
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In order to address the causality issue, table 14 displays the correlations between a 
firm’s current change in takeover defences and the previous and future changes in 
firm performance. If the current change in takeover defences is significantly 
correlated with previous changes in firm performance, then causality runs from 
performance to antitakeover provisions. On the other hand, if the current change in 
takeover defences is significantly correlated with future changes in firm 
performance, then causality runs from antitakeover provisions to firm performance. 
Results in table 14 show that current changes in the number of E-index provisions is 
significantly correlated with changes in future firm performance only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Previous Change in Tobin's Q 
 
Future Change in Tobin's 
Q 
 
Change in 
Q last 3 
years 
Change in 
Q last 2 
years 
Change in 
Q last year   
Change in 
Q Next 
Year 
Change in 
Q Next 2 
Years 
       Current Change in E -0.0173 -0.0293 -0.0001 
 
-0.1134* -0.0744* 
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Table 15: Fixed Effect Regression for the effect of antitakeover provisions on the 
independence-performance using lag variables for all independent variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
model1 model2 model3 
 
   
E Index -0.103*** 
  
 
(0.024) 
  
Category A 
 
-0.090*** -0.038** 
 
 
(0.028) (0.015) 
Category B 
 
-0.108*** -0.137*** 
 
 
(0.021) (0.032) 
% Independent Directors -0.002** -0.003** -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
E * Independence 0.000* 
  
 
(0.000) 
  
A * Independence 
 
0.001*** 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
B * Independence 
  
0.000 
 
  
(0.000) 
CEO Ownership 0.013 0.014 0.015 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ownership Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.025 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Board Size 0.015*** 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm Size -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Leverage 0.144 0.131 0.133 
 
(0.125) (0.124) (0.125) 
Liquidity 1.490*** 1.518*** 1.518*** 
 
(0.322) (0.321) (0.322) 
R&D Expenditure 8.133*** 8.122*** 8.111*** 
 
(1.620) (1.623) (1.627) 
Advertising Expenditure 1.107 1.134 1.137 
 
(0.775) (0.770) (0.775) 
Capital Expenditure 0.998* 1.006* 1.009* 
 
(0.522) (0.525) (0.522) 
ROA 4.963*** 4.955*** 4.954*** 
 
(0.458) (0.460) (0.461) 
Constant 0.481*** 0.438*** 0.369** 
 
(0.161) (0.159) (0.155) 
Number of observations 16728 16728 16728 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2373 0.2389 0.2386 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In addition to the correlations, tables 15 and 16 provide additional fixed effect 
regressions similar to tables 12 and 13 but using the lagged values for all 
214 
 
independent variables. This is done in order to rule out the possibility of the 
dependent variable having an effect on the explanatory variables since the current 
year’s firm performance could not have affected last year’s governance mechanisms. 
Thus, in order for the previous results presented in this study to be valid, tables 15 
and 16 should provide qualitatively similar results. 
Table 15 shows that hypotheses 2-a, 2-b and 2-c are still supported while using the 
lag values for all independent variables. Results suggest that, in the presence 
(absence) of E-index takeover defences, increasing the percentage of independent of 
independent directors has a positive (negative) effect on a firm’s performance in the 
coming year. Results are also consistent for provisions of categories A and B.  
Category A provisions are the driving factor behind the effect of E-Index provisions 
and the independence-performance relationship. On the other hand, the presence or 
absence of Category B provisions does not have a significant effect on the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance. 
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Table 16: Fixed Effect Regression for the effect of antitakeover provisions on the 
ownership-performance relationship using lag variables for all independent variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
model1 model2 model3 
 
   
E Index -0.061*** 
  
 
(0.013) 
  
Category A 
 
-0.023 -0.038** 
 
 
(0.015) (0.015) 
Category B 
 
-0.109*** -0.100*** 
 
 
(0.021) (0.019) 
CEO Ownership 0.026* 0.028* 0.018 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
E * Ownership -0.006** 
  
 
(0.003) 
  
A * Ownership 
 
-0.008* 
 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
B * Ownership 
  
-0.005 
 
  
(0.004) 
Ownership Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.026 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027) 
% Independent Directors -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board Size 0.015*** 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm Size -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Leverage 0.146 0.135 0.133 
 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.125) 
Liquidity 1.494*** 1.521*** 1.518*** 
 
(0.324) (0.322) (0.324) 
R&D Expenditure 8.150*** 8.130*** 8.121*** 
 
(1.622) (1.627) (1.629) 
Advertising Expenditure 1.104 1.129 1.137 
 
(0.766) (0.765) (0.772) 
Capital Expenditure 0.992* 1.008* 1.002* 
 
(0.519) (0.518) (0.523) 
ROA 4.963*** 4.955*** 4.954*** 
 
(0.461) (0.463) (0.462) 
Constant 0.376** 0.318* 0.343** 
 
(0.163) (0.166) (0.156) 
Number of observations 16728 16728 16728 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2382 0.2395 0.2389 
The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 16 also provides results supporting hypotheses 4-a, 4-b, 4-c. Results indicate 
that all three indices of provisions have a negative effect on future firm performance. 
In addition, in the presence of Category A provisions, increasing CEO ownership has 
a negative impact on future firm performance due to the high entrenching effect of 
Category A provisions.  Moreover, the last column of table 16 shows that the 
presence of Category B provisions does not have a significant negative impact on the 
relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance. Thus, the results of 
table 16 also support hypothesis 6-d which was not supported in the previous tests. 
The results of tables 15 and 16 provide additional support for the results of table 14, 
further indicating that the causation runs from takeover defences and the other 
explanatory variables to firm performance. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the 
causality runs from takeover defences to firm performance and not the other way 
around. 
The second case where takeover defences can be endogenous when studying their 
effect on firm performance is the case of unobservable firm heterogeneity. There is a 
possibility that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable in this study is driven by another omitted variable that the study fails to 
control for (Chi, 2005). In order to address this issue, Chi (2005) states that “When 
some firm heterogeneity is unobservable, a fixed effects specification helps capture 
the effect of the unobservable variable and therefore alleviates the endogeneity 
problem caused by the omitted variable.” (Chi, 2005, p.p. 66). Therefore this study 
uses fixed effect specifications, as well as a list of control variables, in order to 
account for any unobserved firm heterogeneity. All of the tests are made with a fixed 
effect specification and provide consistent results, indicating that endogeneity due to 
omitted variables is not a concern in this study. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
The findings in this research confirm that the level of antitakeover provisions 
moderates the relationship between other governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. The presence of antitakeover provisions increases the entrenchment 
effect of CEO ownership on firm value, leading to higher levels of entrenchment and 
demotivation for CEOs. These results are consistent for all indexes of provisions 
used in our study (Category A, Category B and the E-Index), confirming that the 
presence of all types of antitakeover provisions worsens the relationship between 
CEO ownership and firm value. Additional robustness tests reveal that the results are 
consistent when using the lag values for all of the explanatory variables except for 
the interaction between Category B provisions and CEO ownership. This coefficient 
becomes insignificant which also confirms that Category A provisions have a higher 
entrenching effect for managers than Category B provisions. 
On the other hand, the interaction variables between antitakeover provisions and 
board independence provide interesting results. The presence of provisions from the 
Category A index trigger an alarm for independent directors that CEOs have room to 
extract some private benefits. In such a case, more monitoring should be 
implemented and therefore more independent directors should be present at the 
company. Consistently, results demonstrate that, in the presence of Category A 
provisions, as the percentage of independent directors increases, firm value increases 
as well. Moreover, in the absence of all Category A provisions, results suggest that 
independent directors negatively affect firm value. In such firms with high 
shareholder rights, management teams could benefit more from the expertise 
provided by insider directors than the monitoring function of independent directors. 
On the other hand, the presence or absence of Category B provisions does not affect 
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the relationship between the percentage of independent directors and firm value. 
These significant findings help in explaining the mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between independent directors. We conclude that the role of 
independent directors in agency theory, as better monitors of managerial behavior, is 
valid for powerful CEOs who have the potential for opportunistic behavior. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the whole work done in the thesis. It highlights the 
importance of contribution of this thesis for future researchers by identifying gaps 
found in previous work and literature. By providing a new perception of antitakeover 
provisions as they relate to CEO monetary benefits, this research provides room to 
re-investigate all of the previous work done on antitakeover provisions using the new 
grouping method. In addition, the second model offers an explanation for the largely 
inconsistent results of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. The 
interaction between external governance mechanisms and internal governance 
mechanisms helps identify the cases in which these mechanisms have a positive 
effect on firm performance and other cases where the relationship is negative. 
This chapter also includes a summary of the theoretical framework designed to 
develop this research. This framework also contributes to previous literature that 
relies solely on a single theory to explain the various aspects of corporate 
governance. By integrating the work of both agency and stewardship theories, this 
research provides a multi-theoretical framework that covers a wider aspect than each 
theory on its own. The theoretical framework is followed by a summary of the 
research findings for both models. The empirical tests for both models are based on 
the aforementioned framework and the results provide further support for adopting a 
multi-theoretical approach. 
Finally, the conclusion also includes sections for the implications and limitations of 
this research. The implications section stresses on the importance of this research in 
the real world. This includes how managers or independent directors should perceive 
antitakeover provisions based on the new grouping method. Following the 
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implication section, a limitations section is included. Limitations do not undermine 
the importance of this research, however, they stress the need for more work to be 
done in the area of corporate governance.  
8.2 Theoretical Framework 
Researchers use different theories to explain different aspects of corporate 
governance. These theories include: Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, researchers have 
not been able to find consistent relationships for corporate governance mechanisms 
using these theories.  
Due to the lack of consistent empirical results, this research proposes a multi-
theoretical framework where the agency and stewardship theories act as substitutes 
based on the level of external governance and shareholder rights. For example, if a 
firm is already enjoying a high level of governance, increasing board independence 
adds unnecessary monitoring to the board of directs. In other words, the asymmetry 
cost associated with independent directors exceeds the benefit from having more 
independent directors to monitor managers. Moreover, CEOs serving as chairmen of 
the board will provide such firms with a sense of unity that improves the decision 
making process. On the other hand, for firms with low levels of governance, 
managers have lots of room for opportunistic behavior. Therefore the benefit from 
having more independent directors monitoring managers exceeds the asymmetry cost 
associated with them. In addition, CEOs serving as chairmen of the board in such 
firms provides managers with excessive power due to the absence of monitoring and 
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disciplinary mechanisms. This leads to further CEO entrenchment and a detrimental 
effect on firm performance. 
8.3 Results and Findings 
Empirical evidence from the first model provides surprising results regarding the 
determinants of the E-Index. Contrary to agency theory suggestions, independent 
directors seem to favour the adoption of the E-index provisions while CEOs acting 
as chairmen of the board are against the adoption of such provisions. However, upon 
splitting the provisions into Category A and Category B, and studying the 
determinants of individual provisions, the results become more consistent with 
expectations. CEOs acting as chairmen of the board support the adoption of all 
Category A provisions and oppose the adoption of all Category B provisions. This 
indicates that the results for the determinants of the E-Index could be misinterpreted 
and, therefore, highlights the importance of splitting takeover defences based on 
CEO’s monetary benefits.  Further tests also show a trade-off between the adoption 
of Category A and Category B provisions. In other words, the number of Category A 
provisions adopted increases as the number of Category B provisions adopted 
decreases.  This explains the CEO’s behaviour of opposing Category B provisions in 
order to adopt provisions that provide them with personal benefits (Category A). 
Moreover, in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship between Category A 
provisions and firm value worsens significantly. On the other hand, the relationship 
between Category B provisions and firm value is unaffected by the presence of CEO 
duality. This indicates that CEOs acting as chairmen of the board feel demotivated in 
the presence of Category A provisions, which leads to a further deterioration in firm 
value. Other findings show that independent directors generally oppose the adoption 
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of Category A provisions and favour the adoption of Category B provisions. This 
indicates that Category B provisions could be more beneficial to shareholders than 
Category A provisions and, therefore, are supported by independent directors. 
Findings also indicate that the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance depends on the levels of governance and shareholder rights. In 
companies with high (low) levels of governance and shareholder rights, CEO duality 
has a positive (negative) effect on firm performance. This finding is in contrast with 
arguments that strictly support or oppose the presence of CEO duality. In other 
words, providing the manager with higher levels of control and authority as a means 
to boost his/her motivation and efficiency enhances firm performances in firms with 
high shareholder rights. Otherwise, when shareholder rights are low, a duality role 
seems to induce managers to consume more private benefits and, thus, reduces firm 
value.  
The results for the determinants of takeover defences provide partial support for both 
agency and stewardship theories. Thus, this study proposes that one theory on its 
own cannot explain the complex aspects of corporate governance. Studying the 
determinants of antitakeover provisions without accounting for their monetary 
implications for CEOs may be misleading. In other words, there is a need to account 
for the relation between antitakeover provisions and CEO’s/ monetary benefits when 
investigating the determinants of these provisions. This indicates that studies 
addressing the impact of antitakeover provisions on corporate governance could 
come to different conclusions depending on the type of provision under study. 
Building on the results from the first model, the results of the second model of this 
research suggest that the monitoring role of independent directors and the 
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disciplinary role of the market for corporate control act as substitutes. When the 
market for corporate control is weak due to the presence of takeover defences, 
increasing board independence has a positive effect on firm value. On the other 
hand, in the absence of takeover defences, increasing the percentage of independent 
directors has an adverse effect on firm value. In such a case, firms are already 
benefitting from the disciplinary function of the market for corporate control, and 
thus do not need additional monitoring by independent directors.  
Further tests reveal that the results for interacting Category A provisions with board 
independence are consistent with the results of the E-Index. On the other hand, the 
interaction between Category B provisions and board independence has no 
significant impact on firm value. These results provide additional support for the 
grouping method of antitakeover provisions based on CEO and independent 
directors’ preferences. Independent directors perceive that Category A provisions 
lead to a higher level of entrenchment and a weaker governance structure than 
Category B provisions. Therefore, increasing board independence is beneficial in the 
presence of Category A provisions, and does not have any impact in the presence of 
Category B provisions. 
Other findings indicate that the presence of antitakeover provisions increases the 
negative entrenchment effect of high levels of CEO ownership on firm performance. 
The results are consistent for all three indices of provisions (Category A, Category B 
and E-Index). This indicates that, in the presence of takeover defenses, the 
entrenchment hypothesis of CEO ownership prevails over the interest alignment 
hypothesis. 
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8.4 Implications and Suggestions 
The results of this research have particular importance for firms, managers and 
directors. Previous researchers provide two different hypotheses for adopting 
antitakeover provisions. Supporters of the entrenchment hypothesis claim that 
managers adopt takeover mechanisms in order to protect their positions in the 
company regardless of the effect on firm value. On the other hand, supporters of the 
bargaining power hypothesis suggest that managers adopt takeover defences in order 
to bargain for a higher bid premium when facing a takeover. Therefore, the 
bargaining power hypothesis assumes that takeover defences are in the shareholders’ 
best interest. 
The new grouping method developed in this research could help differentiate 
between the provisions that provide support for the entrenchment hypothesis and the 
provisions that provide support for the bargaining power hypothesis. Since Category 
A provision provide managers with a monetary benefit and are supported by CEOs 
with a role duality, Category A provisions provide more support for the 
entrenchment hypothesis. On the other hand, Category B provisions do not provide 
managers with any private benefits and are opposed by CEOs with a role duality. 
Additional evidence for this suggestion is provided in this research showing that 
Category A provisions worsen the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
firm performance more than Category B provisions. Therefore, firms could be better 
off adopting Category B provisions in order to provide themselves with a higher 
bargaining power.  
The results of the second model also have important consequences for the decision 
making process of firms. Instead of having reforms that support increasing the 
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percentage of independent directors or removing CEO duality, managers should look 
on the overall governance of their firm before taking such decisions. As mentioned 
previously, firms with a high level of governance benefit from having CEO duality 
and increasing the number of insider directors while firms with low levels of 
governance benefit from removing CEO duality and increasing the number of 
independent directors. Accordingly, this research assumes that corporate governance 
is not a one-hat-fits-all. Firms should study their overall governance before taking 
decisions on which corporate governance mechanisms to adopt. 
8.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Although this research attempts to provide comprehensive work regarding the 
determinants and effects of antitakeover provisions, more work can still be done on 
this topic. The new grouping process of antitakeover provisions suggested in this 
study opens a wide variety of topics for future researches. The six provisions of the 
E-index are found to be the most significant antitakeover provisions. However, there 
are several other provisions adopted by firms in the market. Future studies could 
address the determinants of other antitakeover provisions according to this study’s 
grouping process to provide further support for the grouping process. 
While this research stresses on the importance of the US market in the evolution of 
antitakeover provisions, it does not address the determinants and/or effects of 
antitakeover provisions in other markets. It is interesting for future researchers to test 
if takeover defenses are treated the same way in other important or emerging 
markets. 
Researchers could also address how the two categories of provisions interact with 
other governance in affecting firm performance. Furthermore, due to the mixed 
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evidence in the literature on takeover defences, studies can empirically test whether 
one category of provisions serves the interest alignment hypotheses while the other 
category serves the entrenchment hypothesis. For example, studies can investigate 
the effect of both categories of provisions on long term investments. This would test 
whether managers adopt takeover defences to freely engage in research and 
development activities or to entrench themselves in their position. In addition, since 
the grouping process is based on CEO preferences and monetary benefits, studies 
may investigate the effect of both categories of provisions on CEO compensation 
plans. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This research attempts to provide a comprehensive study of antitakeover provisions 
in a new and dynamic manner. The importance of this research is highlighted in its 
ability to provide a new grouping method for categorizing antitakeover provisions. 
This method in its turn is used to explain the mixed evidence found in previous 
literature for the relationship between different governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. This is done by creating interaction variables between the different 
categories of provisions and governance mechanisms. Such interaction variables 
offer a deeper understanding of the governance mechanisms-firm performance 
relationship in the presence/absence of takeover defenses. 
This chapter also delivers important suggestions for firms, managers and directors. 
Instead of having a one-hat-fits-all mentality in setting a firm’s governance structure, 
this study supports the ideology of setting the governance structure on a case by case 
basis. Empirical evidence provide support for this argument by indicating that CEO 
duality could be beneficial (detrimental) to firms with a high (low) level of 
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governance. Moreover, other results show that increasing the percentage of 
independent directors leads to a positive (negative) effect on firm performance in 
firm’s with low (high) levels of shareholder rights. This is explained by the notion 
that managers of firms with low shareholder rights have more room to extract private 
benefits. Therefore, more strict monitoring by independent directors can discipline 
the opportunistic managerial behaviour. On the other hand, any extra monitoring for 
firms that are already enjoying a high level of governance and shareholder rights is 
considered as extra monitoring that only provides more cost for its firm. Instead, 
such firms would benefit more from the expertise of insider directors since managers 
do not have room to extract private benefits. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
 Variable Definition 
Advertising 
Expenditure 
The annual dollar amount spent by the company on advertising. 
Board Size The total number of directors serving on a company’s board 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
The annual dollar amount spent by a company to acquire or upgrade its tangible assets 
Category A 
Provisions 
Categorical variable ranging from 0 to 3. It includes the provisions that provide, or help in 
providing, a monetary compensation to a CEO in case a takeover occurs. 
Category B 
Provisions 
Categorical variable ranging from 0 to 3. It includes the provisions that simply make a 
takeover process harder without providing manager with any monetary compensation in the 
case of a takeover. 
 
CEO Age The age of a firm’s CEO 
CEO Ownership The percentage of stocks owned by a CEO excluding stock options 
Dualityt-1 A dummy variable equal to 0 if two independent people serve as the CEO and COB and 1 
otherwise 
 
E-Index Categorical variable ranging from 0 to 6. The presence of each of the six antitakeover 
provisions adds a value of 1 to the E-Index 
 
Firm Size The value of a firm’s Total Assets 
Independent 
Directors 
The percentage of independent directors serving on a company’s board. This study uses the 
definition of independent directors as provided by the RiskMetrics. Consistent with the 
NASDAQ listing rule 5605 (2), independent directors are those who are independent of top 
management, are not ex-employees, and do not have any business relationship with the 
company. 
 
Leverage The ratio of a firm’s Debt to Total Assets. 
Liquidity The ratio of a firm’s cash to Total Assets 
R&D Exp. The annual dollar amount spent by a company on research in order to create future 
opportunities for investments or invention of new products. 
ROAt-1 Return on Assets at time t-1. 
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Provisions Definitions 
 Variable Definition 
 
Golden 
Parachutes 
Golden parachutes are compensations paid to senior managers in 
case they resign, or they are fired from their position, after a 
successful takeover. They suggest that golden parachutes take away 
the right of shareholders to replace the management team without 
experiencing heavy costs.  
 
Poison Pills Poison pills give stockholders of the acquired firm, different from 
the bidder, the right to buy stocks in one of the two merged 
companies at a great discount price.  
 
Staggered 
Boards 
 
A staggered board is a board in which its members are split into 
different and overlapping classes for re-election (usually 3 classes). 
This separation makes it impossible for the bidder to replace a 
majority of the board members in one single year, even if the 
bidder has support from the majority of shareholders. Therefore, in 
order for a bidding firm to gain full control of the board, they have 
to wait for several years (at least 2 election periods). 
 
Supermajority 
Requirement to 
Approve a 
Merger 
A supermajority requirement for mergers is a provision that 
necessitates a percentage of voting that is higher than that of the 
state law in order to approve a merger (common used percentages 
are 66.7, 75, or 85 percent).  
 
Limitations on 
Bylaw and 
Charter 
Amendments 
These provisions limit the ability of shareholders to make changes 
in the documents that govern the corporation. The limitations can 
range from requiring a supermajority of shareholders to vote in 
order to approve bylaws and charter amendments to eliminating the 
shareholders’ capacity to make changes in the bylaws and charter 
or even give the directors the right to make amendments to the 
charter and bylaws without having the shareholders’ consent. 
 
 
 
